The main update is actually in github.com/opencontainers/cgroups, but we
need to also update runtime-spec to a newer pre-release version to get
the updates from there as well.
In short, the behaviour change is now that "0" is treated as a valid
value to set in "pids.max", "-1" means "max" and unset/nil means "do
nothing". As described in the opencontainers/cgroups PR, this change is
actually backwards compatible because our internal state.json stores
PidsLimit, and that entry is marked as "omitempty". So, an old runc
would omit PidsLimit=0 in state.json, and this will be parsed by a new
runc as being "nil" -- and both would treat this case as "do not set
anything".
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
(cherry picked from commit 3b75374cc7)
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
This was always the intended behaviour but commit 72fbb34f50 ("rootfs:
switch to fd-based handling of mountpoint targets") regressed it when
adding a mechanism to create a file handle to the target if it didn't
already exist (causing the later stat to always succeed).
A lot of people depend on this functionality, so add some tests to make
sure we don't break it in the future.
Fixes: 72fbb34f50 ("rootfs: switch to fd-based handling of mountpoint targets")
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
(cherry picked from commit 9a9719eeb4)
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
On MIPS arches, Rdev is uint32 so we have to convert it.
Fixes issue 4962.
Fixes: 8476df83 ("libct: add/use isDevNull, verifyDevNull")
Fixes: de87203e ("console: verify /dev/pts/ptmx before use")
Fixes: 398955bc ("console: add fallback for pre-TIOCGPTPEER kernels")
Reported-by: Tianon Gravi <admwiggin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kir Kolyshkin <kolyshkin@gmail.com>
(cherry picked from commit 1b954f1f06)
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Aleksa Sarai (22):
rootfs: re-allow dangling symlinks in mount targets
openat2: improve resilience on busy systems
selinux: use safe procfs API for labels
rootfs: switch to fd-based handling of mountpoint targets
libct/system: use securejoin for /proc/$pid/stat
init: use securejoin for /proc/self/setgroups
init: write sysctls using safe procfs API
utils: remove unneeded EnsureProcHandle
utils: use safe procfs for /proc/self/fd loop code
apparmor: use safe procfs API for labels
ci: add lint to forbid the usage of os.Create
rootfs: avoid using os.Create for new device inodes
internal: add wrappers for securejoin.Proc*
go.mod: update to github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin@v0.5.0
console: verify /dev/pts/ptmx before use
console: avoid trivial symlink attacks for /dev/console
console: add fallback for pre-TIOCGPTPEER kernels
console: use TIOCGPTPEER when allocating peer PTY
*: switch to safer securejoin.Reopen
internal: move utils.MkdirAllInRoot to internal/pathrs
internal/sys: add VerifyInode helper
internal: linux: add package doc-comment
Li Fubang (1):
libct: align param type for mountCgroupV1/V2 functions
Kir Kolyshkin (3):
libct: maskPaths: don't rely on ENOTDIR for mount
libct: maskPaths: only ignore ENOENT on mount dest
libct: add/use isDevNull, verifyDevNull
Fixes: CVE-2025-31133 GHSA-9493-h29p-rfm2
Fixes: CVE-2025-52565 GHSA-qw9x-cqr3-wc7r
Fixes: CVE-2025-52881 GHSA-cgrx-mc8f-2prm
Reported-by: Lei Wang <ssst0n3@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Li Fubang <lifubang@acmcoder.com>
Reported-by: Tõnis Tiigi <tonistiigi@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
It seems there are a fair few images where dangling symlinks are used as
path components for mount targets, which pathrs-lite does not support
(and it would be difficult to fully support this in a race-free way).
This was actually meant to be blocked by commit 63c2908164 ("rootfs:
try to scope MkdirAll to stay inside the rootfs"), followed by commit
dd827f7b71 ("utils: switch to securejoin.MkdirAllHandle"). However, we
still used SecureJoin to construct mountpoint targets, which means that
dangling symlinks were "resolved" before reaching pathrs-lite.
This patch basically re-adds this hack in order to reduce the breakages
we've seen so far.
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
An attacker could race with us during mount configuration in order to
trick us into mounting over an unexpected path. This would bypass
checkProcMount() and would allow for security profiles to be left
unapplied by mounting over /proc/self/attr/... (or even more serious
outcomes such as killing the entire system by tricking runc into writing
strings to /proc/sysrq-trigger).
