Given that the majority of reviewers favor the 'nr_inodes=2' retry logic,
we propose reverting #5353 and implementing the new approach.
1. Revert "libct: add a fallback for nr_inodes=2"
This reverts commit 79ac57770f.
2. Revert "libct: Enforce nr_inodes=2 to fix Focal mount errors"
This reverts commit feea25820e.
3. The new approach:
On most kernels `nr_inodes=1` works fine. However, Ubuntu 20.04 (Focal) with
the official 5.4 kernel carries a private patch in "mm/shmem.c" that rejects
`nr_inodes<2`, so retry with `nr_inodes=2` here.
For reference, search for "case Opt_nr_inodes" in:
https://git.launchpad.net/~ubuntu-kernel/ubuntu/+source/linux/+git/focal/plain/mm/shmem.c?h=Ubuntu-5.4.0-216.236
Signed-off-by: lifubang <lifubang@acmcoder.com>
(cherry picked from commit a5690a084d)
Signed-off-by: lifubang <lifubang@acmcoder.com>
We don't know whether some kernels will fail with "nr_inodes=2",
so let's fall back to mount a tmpfs without "nr_inodes".
Signed-off-by: lifubang <lifubang@acmcoder.com>
(cherry picked from commit 79ac57770f)
Signed-off-by: lifubang <lifubang@aliyun.com>
On most kernels `nr_inodes=1` works fine. However, Ubuntu 20.04 (Focal) with
the official 5.4 kernel carries a private patch in mm/shmem.c that rejects
"nr_inodes<2", so let's keep `nr_inodes=2` here!
Signed-off-by: lifubang <lifubang@acmcoder.com>
(cherry picked from commit feea25820e)
Signed-off-by: lifubang <lifubang@aliyun.com>
As with /dev symlinks, this was missed in commit d40b3439a9 ("rootfs:
switch to fd-based handling of mountpoint targets"). It's not really
clear to what extent this was exploitable (/sys/fs/cgroup is a tmpfs we
create) but it's better to just fix this anyway.
Fixes: d40b3439a9 ("rootfs: switch to fd-based handling of mountpoint targets")
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <aleksa@amutable.com>
(cherry picked from commit 66acd48f9d)
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <aleksa@amutable.com>
These codepaths are very old and operate on pure paths but before
pivot_root(2), meaning that a bad image with a malicious /dev symlink
could cause us to operate on host paths instead.
In practice this means that we could be tricked into removing a file
called "ptmx" (note that /dev/pts/ptmx and /dev/ptmx are both immune for
different reasons) or creating a very restricted set of symlinks (with
fixed targets and names). The scope of these bugs is thus quite limited,
but we definitely need to harden against it.
These codepaths were unfortunately missed during the fd-based rework in
commit d40b3439a9 ("rootfs: switch to fd-based handling of mountpoint
targets") -- I must've assumed they were called after pivot_root(2)...
Fixes: GHSA-xjvp-4fhw-gc47
Fixes: CVE-2026-41579
Fixes: d40b3439a9 ("rootfs: switch to fd-based handling of mountpoint targets")
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <aleksa@amutable.com>
(cherry picked from commit 864db8042d)
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <aleksa@amutable.com>
This argument order matches most other helpers we have and will also
match the changes we are about to make to setupPtmx and
setupDevSymlinks.
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <aleksa@amutable.com>
(cherry picked from commit fcf04eb41b)
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <aleksa@amutable.com>
Close the root file descriptor immediately after use in maskPaths to
reduce the window during which an attacker could potentially exploit
an open fd to access or manipulate the root filesystem. This follows
the principle of least privilege and mitigates risks in compromised
or malicious container scenarios.
Co-authored-by: Kir Kolyshkin <kolyshkin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: lifubang <lifubang@acmcoder.com>
(cherry picked from commit b88635e57e)
Signed-off-by: lifubang <lifubang@acmcoder.com>
This is a follow-up to #5275. That change reused a single tmpfs mount
to mask multiple directories, which is efficient when masking more than
one path. However, it introduced unnecessary overhead when only one
directory is masked. This commit restores the original behavior for the
single-path case while preserving shared tmpfs logic for multiple paths.
