Files
runc/libcontainer/init_linux.go
T
Kir Kolyshkin 096e6f88f0 [1.1] libct/system: ClearRlimitNofileCache for go 1.23
Go 1.23 tightens access to internal symbols, and even puts runc into
"hall of shame" for using an internal symbol (recently added by commit
da68c8e3). So, while not impossible, it becomes harder to access those
internal symbols, and it is a bad idea in general.

Since Go 1.23 includes https://go.dev/cl/588076, we can clean the
internal rlimit cache by setting the RLIMIT_NOFILE for ourselves,
essentially disabling the rlimit cache.

Once Go 1.22 is no longer supported, we will remove the go:linkname hack.

(cherry picked from commit 584afc6756)
Signed-off-by: Kir Kolyshkin <kolyshkin@gmail.com>
2024-06-05 12:51:15 -07:00

642 lines
20 KiB
Go

package libcontainer
import (
"bytes"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"net"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"syscall"
"unsafe"
"github.com/containerd/console"
"github.com/opencontainers/runtime-spec/specs-go"
"github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
"github.com/vishvananda/netlink"
"golang.org/x/sys/unix"
"github.com/opencontainers/runc/libcontainer/capabilities"
"github.com/opencontainers/runc/libcontainer/cgroups"
"github.com/opencontainers/runc/libcontainer/configs"
"github.com/opencontainers/runc/libcontainer/system"
"github.com/opencontainers/runc/libcontainer/user"
"github.com/opencontainers/runc/libcontainer/utils"
)
type initType string
const (
initSetns initType = "setns"
initStandard initType = "standard"
)
type pid struct {
Pid int `json:"stage2_pid"`
PidFirstChild int `json:"stage1_pid"`
}
// network is an internal struct used to setup container networks.
type network struct {
configs.Network
// TempVethPeerName is a unique temporary veth peer name that was placed into
// the container's namespace.
TempVethPeerName string `json:"temp_veth_peer_name"`
}
// initConfig is used for transferring parameters from Exec() to Init()
type initConfig struct {
Args []string `json:"args"`
Env []string `json:"env"`
Cwd string `json:"cwd"`
Capabilities *configs.Capabilities `json:"capabilities"`
ProcessLabel string `json:"process_label"`
AppArmorProfile string `json:"apparmor_profile"`
NoNewPrivileges bool `json:"no_new_privileges"`
User string `json:"user"`
AdditionalGroups []string `json:"additional_groups"`
Config *configs.Config `json:"config"`
Networks []*network `json:"network"`
PassedFilesCount int `json:"passed_files_count"`
ContainerId string `json:"containerid"`
Rlimits []configs.Rlimit `json:"rlimits"`
CreateConsole bool `json:"create_console"`
ConsoleWidth uint16 `json:"console_width"`
ConsoleHeight uint16 `json:"console_height"`
RootlessEUID bool `json:"rootless_euid,omitempty"`
RootlessCgroups bool `json:"rootless_cgroups,omitempty"`
SpecState *specs.State `json:"spec_state,omitempty"`
Cgroup2Path string `json:"cgroup2_path,omitempty"`
}
type initer interface {
Init() error
}
func newContainerInit(t initType, pipe *os.File, consoleSocket *os.File, fifoFd, logFd int, mountFds []int) (initer, error) {
var config *initConfig
if err := json.NewDecoder(pipe).Decode(&config); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if err := populateProcessEnvironment(config.Env); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
// Clean the RLIMIT_NOFILE cache in go runtime.
// Issue: https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/issues/4195
maybeClearRlimitNofileCache(config.Rlimits)
switch t {
case initSetns:
// mountFds must be nil in this case. We don't mount while doing runc exec.
if mountFds != nil {
return nil, errors.New("mountFds must be nil. Can't mount while doing runc exec.")