This is a larger issue with our current mount infrastructure, and the
ideal solution would be to rewrite it all to be fd-based (which would
also allow us to support the "new" mount API, which also avoids a bunch
of other issues with mount(8)). However, such a rewrite is not really
workable as a security fix, so this patch is a bit of a compromise
approach to fix the issue while also moving us a bit towards that
eventual end-goal.
The core issue in CVE-2025-52881 is that we currently use the (insecure)
SecureJoin to re-resolve mountpoint target paths multiple times during
mounting. Rather than generating a string from createMountpoint(), we
instead open an *os.File handle to the target mountpoint directly and
then operate on that handle. This will make it easier to remove
utils.WithProcfd() and rework mountViaFds() in the future.
The only real issue we need to work around is that we need to re-open
the mount target after doing the mount in order to get a handle to the
mountpoint -- pathrs.Reopen() doesn't work in this case (it just
re-opens the inode under the mountpoint) so we need to do a naive
re-open using the full path. Note that if we used move_mount(2) this
wouldn't be a problem because we would have a handle to the mountpoint
itself.
Note that this is still somewhat of a temporary solution -- ideally
mountViaFds would use *os.File directly to let us avoid some other
issues with using bare /proc/... paths, as well as also letting us more
easily use the new mount API on modern kernels.
Fixes: GHSA-cgrx-mc8f-2prm CVE-2025-52881
Co-developed-by: lifubang <lifubang@acmcoder.com>
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
sysctls could in principle also be used as a write gadget for arbitrary
procfs files. As this requires getting a non-subset=pid /proc handle we
amortise this by only allocating a single procfs handle for all sysctl
writes.
Fixes: GHSA-cgrx-mc8f-2prm CVE-2025-52881
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
All of the callers of EnsureProcHandle now use filepath-securejoin's
ProcThreadSelf to get a file handle, which has much stricter
verification to avoid procfs attacks than EnsureProcHandle's very
simplistic filesystem type check.
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
From a safety perspective this might not be strictly required, but it
paves the way for us to remove utils.ProcThreadSelf.
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
EnsureProcHandle only protects us against a tmpfs mount, but the risk of
a procfs path being used (such as /proc/self/sched) has been known for a
while. Now that filepath-securejoin has a reasonably safe procfs API,
switch to it.
Fixes: GHSA-cgrx-mc8f-2prm CVE-2025-52881
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
os.Create is shorthand for open(O_CREAT|O_TRUNC) *without* O_EXCL, which
is incredibly unsafe for us to do when interacting with a container
rootfs (especially before pivot_root) as an attacker could swap the
target path with a symlink that points to the host filesystem, causing
us to delete the contents of or create host files.
We did have a similar bug in CVE-2024-45310, but in that case we
(luckily) didn't have O_TRUNC set which avoided the worst possible case.
However, os.Create does set O_TRUNC and we were using it in scenarios
that may have been exploitable.
Because of how easy it us for us to accidentally introduce this kind of
bug, we should simply not allow the usage of os.Create in our entire
codebase.
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
If an attacker were to make the target of a device inode creation be a
symlink to some host path, os.Create would happily truncate the target
which could lead to all sorts of issues. This exploit is probably not as
exploitable because device inodes are usually only bind-mounted for
rootless containers, which cannot overwrite important host files (though
user files would still be up for grabs).
The regular inode creation logic could also theoretically be tricked
into changing the access mode and ownership of host files if the
newly-created device inode was swapped with a symlink to a host path.
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
This is primarily done out of an abudance of caution against runc exec
being attacked by a container where /dev/pts/ptmx has been replaced with
some other bad inode (a disconnected NFS handle, a symlink that goes
through a leaked runc file descriptor to reference a host ptmx, etc).
Unfortunately, we cannot trivially verify that /dev/pts/ptmx is actually
the /dev/pts from the container without storing stuff like the fsid in
the runc state.json, which is probably not worth the extra effort. This
should at least avoid the most concerning cases.
Reported-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
An attacker could make /dev/console a symlink. This presents two
possible issues:
1. os.Create will happily truncate targets, which could have resulted
in a worse version of CVE-2024-4531. Luckily, this all happens after
pivot_root(2) so the scope of that particular attack is fairly
limited (you are unlikely to be able to easily access host rootfs
files -- though it might be possible to take advantage of leaks such
as in CVE-2024-21626). However, O_CREAT|O_NOFOLLOW is what we should
be doing for all file creations.