Signed-off-by: lifubang <lifubang@acmcoder.com>
(cherry picked from commit e7e2f00248)
Signed-off-by: lifubang <lifubang@acmcoder.com>
Kubernetes may add one sysfs thermal_throttle entry per CPU to
maskedPaths. On large Intel systems this can produce many directory
masks for a single container. runc currently handles each directory
mask with a separate read-only tmpfs mount, and therefore a separate
tmpfs superblock.
On Linux 4.18/RHEL 8 kernels, creating and tearing down many tmpfs
superblocks can contend on the global shrinker_rwsem when containers
start or stop concurrently.
Use one read-only tmpfs for directory masks and bind-mount it over the
remaining directory targets. The first non-procfs-fd directory mount is
reopened through the container root fd before it is reused. File masks
still bind /dev/null, and procfs fd targets keep the existing
one-tmpfs-per-target behaviour because they are fd aliases rather than
stable rootfs paths.
If the bind-mount of the shared source fails (e.g. due to kernel
restrictions), fall back to individual tmpfs mounts for all remaining
directories. Tmpfs mounts use nr_blocks=1,nr_inodes=1 to minimise
kernel resource usage.
The bind mounts do not create additional tmpfs superblocks. They also
retain the read-only mount flag inherited from the source vfsmount, so
the masking semantics remain unchanged.
xref: kubernetes/kubernetes#138512
xref: kubernetes/kubernetes#138388
xref: kubernetes/kubernetes#131018
Co-authored-by: Davanum Srinivas <davanum@gmail.com>
Refactored-by: lifubang <lifubang@acmcoder.com>
Signed-off-by: lifubang <lifubang@acmcoder.com>
(cherry picked from commit c046c9b973)
Signed-off-by: lifubang <lifubang@acmcoder.com>
Previously, masked directories (e.g., /proc/acpi, /proc/scsi) were
mounted as read-only tmpfs without explicit size or inode limits.
Although these mounts are meant to be empty and unwritable, the lack
of resource constraints means that—should an attacker bypass the
read-only protection (e.g., via container escape, mount namespace
manipulation, or a kernel vulnerability)—the tmpfs could consume up
to 50% of system memory by default (the kernel's default tmpfs limit).
To mitigate this risk in high-density container environments and
adhere to the principle of least privilege, we now explicitly set:
- nr_blocks=1 (sufficient for at most one block size)
- nr_inodes=1 (sufficient for at most one inode)
Ref: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man5/tmpfs.5.html
These limits ensure that even if compromised, kernel memory usage
remains strictly bounded and negligible.
This change aligns with best practices used by other container
runtimes and strengthens defense-in-depth for sensitive masked paths.
Co-authored-by: Davanum Srinivas <davanum@gmail.com>
Refactored-by: lifubang <lifubang@acmcoder.com>
Signed-off-by: lifubang <lifubang@acmcoder.com>
(cherry picked from commit e57a7a4c8f)
Signed-off-by: lifubang <lifubang@acmcoder.com>
A lot of filesystem-related stuff happens inside the container root
directory, and we have used its name before. It makes sense to pre-open
it and use a *os.File handle instead.
Function names in internal/pathrs are kept as is for simplicity (and it
is an internal package), but they now accept root as *os.File.
Signed-off-by: Kir Kolyshkin <kolyshkin@gmail.com>
(cherry picked from commit 28cb321887)
Signed-off-by: Kir Kolyshkin <kolyshkin@gmail.com>
No change in functionality, just a preparation for the next patch.
Signed-off-by: Kir Kolyshkin <kolyshkin@gmail.com>
(cherry picked from commit 78b80677f6)
Signed-off-by: Kir Kolyshkin <kolyshkin@gmail.com>
Indeed, it does not make sense to prepend c.root once we started using
MkdirAllInRoot in commit 63c29081.