}
return &linuxSetnsInit{
pipe: pipe,
consoleSocket: consoleSocket,
config: config,
logFd: logFd,
}, nil
case initStandard:
return &linuxStandardInit{
pipe: pipe,
consoleSocket: consoleSocket,
parentPid: unix.Getppid(),
config: config,
fifoFd: fifoFd,
logFd: logFd,
mountFds: mountFds,
}, nil
}
return nil, fmt.Errorf("unknown init type %q", t)
}
// populateProcessEnvironment loads the provided environment variables into the
// current processes's environment.
func populateProcessEnvironment(env []string) error {
for _, pair := range env {
p := strings.SplitN(pair, "=", 2)
if len(p) < 2 {
return errors.New("invalid environment variable: missing '='")
}
name, val := p[0], p[1]
if name == "" {
return errors.New("invalid environment variable: name cannot be empty")
}
if strings.IndexByte(name, 0) >= 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid environment variable %q: name contains nul byte (\\x00)", name)
}
if strings.IndexByte(val, 0) >= 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid environment variable %q: value contains nul byte (\\x00)", name)
}
if err := os.Setenv(name, val); err != nil {
return err
}
}
return nil
}
// verifyCwd ensures that the current directory is actually inside the mount
// namespace root of the current process.
func verifyCwd() error {
// getcwd(2) on Linux detects if cwd is outside of the rootfs of the
// current mount namespace root, and in that case prefixes "(unreachable)"
// to the returned string. glibc's getcwd(3) and Go's Getwd() both detect
// when this happens and return ENOENT rather than returning a non-absolute
// path. In both cases we can therefore easily detect if we have an invalid
// cwd by checking the return value of getcwd(3). See getcwd(3) for more
// details, and CVE-2024-21626 for the security issue that motivated this
// check.
//
// We have to use unix.Getwd() here because os.Getwd() has a workaround for
// $PWD which involves doing stat(.), which can fail if the current
// directory is inaccessible to the container process.
if wd, err := unix.Getwd(); errors.Is(err, unix.ENOENT) {
return errors.New("current working directory is outside of container mount namespace root -- possible container breakout detected")
} else if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to verify if current working directory is safe: %w", err)
} else if !filepath.IsAbs(wd) {
// We shouldn't ever hit this, but check just in case.
return fmt.Errorf("current working directory is not absolute -- possible container breakout detected: cwd is %q", wd)
}
return nil
}
// finalizeNamespace drops the caps, sets the correct user
// and working dir, and closes any leaked file descriptors
// before executing the command inside the namespace
func finalizeNamespace(config *initConfig) error {
// Ensure that all unwanted fds we may have accidentally
// inherited are marked close-on-exec so they stay out of the
// container
if err := utils.CloseExecFrom(config.PassedFilesCount + 3); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("error closing exec fds: %w", err)
}
// we only do chdir if it's specified
doChdir := config.Cwd != ""
if doChdir {
// First, attempt the chdir before setting up the user.
// This could allow us to access a directory that the user running runc can access
// but the container user cannot.
err := unix.Chdir(config.Cwd)
switch {
case err == nil:
doChdir = false
case os.IsPermission(err):
// If we hit an EPERM, we should attempt again after setting up user.
// This will allow us to successfully chdir if the container user has access
// to the directory, but the user running runc does not.
// This is useful in cases where the cwd is also a volume that's been chowned to the container user.
default:
return fmt.Errorf("chdir to cwd (%q) set in config.json failed: %w", config.Cwd, err)
}
}
caps := &configs.Capabilities{}
if config.Capabilities != nil {
caps = config.Capabilities
} else if config.Config.Capabilities != nil {
caps = config.Config.Capabilities
}
w, err := capabilities.New(caps)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// drop capabilities in bounding set before changing user
if err := w.ApplyBoundingSet(); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("unable to apply bounding set: %w", err)
}
// preserve existing capabilities while we change users
if err := system.SetKeepCaps(); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("unable to set keep caps: %w", err)
}
if err := setupUser(config); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("unable to setup user: %w", err)
}
// Change working directory AFTER the user has been set up, if we haven't done it yet.
if doChdir {
if err := unix.Chdir(config.Cwd); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("chdir to cwd (%q) set in config.json failed: %w", config.Cwd, err)
}
}
// Make sure our final working directory is inside the container.