2. Because we passed /dev/console as the only mount path (as opposed to
using a /proc/self/fd/$n path), an attacker could swap the symlink
to point to any other path and thus cause us to mount over some
other path. This is not as big of a problem because all the mounts
are in the container namespace after pivot_root(2), and users
usually can create arbitrary mount targets inside the container.
These issues don't seem particularly exploitable, but they deserve to be
hardened regardless.
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
The pty driver has very consistent allocation rules for the major:minor
numbers of /dev/pts/$n inodes, so it is possible to somewhat safely open
/dev/pts/* paths if we validate that the inode is the one we expect.
It is possible for an attacker to have over-mounted a pts peer from a
different devpts instance, but to fix this would require more tracking
of devpts instances than runc currently can do.
This means runc should continue to work on very old kernels.
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
When opening the peer end of a pty, the old kernel API required us to
open /dev/pts/$num inside the container (at least since we fixed console
handling many years ago in commit 244c9fc426 ("*: console rewrite")).
The problem is that in a hostile container it is possible for
/dev/pts/$num to be an attacker-controlled symlink that runc can be
tricked into resolving when doing bind-mounts. This allows the attacker
to (among other things) persist /proc/... entries that are later masked
by runc, allowing an attacker to escape through the kernel.core_pattern
sysctl (/proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern). This is the original issue
reported by Lei Wang and Li Fu Bang in CVE-2025-52565.
However, it should be noted that this is not entirely a newly-discovered
problem. Way back in Linux 4.13 (2017), I added the TIOCGPTPEER ioctl,
which allows us to get a pty peer without touching the /dev/pts inside
the container. The original threat model was around an attacker
replacing /dev/pts/$n or /dev/pts/ptmx with some malicious inode (a DoS
inode, or possibly a PTY they wanted a confused deputy to operate on).
Unfortunately, there was no practical way for runc to cache a safe
O_PATH handle to /dev/pts/ptmx (unlike other runtimes like LXC, which
switched to TIOCGPTPEER way back in 2017). Since it wasn't clear how we
could protect against the main attack TIOCGPTPEER was meant to protect
against, we never switched to it (even though I implemented it
specifically to harden container runtimes).
Unfortunately, It turns out that mount *sources* are a threat we didn't
fully consider. Since TIOCGPTPEER already solves this problem entirely
for us in a race free way, we should just use that. In a later patch, we
will add some hardening for /dev/pts/$num opening to maintain support
for very old kernels (Linux 4.13 is very old at this point, but RHEL 7
is still kicking and is stuck on Linux 3.10).
Fixes: GHSA-qw9x-cqr3-wc7r CVE-2025-52565
Reported-by: Lei Wang <ssst0n3@gmail.com> (CVE-2025-52565)
Reported-by: lfbzhm <lifubang@acmcoder.com> (CVE-2025-52565)
Reported-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com> (TIOCGPTPEER)
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Currently, we rely on mount returning ENOTDIR when the destination is a
directory (and so mount tells us that the source is not), and fall back
to read-only tmpfs bind mount for such cases.
Theoretically, ENOTDIR can also be returned in some other cases,
resulting in the wrong type of mount being used.
Let's be more straightforward here -- call fstat on destination file
descriptor, and use the proper mount depending on whether it is a
directory.
Reported-by: Rodrigo Campos <rodrigoca@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Kir Kolyshkin <kolyshkin@gmail.com>
When mounting a path being masked, the /dev/null might disappear from
under us, and mount (even on an opened /dev/null file descriptor) will
return ENOENT, which we deliberately ignore, as there's no need to mask
non-existent paths.
Let's open the destination path and ignore ENOENT during open, then
mount via the destination file descriptor, not ignoring ENOENT.
Reported-by: lifubang <lifubang@acmcoder.com>
Signed-off-by: Kir Kolyshkin <kolyshkin@gmail.com>
The /dev/null in a container should not be trusted, because when /dev
is a bind mount, /dev/null is not created by runc itself.
1. Add isDevNull which checks the fd minor/major and device type,
and verifyDevNull which does the stat and the check.
2. Rewrite maskPath to open and check /dev/null, and use its fd to
perform mounts. Move the loop over the MaskPaths into the function,
and rename it to maskPaths.
3. reOpenDevNull: use verifyDevNull and isDevNull.
4. fixStdioPermissions: use isDevNull instead of stat.