Signed-off-by: Kir Kolyshkin <kolyshkin@gmail.com>
(cherry picked from commit 60352524d3)
Signed-off-by: Kir Kolyshkin <kolyshkin@gmail.com>
This commit factors out setupAndMountToRootfs without changing any
logic. Use "Hide whitespace changes" during review to focus on the
actual changes.
The refactor ensures the mount source file descriptor is closed via
defer in each loop iteration, reducing the total number of open FDs
in runc. This helps avoid hitting the file descriptor limit under
high concurrency or when handling many mounts.
Signed-off-by: lifubang <lifubang@acmcoder.com>
(cherry picked from commit c77e71a3e7)
Signed-off-by: lifubang <lifubang@acmcoder.com>
There is no way to set Mount.Relabel field via OCI spec (config.json),
and so the relabeling code is never used.
My guess it's a leftover from times when runc used to be part of Docker.
Remove it, and mark Relabel field as deprecated.
Signed-off-by: Kir Kolyshkin <kolyshkin@gmail.com>
While CreateInRoot supports hallucinating the target path, we do not use
it directly when constructing device inode targets because we need to
have different handling for mknod and bind-mounts.
The solution is to simply have a more generic MkdirAllParentInRoot
helper that MkdirAll's the parent directory of the target path and then
allows the caller to create the trailing component however they like.
(This can be used by CreateInRoot internally as well!)
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
In order to maintain compatibility with previous releases of runc (which
permitted dangling symlinks as path components by permitting
non-existent path components to be treated like real directories) we
have to first do SecureJoin to construct a target path that is
compatible with the old behaviour but has all dangling symlinks (or
other invalid paths like ".." components after non-existent directories)
removed.
This is effectively a more generic verison of commit 3f925525b4
("rootfs: re-allow dangling symlinks in mount targets") and will let us
remove the need for open-coding SecureJoin workarounds.
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Now that MkdirAllInRoot has been removed, we can make MkdirAllInRootOpen
less wordy by renaming it to MkdirAllInRoot. This is a non-functional
change.
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
This probably should've been done as part of commit d40b3439a9
("rootfs: switch to fd-based handling of mountpoint targets") but it
seems I missed them when doing the rest of the conversions.
This also lets us remove utils.WithProcfd entirely, as well as
pathrs.MkdirAllInRoot. Unfortunately, WithProcfd was exposed in the
externally-importable "libcontainer/utils" package and so we need to
have a deprecation notice to remove it in runc 1.5.
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
These helpers will be needed for the compatibility code added in future
patches in this series, but because "internal/pathrs" is imported by
"libcontainer/utils" we need to move them so that we can avoid circular
dependencies.
Because the old functions were in a non-internal package it is possible
some downstreams use them, so add some wrappers but mark them as
deprecated.
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Commit b2f8a74d "clothed" the naked return as inflicted by gofumpt
v0.9.0. Since gofumpt v0.9.2 this rule was moved to "extra" category,
not enabled by default. The only other "extra" rule is to group adjacent
parameters with the same type, which also makes sense.
Enable gofumpt "extra" rules, and reformat the code accordingly.
Signed-off-by: Kir Kolyshkin <kolyshkin@gmail.com>
This was always the intended behaviour but commit 72fbb34f50 ("rootfs:
switch to fd-based handling of mountpoint targets") regressed it when
adding a mechanism to create a file handle to the target if it didn't
already exist (causing the later stat to always succeed).
A lot of people depend on this functionality, so add some tests to make
sure we don't break it in the future.
Fixes: 72fbb34f50 ("rootfs: switch to fd-based handling of mountpoint targets")
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
On MIPS arches, Rdev is uint32 so we have to convert it.
Fixes issue 4962.
Fixes: 8476df83 ("libct: add/use isDevNull, verifyDevNull")
Fixes: de87203e ("console: verify /dev/pts/ptmx before use")
Fixes: 398955bc ("console: add fallback for pre-TIOCGPTPEER kernels")
Reported-by: Tianon Gravi <admwiggin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kir Kolyshkin <kolyshkin@gmail.com>
It seems there are a fair few images where dangling symlinks are used as
path components for mount targets, which pathrs-lite does not support
(and it would be difficult to fully support this in a race-free way).