if err := verifyCwd(); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := system.ClearKeepCaps(); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("unable to clear keep caps: %w", err)
}
if err := w.ApplyCaps(); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("unable to apply caps: %w", err)
}
return nil
}
// setupConsole sets up the console from inside the container, and sends the
// master pty fd to the config.Pipe (using cmsg). This is done to ensure that
// consoles are scoped to a container properly (see runc#814 and the many
// issues related to that). This has to be run *after* we've pivoted to the new
// rootfs (and the users' configuration is entirely set up).
func setupConsole(socket *os.File, config *initConfig, mount bool) error {
defer socket.Close()
// At this point, /dev/ptmx points to something that we would expect. We
// used to change the owner of the slave path, but since the /dev/pts mount
// can have gid=X set (at the users' option). So touching the owner of the
// slave PTY is not necessary, as the kernel will handle that for us. Note
// however, that setupUser (specifically fixStdioPermissions) *will* change
// the UID owner of the console to be the user the process will run as (so
// they can actually control their console).
pty, slavePath, err := console.NewPty()
if err != nil {
return err
}
// After we return from here, we don't need the console anymore.
defer pty.Close()
if config.ConsoleHeight != 0 && config.ConsoleWidth != 0 {
err = pty.Resize(console.WinSize{
Height: config.ConsoleHeight,
Width: config.ConsoleWidth,
})
if err != nil {
return err
}
}
// Mount the console inside our rootfs.
if mount {
if err := mountConsole(slavePath); err != nil {
return err
}
}
// While we can access console.master, using the API is a good idea.
if err := utils.SendFd(socket, pty.Name(), pty.Fd()); err != nil {
return err
}
// Now, dup over all the things.
return dupStdio(slavePath)
}
// syncParentReady sends to the given pipe a JSON payload which indicates that
// the init is ready to Exec the child process. It then waits for the parent to
// indicate that it is cleared to Exec.
func syncParentReady(pipe io.ReadWriter) error {
// Tell parent.
if err := writeSync(pipe, procReady); err != nil {
return err
}
// Wait for parent to give the all-clear.
return readSync(pipe, procRun)
}
// syncParentHooks sends to the given pipe a JSON payload which indicates that
// the parent should execute pre-start hooks. It then waits for the parent to
// indicate that it is cleared to resume.
func syncParentHooks(pipe io.ReadWriter) error {
// Tell parent.
if err := writeSync(pipe, procHooks); err != nil {
return err
}
// Wait for parent to give the all-clear.
return readSync(pipe, procResume)
}
// syncParentSeccomp sends to the given pipe a JSON payload which
// indicates that the parent should pick up the seccomp fd with pidfd_getfd()
// and send it to the seccomp agent over a unix socket. It then waits for
// the parent to indicate that it is cleared to resume and closes the seccompFd.
// If the seccompFd is -1, there isn't anything to sync with the parent, so it
// returns no error.
func syncParentSeccomp(pipe io.ReadWriter, seccompFd int) error {
if seccompFd == -1 {
return nil
}
// Tell parent.
if err := writeSyncWithFd(pipe, procSeccomp, seccompFd); err != nil {
unix.Close(seccompFd)
return err
}
// Wait for parent to give the all-clear.
if err := readSync(pipe, procSeccompDone); err != nil {
unix.Close(seccompFd)
return fmt.Errorf("sync parent seccomp: %w", err)
}
if err := unix.Close(seccompFd); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("close seccomp fd: %w", err)
}
return nil
}
// setupUser changes the groups, gid, and uid for the user inside the container
func setupUser(config *initConfig) error {
// Set up defaults.
defaultExecUser := user.ExecUser{
Uid: 0,
Gid: 0,
Home: "/",
}
passwdPath, err := user.GetPasswdPath()
if err != nil {
return err
}
groupPath, err := user.GetGroupPath()
if err != nil {
return err
}
execUser, err := user.GetExecUserPath(config.User, &defaultExecUser, passwdPath, groupPath)
if err != nil {
return err
}
var addGroups []int
if len(config.AdditionalGroups) > 0 {
addGroups, err = user.GetAdditionalGroupsPath(config.AdditionalGroups, groupPath)
if err != nil {
return err
}
}
// Rather than just erroring out later in setuid(2) and setgid(2), check
// that the user is mapped here.
