filepath-securejoin v0.3 gave us a much safer re-open primitive, we
should use it to avoid any theoretical attacks. Rather than using it
direcly, add a small pathrs wrapper to make libpathrs migrations in the
future easier...
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Prior to kernel Linux 5.5, F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE has a bug which maps
memory as shared between processes even if it is set as private. See
kernel commit 05d351102dbe ("mm, memfd: fix COW issue on MAP_PRIVATE and
F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE mappings") for more details.
According to the fcntl(2) man pages, F_SEAL_WRITE is enough:
> Furthermore, trying to create new shared, writable memory-mappings via
> mmap(2) will also fail with EPERM.
>
> Using the F_ADD_SEALS operation to set the F_SEAL_WRITE seal fails
> with EBUSY if any writable, shared mapping exists. Such mappings must
> be unmapped before you can add this seal.
F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE only makes sense if a read-write shared mapping in
one process should be read-only in another process. This is not case for
runc, especially not for the /proc/self/exe we are protecting.
Signed-off-by: Tomasz Duda <tomaszduda23@gmail.com>
(cyphar: improve the comment regarding F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE)
(cyphar: improve commit message)
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
(cherry picked from commit c43ea7d629)
Signed-off-by: Kir Kolyshkin <kolyshkin@gmail.com>
Commit b999376fb2 ("nsenter: cloned_binary: remove bindfd logic
entirely") removed the read-only bind-mount logic from our cloned binary
code because it wasn't really safe because a container with
CAP_SYS_ADMIN could remove the MS_RDONLY bit and get write access to
/proc/self/exe (even with user namespaces this could've been an issue
because it's not clear if the flags are locked).
However, copying a binary does seem to have a minor performance impact.
The only way to have no performance impact would be for the kernel to
block these write attempts, but barring that we could try to reduce the
overhead by coming up with a mount that cannot have it's read-only bits
cleared.
The "simplest" solution is to create a temporary overlayfs using
fsopen(2) which uses the directory where runc exists as a lowerdir,
ensuring that the container cannot access the underlying file -- and we
don't have to do any copies.
While fsopen(2) is not free because mount namespace cloning is usually
expensive (and so it seems like the difference would be marginal), some
basic performance testing seems to indicate there is a ~60% improvement
doing it this way and that it has effectively no overhead even when
compared to just using /proc/self/exe directly:
% hyperfine --warmup 50 \
> "./runc-noclone run -b bundle ctr" \
> "./runc-overlayfs run -b bundle ctr" \
> "./runc-memfd run -b bundle ctr"
Benchmark 1: ./runc-noclone run -b bundle ctr
Time (mean ± σ): 13.7 ms ± 0.9 ms [User: 6.0 ms, System: 10.9 ms]
Range (min … max): 11.3 ms … 16.1 ms 184 runs
Benchmark 2: ./runc-overlayfs run -b bundle ctr
Time (mean ± σ): 13.9 ms ± 0.9 ms [User: 6.2 ms, System: 10.8 ms]
Range (min … max): 11.8 ms … 16.0 ms 180 runs
Benchmark 3: ./runc-memfd run -b bundle ctr
Time (mean ± σ): 22.6 ms ± 1.3 ms [User: 5.7 ms, System: 20.7 ms]
Range (min … max): 19.9 ms … 26.5 ms 114 runs
Summary
./runc-noclone run -b bundle ctr ran
1.01 ± 0.09 times faster than ./runc-overlayfs run -b bundle ctr
1.65 ± 0.15 times faster than ./runc-memfd run -b bundle ctr
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
While we did set +x when "sealing" regular temporary files, the "is
executable" checks were done before then and would thus fail, causing
the fallback to not work properly.
So just set +x after we create the file. We already have a O_RDWR handle
open when we do the chmod so we won't get permission issues when writing
to the file.
Fixes: e089db3b4a ("dmz: add fallbacks to handle noexec for O_TMPFILE and mktemp()")
Signed-off-by: lifubang <lifubang@acmcoder.com>
Previously, if /var/run was mounted noexec, our cloned binary logic
would not work if memfd_create(2) was not available because we would try
to exec a binary that is on a noexec filesystem.
We cannot guarantee there will be an executable filesystem on the system
(other than mounting one ourselves, which would cause a bunch of other
headaches) but we can at least try the obvious options (/tmp, /bin, and
/). If none of these work, we will have to fail.
Reported-by: lifubang <lifubang@acmcoder.com>
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
This allow us to remove the amount of C code in runc quite
substantially, as well as removing a whole execve(2) from the nsexec
path because we no longer spawn "runc init" only to re-exec "runc init"
after doing the clone.
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Aleksa Sarai