This was actually meant to be blocked by commit 63c2908164 ("rootfs:
try to scope MkdirAll to stay inside the rootfs"), followed by commit
dd827f7b71 ("utils: switch to securejoin.MkdirAllHandle"). However, we
still used SecureJoin to construct mountpoint targets, which means that
dangling symlinks were "resolved" before reaching pathrs-lite.
This patch basically re-adds this hack in order to reduce the breakages
we've seen so far.
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
An attacker could race with us during mount configuration in order to
trick us into mounting over an unexpected path. This would bypass
checkProcMount() and would allow for security profiles to be left
unapplied by mounting over /proc/self/attr/... (or even more serious
outcomes such as killing the entire system by tricking runc into writing
strings to /proc/sysrq-trigger).
This is a larger issue with our current mount infrastructure, and the
ideal solution would be to rewrite it all to be fd-based (which would
also allow us to support the "new" mount API, which also avoids a bunch
of other issues with mount(8)). However, such a rewrite is not really
workable as a security fix, so this patch is a bit of a compromise
approach to fix the issue while also moving us a bit towards that
eventual end-goal.
The core issue in CVE-2025-52881 is that we currently use the (insecure)
SecureJoin to re-resolve mountpoint target paths multiple times during
mounting. Rather than generating a string from createMountpoint(), we
instead open an *os.File handle to the target mountpoint directly and
then operate on that handle. This will make it easier to remove
utils.WithProcfd() and rework mountViaFds() in the future.
The only real issue we need to work around is that we need to re-open
the mount target after doing the mount in order to get a handle to the
mountpoint -- pathrs.Reopen() doesn't work in this case (it just
re-opens the inode under the mountpoint) so we need to do a naive
re-open using the full path. Note that if we used move_mount(2) this
wouldn't be a problem because we would have a handle to the mountpoint
itself.
Note that this is still somewhat of a temporary solution -- ideally
mountViaFds would use *os.File directly to let us avoid some other
issues with using bare /proc/... paths, as well as also letting us more
easily use the new mount API on modern kernels.
Fixes: GHSA-cgrx-mc8f-2prm CVE-2025-52881
Co-developed-by: lifubang <lifubang@acmcoder.com>
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
sysctls could in principle also be used as a write gadget for arbitrary
procfs files. As this requires getting a non-subset=pid /proc handle we
amortise this by only allocating a single procfs handle for all sysctl
writes.
Fixes: GHSA-cgrx-mc8f-2prm CVE-2025-52881
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
If an attacker were to make the target of a device inode creation be a
symlink to some host path, os.Create would happily truncate the target
which could lead to all sorts of issues. This exploit is probably not as
exploitable because device inodes are usually only bind-mounted for
rootless containers, which cannot overwrite important host files (though
user files would still be up for grabs).
The regular inode creation logic could also theoretically be tricked
into changing the access mode and ownership of host files if the
newly-created device inode was swapped with a symlink to a host path.
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Currently, we rely on mount returning ENOTDIR when the destination is a
directory (and so mount tells us that the source is not), and fall back
to read-only tmpfs bind mount for such cases.
Theoretically, ENOTDIR can also be returned in some other cases,
resulting in the wrong type of mount being used.
Let's be more straightforward here -- call fstat on destination file
descriptor, and use the proper mount depending on whether it is a
directory.
Reported-by: Rodrigo Campos <rodrigoca@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Kir Kolyshkin <kolyshkin@gmail.com>
When mounting a path being masked, the /dev/null might disappear from
under us, and mount (even on an opened /dev/null file descriptor) will
return ENOENT, which we deliberately ignore, as there's no need to mask
non-existent paths.
Let's open the destination path and ignore ENOENT during open, then
mount via the destination file descriptor, not ignoring ENOENT.