Fixes: GHSA-9493-h29p-rfm2 CVE-2025-31133
Co-authored-by: Rodrigo Campos <rodrigoca@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Kir Kolyshkin <kolyshkin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
filepath-securejoin v0.3 gave us a much safer re-open primitive, we
should use it to avoid any theoretical attacks. Rather than using it
direcly, add a small pathrs wrapper to make libpathrs migrations in the
future easier...
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
We will have more wrappers around filepath-securejoin, and so move them
to their own specific package so that we can eventually use libpathrs
fairly cleanly (by swapping out the implementation).
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Since gofumpt v0.9.0 there's a new formatting rule to "clothe" any naked
returns.
Signed-off-by: Kir Kolyshkin <kolyshkin@gmail.com>
(cherry picked from commit b2f8a74de5)
Signed-off-by: lifubang <lifubang@acmcoder.com>
Factor startWithCgroupFD out of start to reduce the start complexity.
This also implements a more future-proof way of calling p.comm.closeChild.
Co-authored-by: lifubang <lifubang@acmcoder.com>
Signed-off-by: Kir Kolyshkin <kolyshkin@gmail.com>
(cherry picked from commit 871052b791)
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
The (*setns).start is supposed to close child fds once the child has
started, or upon an error. Commit 5af4dd4e6 added a bug -- child fds
are not closed if prepareCgroupFD fails.
Fix by adding a missing call to closeChild.
I'm not sure how to write a good test case for it. Found when working
on PR 4928 (and tested in there).
Fixes: 5af4dd4e6
Signed-off-by: Kir Kolyshkin <kolyshkin@gmail.com>
(cherry picked from commit 4e262509b8)
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Now that we've updated to golang.org/x/sys@v0.37.0, CPUSet has a Fill
helper that does the equivalent to our underflow trick to make setting
all CPUs efficient.
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
(cherry picked from commit 93f9a392cf)
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
The linux.intelRdt.enableMonitoring field enables the creation of
a per-container monitoring group. The monitoring group is removed when
the container is destroyed.
Signed-off-by: Markus Lehtonen <markus.lehtonen@intel.com>
(cherry picked from commit 7aa4e1a63d)
The main benefit here is when we are using a systemd cgroup driver,
we actually ask systemd to add a PID, rather than doing it ourselves.
This way, we can add rootless exec PID to a cgroup.
This requires newer opencontainers/cgroups and coreos/go-systemd.
Signed-off-by: Kir Kolyshkin <kolyshkin@gmail.com>
(cherry picked from commit 37b5acc2d7)
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Remove cgroupPaths field from struct setnsProcess, because:
- we can get base cgroup paths from p.manager.GetPaths();
- we can get sub-cgroup paths from p.process.SubCgroupPaths.
But mostly because we are going to need separate cgroup paths when
adopting cgroups.AddPid.
Signed-off-by: Kir Kolyshkin <kolyshkin@gmail.com>
(cherry picked from commit 5730a141f1)
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
The main idea is to maintain the code separately (and eventually kill V1
implementation).
Signed-off-by: Kir Kolyshkin <kolyshkin@gmail.com>
(cherry picked from commit 5560020cbb)
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Implement support for the linux.intelRdt.schemata field of the spec.
This allows management of the "schemata" file in the resctrl group in a
generic way.
Signed-off-by: Markus Lehtonen <markus.lehtonen@intel.com>
(cherry picked from commit 41553216ee)
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
This package was marked deprecated in commit 9b60a93cf3
("libcontainer/userns: migrate to github.com/moby/sys/userns"), which
was included in runc 1.2. Users have thus had a year to migrate to
github.com/moby/sys/userns and it's okay for us to remove this wrapper
package.
(Cherry-pick of commit e4f99b5c95b8f49434452edff82e73547c7a8252.)
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Set the process personality early to ensure it takes effect before
seccomp is initialized. If seccomp filters are applied first and they
block personality-related system calls (e.g., `personality(2)`),
subsequent attempts to set the personality will fail.
Signed-off-by: lifubang <lifubang@acmcoder.com>
(cherry picked from commit f7dda6e6dc)
Signed-off-by: lifubang <lifubang@acmcoder.com>
These sysctls are all per-userns (termed `ucounts` in the kernel code) are
settable with CAP_SYS_RESOURCE in the user namespace.
Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.pizza>
(cherry picked from commit 70d88bc449)
libcontainer/user was marked as deprecated in d9ea71bf96 ("deprecate
libcontainer/user") and users have had plenty of time to migrate to
github.com/moby/sys/user.
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Aleksa Sarai