if _, err := config.Config.HostUID(execUser.Uid); err != nil {
return errors.New("cannot set uid to unmapped user in user namespace")
}
if _, err := config.Config.HostGID(execUser.Gid); err != nil {
return errors.New("cannot set gid to unmapped user in user namespace")
}
if config.RootlessEUID {
// We cannot set any additional groups in a rootless container and thus
// we bail if the user asked us to do so. TODO: We currently can't do
// this check earlier, but if libcontainer.Process.User was typesafe
// this might work.
if len(addGroups) > 0 {
return errors.New("cannot set any additional groups in a rootless container")
}
}
// Before we change to the container's user make sure that the processes
// STDIO is correctly owned by the user that we are switching to.
if err := fixStdioPermissions(execUser); err != nil {
return err
}
setgroups, err := os.ReadFile("/proc/self/setgroups")
if err != nil && !os.IsNotExist(err) {
return err
}
// This isn't allowed in an unprivileged user namespace since Linux 3.19.
// There's nothing we can do about /etc/group entries, so we silently
// ignore setting groups here (since the user didn't explicitly ask us to
// set the group).
allowSupGroups := !config.RootlessEUID && string(bytes.TrimSpace(setgroups)) != "deny"
if allowSupGroups {
suppGroups := append(execUser.Sgids, addGroups...)
if err := unix.Setgroups(suppGroups); err != nil {
return &os.SyscallError{Syscall: "setgroups", Err: err}
}
}
if err := system.Setgid(execUser.Gid); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := system.Setuid(execUser.Uid); err != nil {
return err
}
// if we didn't get HOME already, set it based on the user's HOME
if envHome := os.Getenv("HOME"); envHome == "" {
if err := os.Setenv("HOME", execUser.Home); err != nil {
return err
}
}
return nil
}
// fixStdioPermissions fixes the permissions of PID 1's STDIO within the container to the specified user.
// The ownership needs to match because it is created outside of the container and needs to be
// localized.
func fixStdioPermissions(u *user.ExecUser) error {
var null unix.Stat_t
if err := unix.Stat("/dev/null", &null); err != nil {
return &os.PathError{Op: "stat", Path: "/dev/null", Err: err}
}
for _, file := range []*os.File{os.Stdin, os.Stdout, os.Stderr} {
var s unix.Stat_t
if err := unix.Fstat(int(file.Fd()), &s); err != nil {
return &os.PathError{Op: "fstat", Path: file.Name(), Err: err}
}
// Skip chown if uid is already the one we want or any of the STDIO descriptors
// were redirected to /dev/null.
if int(s.Uid) == u.Uid || s.Rdev == null.Rdev {
continue
}
// We only change the uid (as it is possible for the mount to
// prefer a different gid, and there's no reason for us to change it).
// The reason why we don't just leave the default uid=X mount setup is
// that users expect to be able to actually use their console. Without
// this code, you couldn't effectively run as a non-root user inside a
// container and also have a console set up.
if err := file.Chown(u.Uid, int(s.Gid)); err != nil {
// If we've hit an EINVAL then s.Gid isn't mapped in the user
// namespace. If we've hit an EPERM then the inode's current owner
// is not mapped in our user namespace (in particular,
// privileged_wrt_inode_uidgid() has failed). Read-only
// /dev can result in EROFS error. In any case, it's
// better for us to just not touch the stdio rather
// than bail at this point.
if errors.Is(err, unix.EINVAL) || errors.Is(err, unix.EPERM) || errors.Is(err, unix.EROFS) {
continue
}
return err
}
}
return nil
}
// setupNetwork sets up and initializes any network interface inside the container.