Reported-by: lifubang <lifubang@acmcoder.com>
Signed-off-by: Kir Kolyshkin <kolyshkin@gmail.com>
The /dev/null in a container should not be trusted, because when /dev
is a bind mount, /dev/null is not created by runc itself.
1. Add isDevNull which checks the fd minor/major and device type,
and verifyDevNull which does the stat and the check.
2. Rewrite maskPath to open and check /dev/null, and use its fd to
perform mounts. Move the loop over the MaskPaths into the function,
and rename it to maskPaths.
3. reOpenDevNull: use verifyDevNull and isDevNull.
4. fixStdioPermissions: use isDevNull instead of stat.
Fixes: GHSA-9493-h29p-rfm2 CVE-2025-31133
Co-authored-by: Rodrigo Campos <rodrigoca@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Kir Kolyshkin <kolyshkin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
We will have more wrappers around filepath-securejoin, and so move them
to their own specific package so that we can eventually use libpathrs
fairly cleanly (by swapping out the implementation).
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
This was added in 2ee9cbbd12 ("It's /proc/stat, not /proc/stats") with
no actual justification, and doesn't really make much sense on further
inspection:
* /proc/net is a symlink to "self/net", which means that /proc/net/dev
is a per-process file, and so overmounting it would only affect pid1.
Any other program that cares about /proc/net/dev would see their own
process's configuration, and unprivileged processes wouldn't be able
to see /proc/1/... data anyway.
In addition, the fact that this is a symlink means that runc will
deny the overmount because /proc/1/net/dev is not in the proc
overmount allowlist. This means that this has not worked for many
years, and probably never worked in the first place.
* /proc/self/net is already namespaced with network namespaces, so the
primary argument for allowing /proc overmounts (lxcfs-like masking of
procfs files to emulate namespacing for files that are not properly
namespaced for containers -- such as /proc/cpuinfo) is moot.
It goes without saying that lxcfs has never overmounted
/proc/self/net/... files, so the general "because lxcfs"
justification doesn't hold water either.
* The kernel has slowly been moving towards blocking overmounts in
/proc/self/. Linux 6.12 blocked overmounts for fd, fdinfo, and
map_files; future Linux versions will probably end up blocking
everything under /proc/self/.
Fixes: 2ee9cbbd12 ("It's /proc/stat, not /proc/stats")
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
While debugging an issue involving failing mounts, I discovered that
just returning the plain mount error message when we are in the fallback
code for handling locked mounts leads to unnecessary confusion.
It also doesn't help that podman currently forcefully sets "rw" on
mounts, which means that rootless containers are likely to hit the
locked mounts issue fairly often.
So we should improve our error messages to explain why the mount is
failing in the locked flags case.
Fixes: 7c71a22705 ("rootfs: remove --no-mount-fallback and finally fix MS_REMOUNT")
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Like these:
> libcontainer/criu_linux.go:959:3: QF1001: could apply De Morgan's law (staticcheck)
> !(req.GetType() == criurpc.CriuReqType_FEATURE_CHECK ||
> ^
> libcontainer/rootfs_linux.go:360:19: QF1001: could apply De Morgan's law (staticcheck)
> if err == nil || !(errors.Is(err, unix.EPERM) || errors.Is(err, unix.EBUSY)) {
> ^
Signed-off-by: Kir Kolyshkin <kolyshkin@gmail.com>
The errrolint linter can finally ignore errors from Close,
and it also ignores direct comparisons of errors from x/sys/unix.
Signed-off-by: Kir Kolyshkin <kolyshkin@gmail.com>
This removes libcontainer/cgroups packages and starts
using those from github.com/opencontainers/cgroups repo.
Mostly generated by:
git rm -f libcontainer/cgroups
find . -type f -name "*.go" -exec sed -i \
's|github.com/opencontainers/runc/libcontainer/cgroups|github.com/opencontainers/cgroups|g' \
{} +
go get github.com/opencontainers/cgroups@v0.0.1
make vendor
gofumpt -w .
Signed-off-by: Kir Kolyshkin <kolyshkin@gmail.com>
lifubang