It turns out that the cilium eBPF library doesn't degrade gracefully if
BPF_F_REPLACE is not supported, so we need to work around it by treating
that case as we treat the more-than-one program case.
It also turns out that we weren't passing BPF_F_REPLACE explicitly, but
this is required by the cilium library (causing EINVALs).
Fixes: d0f2c25f52 ("cgroup2: devices: replace all existing filters when attaching")
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
These were deprecated and moved; the stubs were included in the
last two (rc94, rc95) releases, so external consumers would have
the chance to update their code.
Removing this so that this doesn't get into v1.0.0 GA
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
These were deprecated and moved; the stubs were included in the
last two (rc94, rc95) releases, so external consumers would have
the chance to update their code.
Removing this so that this doesn't get into v1.0.0 GA
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
This fixes isDbusError function, introduced by commit bacfc2c. Due to a
type error it was not working at all.
This also fixes the whole "retry on dbus disconnect" logic.
This also fixes a regression in startUnit (and cgroupManager.Apply()),
which should never return "unit already exists" error but it did.
Fixes: bacfc2c
Signed-off-by: Kir Kolyshkin <kolyshkin@gmail.com>
The runc update CLI is not able to modify devices, so let's set SkipDevices
(so that a cgroup controller won't try to update devices cgroup).
This helps use cases when some other device management (NVIDIA GPUs)
applies its configuration on top of what runc does.
Make sure we do not save SkipDevices into state.json.
Signed-off-by: Kir Kolyshkin <kolyshkin@gmail.com>
These functions are called from multiple places,
and if t.Helper() is not used, the context is not clear.
Signed-off-by: Kir Kolyshkin <kolyshkin@gmail.com>
libcontainer/cgroups/devices/devices_emulator.go:261:9: `if` block ends with a `return` statement, so drop this `else` and outdent its block (golint)
} else {
^
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
This prevents having to maintain GoDoc for the stub implementations,
and makes sure that the "stub" implementations have the same signature
as the "non-stub" versions.
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
gofumpt (mvdan.cc/gofumpt) is a fork of gofmt with stricter rules.
Brought to you by
git ls-files \*.go | grep -v ^vendor/ | xargs gofumpt -s -w
Looking at the diff, all these changes make sense.
Also, replace gofmt with gofumpt in golangci.yml.
Signed-off-by: Kir Kolyshkin <kolyshkin@gmail.com>
strconv.ParseUint(..., 0) is not really safe, because on 32-bit
architectures it will trigger runtime errors when trying to parse large
numbers (which in the case of the cgroupv2 io controller, is almost
certainly going to happen).
Fixes: 1932917b71 ("libcontainer: add initial support for cgroups v2")
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Kubelet and cAdvisor depend on the metrics having the same values as in
cgroupv1, but we didn't correctly map the number of read and write IOs
to the correct cgroupv1 stats table (blkio.io_serviced).
In addition, don't leak any extra stats in our output -- if users need
that information we can always add a new field for it.
Reported-by: Yashpal Choudhary <yashpal.c1995@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
The idea is to mimic what kubelet is doing, with minimum amount of code.
First, create a slice with SkipDevices=true. It should have access to
all devices.
Next, create a scope within the above slice, allowing access to /dev/full
only.
Check that within that scope we can only access /dev/full and not other
devices (such as /dev/null).
Repeat the test with SkipDevices=false, make sure we can not access any
devices (as they are disallowed by a parent cgroup). This is done only
to assess the test correctness.
NOTE that cgroup v1 and v2 behave differently for SkipDevices=false
case, and thus the check is different. Cgroup v1 returns EPERM on
writing to devices.allow, so cgroup manager's Set() fails, and we check
for a particular error from m.Set(). Cgroup v2 allows to create a child
cgroup, but denies access to any device (despite access being enabled)
-- so we check the error from the shell script running in that cgroup.
Again, this is only about SkipDevices=false case.
Signed-off-by: Kir Kolyshkin <kolyshkin@gmail.com>
Most of these were false positives or cases where we want to ignore the
lint, but the change to the BPF generation is actually useful.
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Commit 108ee85b82 adds SkipDevices flag, which is used by kubernetes
to create cgroups for pods.
Unfortunately the above commit falls short, and systemd DevicePolicy and
DeviceAllow properties are still set, which requires kubernetes to set
"allow everything" rule.
This commit fixes this: if SkipDevices flag is set, we return
Device* properties to allow all devices.
Fixes: 108ee85b82
Signed-off-by: Kir Kolyshkin <kolyshkin@gmail.com>
In the normal cases (only one existing filter or no existing filters),
just make use of BPF_F_REPLACE if there is one existing filter. However
if there is more than one filter applied, we should probably remove all
other filters since the alternative is that we will never remove our old
filters.