func setupNetwork(config *initConfig) error {
for _, config := range config.Networks {
strategy, err := getStrategy(config.Type)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if err := strategy.initialize(config); err != nil {
return err
}
}
return nil
}
func setupRoute(config *configs.Config) error {
for _, config := range config.Routes {
_, dst, err := net.ParseCIDR(config.Destination)
if err != nil {
return err
}
src := net.ParseIP(config.Source)
if src == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("Invalid source for route: %s", config.Source)
}
gw := net.ParseIP(config.Gateway)
if gw == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("Invalid gateway for route: %s", config.Gateway)
}
l, err := netlink.LinkByName(config.InterfaceName)
if err != nil {
return err
}
route := &netlink.Route{
Scope: netlink.SCOPE_UNIVERSE,
Dst: dst,
Src: src,
Gw: gw,
LinkIndex: l.Attrs().Index,
}
if err := netlink.RouteAdd(route); err != nil {
return err
}
}
return nil
}
func maybeClearRlimitNofileCache(limits []configs.Rlimit) {
for _, rlimit := range limits {
if rlimit.Type == syscall.RLIMIT_NOFILE {
system.ClearRlimitNofileCache(&syscall.Rlimit{
Cur: rlimit.Soft,
Max: rlimit.Hard,
})
return
}
}
}
func setupRlimits(limits []configs.Rlimit, pid int) error {
for _, rlimit := range limits {
if err := unix.Prlimit(pid, rlimit.Type, &unix.Rlimit{Max: rlimit.Hard, Cur: rlimit.Soft}, nil); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("error setting rlimit type %v: %w", rlimit.Type, err)
}
}
return nil
}
const _P_PID = 1
//nolint:structcheck,unused
type siginfo struct {
si_signo int32
si_errno int32
si_code int32
// below here is a union; si_pid is the only field we use
si_pid int32
// Pad to 128 bytes as detailed in blockUntilWaitable
pad [96]byte
}
// isWaitable returns true if the process has exited false otherwise.
// Its based off blockUntilWaitable in src/os/wait_waitid.go
func isWaitable(pid int) (bool, error) {
si := &siginfo{}
_, _, e := unix.Syscall6(unix.SYS_WAITID, _P_PID, uintptr(pid), uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(si)), unix.WEXITED|unix.WNOWAIT|unix.WNOHANG, 0, 0)
if e != 0 {
return false, &os.SyscallError{Syscall: "waitid", Err: e}
}
return si.si_pid != 0, nil
}
// signalAllProcesses freezes then iterates over all the processes inside the
// manager's cgroups sending the signal s to them.
// If s is SIGKILL then it will wait for each process to exit.
// For all other signals it will check if the process is ready to report its
// exit status and only if it is will a wait be performed.
func signalAllProcesses(m cgroups.Manager, s os.Signal) error {
var procs []*os.Process
if err := m.Freeze(configs.Frozen); err != nil {
logrus.Warn(err)
}
pids, err := m.GetAllPids()
if err != nil {
if err := m.Freeze(configs.Thawed); err != nil {
logrus.Warn(err)
}
return err
}
for _, pid := range pids {
p, err := os.FindProcess(pid)
if err != nil {
logrus.Warn(err)
continue
}
procs = append(procs, p)
if err := p.Signal(s); err != nil {
logrus.Warn(err)
}
}
if err := m.Freeze(configs.Thawed); err != nil {
logrus.Warn(err)
}
subreaper, err := system.GetSubreaper()
if err != nil {
// The error here means that PR_GET_CHILD_SUBREAPER is not
// supported because this code might run on a kernel older
// than 3.4. We don't want to throw an error in that case,
// and we simplify things, considering there is no subreaper
// set.
subreaper = 0
}
for _, p := range procs {
if s != unix.SIGKILL {
if ok, err := isWaitable(p.Pid); err != nil {
if !errors.Is(err, unix.ECHILD) {
logrus.Warn("signalAllProcesses: ", p.Pid, err)
}
continue
} else if !ok {
// Not ready to report so don't wait
continue
}
}
// In case a subreaper has been setup, this code must not
// wait for the process. Otherwise, we cannot be sure the
// current process will be reaped by the subreaper, while
// the subreaper might be waiting for this process in order
// to retrieve its exit code.
if subreaper == 0 {
if _, err := p.Wait(); err != nil {
if !errors.Is(err, unix.ECHILD) {
logrus.Warn("wait: ", err)
}
}
}
}
return nil
}