The only two other viable ways of solving this problem would be to use
BPF pins to either pin the eBPF program using a predictable name (so we
can always only replace *our* programs) or to switch away from custom
programs and instead use eBPF maps (which are pinned) and thus we just
update the map conntents to update the ruleset. Unfortunately these both
would add a hard requirement of bpffs and would require at least a minor
rewrite of the eBPF filtering code -- which is better left for another
time.
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
There were several issues with the previous cgroupv2 devices filter
generator implementation, stemming from the previous implementation
using a few too many tricks to implement the correct cgroup behaviour
(rules were handled in reverse order, with wildcards having particularly
special interpretations). As a result, some slightly odd configurations
with rules in specific orders could result in incorrect filters being
generated.
By switching to the emulator which is already used by cgroupv1, we can
guarantee that the behaviour of filters in both cgroup versions will be
identical, as well as making use of the hardenings in the emulator (not
allowing users to add deny rules the kernel will ignore).
(Note that because the ordering of the devices emulator rules is
deterministic and based on the rule value, the existing test rules had
to be reordered slightly.)
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
The devices cgroup emulator is also useful for removing unneeded rules
as well as computing what the final default-allow state of the filter
will be (allow-list or deny-list).
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
When running inside a Docker container, systemd is not available. The
new TestFdLeaksSystemd forgot to include the relevant t.Skip section.
Fixes: a7feb42395 ("libct/int: add TestFdLeaksSystemd")
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
According to cgroup v2 documentation [1]:
> Freezing of the cgroup may take some time; when this action is
> completed, the “frozen” value in the cgroup.events control file will
> be updated to “1” and the corresponding notification will be issued.
Implement polling of cgroup.events, waiting for "frozen 1" to appear.
In case something goes wrong, limit the maximum number of retries and
return "undefined" after some time (currently 10s).
[1] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/cgroup-v2.html
Signed-off-by: Kir Kolyshkin <kolyshkin@gmail.com>
Before this patch, setFreezer does
- open/read/close (to check if the freezer is supported)
- open/write/close (to set the value)
- open/read/close (to check the value)
Three opens is a bit excessive. Refactor to only open the file once:
- open (to check if the freezer is supported)
- write (to set the value)
- seek/read (to check the value)
- close
Signed-off-by: Kir Kolyshkin <kolyshkin@gmail.com>
In case configs.Undefined or any wrong value is passed, there is no need
to check whether the freezer is supported.
Move arguments check to the beginning to avoid an unnecessary call to
supportFreezer().
While at it, simplify the "whether to return an error if freezer is not
supported" check.
Signed-off-by: Kir Kolyshkin <kolyshkin@gmail.com>
Because the target of a mount is inside a container (which may be a
volume that is shared with another container), there exists a race
condition where the target of the mount may change to a path containing
a symlink after we have sanitised the path -- resulting in us
inadvertently mounting the path outside of the container.
This is not immediately useful because we are in a mount namespace with
MS_SLAVE mount propagation applied to "/", so we cannot mount on top of
host paths in the host namespace. However, if any subsequent mountpoints
in the configuration use a subdirectory of that host path as a source,
those subsequent mounts will use an attacker-controlled source path
(resolved within the host rootfs) -- allowing the bind-mounting of "/"
into the container.
While arguably configuration issues like this are not entirely within
runc's threat model, within the context of Kubernetes (and possibly
other container managers that provide semi-arbitrary container creation
privileges to untrusted users) this is a legitimate issue. Since we
cannot block mounting from the host into the container, we need to block
the first stage of this attack (mounting onto a path outside the
container).
The long-term plan to solve this would be to migrate to libpathrs, but
as a stop-gap we implement libpathrs-like path verification through
readlink(/proc/self/fd/$n) and then do mount operations through the
procfd once it's been verified to be inside the container. The target
could move after we've checked it, but if it is inside the container
then we can assume that it is safe for the same reason that libpathrs
operations would be safe.
A slight wrinkle is the "copyup" functionality we provide for tmpfs,
which is the only case where we want to do a mount on the host
filesystem. To facilitate this, I split out the copy-up functionality
entirely so that the logic isn't interspersed with the regular tmpfs
logic. In addition, all dependencies on m.Destination being overwritten
have been removed since that pattern was just begging to be a source of
more mount-target bugs (we do still have to modify m.Destination for
tmpfs-copyup but we only do it temporarily).
Fixes: CVE-2021-30465
Reported-by: Etienne Champetier <champetier.etienne@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Noah Meyerhans <nmeyerha@amazon.com>
Reviewed-by: Samuel Karp <skarp@amazon.com>
Reviewed-by: Kir Kolyshkin <kolyshkin@gmail.com> (@kolyshkin)
Reviewed-by: Akihiro Suda <akihiro.suda.cz@hco.ntt.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Aleksa Sarai