Files
runc/libcontainer/utils/utils_unix.go
T
Aleksa Sarai d40b3439a9 rootfs: switch to fd-based handling of mountpoint targets
An attacker could race with us during mount configuration in order to
trick us into mounting over an unexpected path. This would bypass
checkProcMount() and would allow for security profiles to be left
unapplied by mounting over /proc/self/attr/... (or even more serious
outcomes such as killing the entire system by tricking runc into writing
strings to /proc/sysrq-trigger).

This is a larger issue with our current mount infrastructure, and the
ideal solution would be to rewrite it all to be fd-based (which would
also allow us to support the "new" mount API, which also avoids a bunch
of other issues with mount(8)). However, such a rewrite is not really
workable as a security fix, so this patch is a bit of a compromise
approach to fix the issue while also moving us a bit towards that
eventual end-goal.

The core issue in CVE-2025-52881 is that we currently use the (insecure)
SecureJoin to re-resolve mountpoint target paths multiple times during
mounting. Rather than generating a string from createMountpoint(), we
instead open an *os.File handle to the target mountpoint directly and
then operate on that handle. This will make it easier to remove
utils.WithProcfd() and rework mountViaFds() in the future.

The only real issue we need to work around is that we need to re-open
the mount target after doing the mount in order to get a handle to the
mountpoint -- pathrs.Reopen() doesn't work in this case (it just
re-opens the inode under the mountpoint) so we need to do a naive
re-open using the full path. Note that if we used move_mount(2) this
wouldn't be a problem because we would have a handle to the mountpoint
itself.

Note that this is still somewhat of a temporary solution -- ideally
mountViaFds would use *os.File directly to let us avoid some other
issues with using bare /proc/... paths, as well as also letting us more
easily use the new mount API on modern kernels.

Fixes: GHSA-cgrx-mc8f-2prm CVE-2025-52881
Co-developed-by: lifubang <lifubang@acmcoder.com>
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
2025-11-01 21:24:06 +11:00

279 lines
10 KiB
Go

//go:build !windows
package utils
import (
"fmt"
"math"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"runtime"
"strconv"
"sync"
_ "unsafe" // for go:linkname
securejoin "github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin"
"github.com/opencontainers/runc/internal/linux"
"github.com/opencontainers/runc/internal/pathrs"
"github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
"golang.org/x/sys/unix"
)
var (
haveCloseRangeCloexecBool bool
haveCloseRangeCloexecOnce sync.Once
)
func haveCloseRangeCloexec() bool {
haveCloseRangeCloexecOnce.Do(func() {
// Make sure we're not closing a random file descriptor.
tmpFd, err := unix.FcntlInt(0, unix.F_DUPFD_CLOEXEC, 0)
if err != nil {
return
}
defer unix.Close(tmpFd)
err = unix.CloseRange(uint(tmpFd), uint(tmpFd), unix.CLOSE_RANGE_CLOEXEC)
// Any error means we cannot use close_range(CLOSE_RANGE_CLOEXEC).
// -ENOSYS and -EINVAL ultimately mean we don't have support, but any
// other potential error would imply that even the most basic close
// operation wouldn't work.
haveCloseRangeCloexecBool = err == nil
})
return haveCloseRangeCloexecBool
}
type fdFunc func(fd int)
// fdRangeFrom calls the passed fdFunc for each file descriptor that is open in
// the current process.
func fdRangeFrom(minFd int, fn fdFunc) error {
fdDir, closer, err := pathrs.ProcThreadSelfOpen("fd/", unix.O_DIRECTORY|unix.O_CLOEXEC)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("get handle to /proc/thread-self/fd: %w", err)
}
defer closer()
defer fdDir.Close()
fdList, err := fdDir.Readdirnames(-1)
if err != nil {
return err
}
for _, fdStr := range fdList {
fd, err := strconv.Atoi(fdStr)
// Ignore non-numeric file names.
if err != nil {
continue
}
// Ignore descriptors lower than our specified minimum.
if fd < minFd {
continue
}
// Ignore the file descriptor we used for readdir, as it will be closed
// when we return.
if uintptr(fd) == fdDir.Fd() {
continue
}
// Run the closure.
fn(fd)
}
return nil
}
// CloseExecFrom sets the O_CLOEXEC flag on all file descriptors greater or
// equal to minFd in the current process.
func CloseExecFrom(minFd int) error {
// Use close_range(CLOSE_RANGE_CLOEXEC) if possible.
if haveCloseRangeCloexec() {
err := unix.CloseRange(uint(minFd), math.MaxInt32, unix.CLOSE_RANGE_CLOEXEC)
if err == nil {
return nil
}
logrus.Debugf("close_range failed, closing range one at a time (error: %v)", err)
// If close_range fails, we fall back to the standard loop.
}
// Otherwise, fall back to the standard loop.
return fdRangeFrom(minFd, unix.CloseOnExec)
}
//go:linkname runtime_IsPollDescriptor internal/poll.IsPollDescriptor
// In order to make sure we do not close the internal epoll descriptors the Go
// runtime uses, we need to ensure that we skip descriptors that match
// "internal/poll".IsPollDescriptor. Yes, this is a Go runtime internal thing,
// unfortunately there's no other way to be sure we're only keeping the file
// descriptors the Go runtime needs. Hopefully nothing blows up doing this...
func runtime_IsPollDescriptor(fd uintptr) bool //nolint:revive
// UnsafeCloseFrom closes all file descriptors greater or equal to minFd in the
// current process, except for those critical to Go's runtime (such as the
// netpoll management descriptors).
//
// NOTE: That this function is incredibly dangerous to use in most Go code, as
// closing file descriptors from underneath *os.File handles can lead to very
// bad behaviour (the closed file descriptor can be reused and then any
// *os.File operations would apply to the wrong file). This function is only
// intended to be called from the last stage of runc init.
func UnsafeCloseFrom(minFd int) error {
// We cannot use close_range(2) even if it is available, because we must
// not close some file descriptors.
return fdRangeFrom(minFd, func(fd int) {
if runtime_IsPollDescriptor(uintptr(fd)) {
// These are the Go runtimes internal netpoll file descriptors.
// These file descriptors are operated on deep in the Go scheduler,
// and closing those files from underneath Go can result in panics.
// There is no issue with keeping them because they are not
// executable and are not useful to an attacker anyway. Also we
// don't have any choice.
return
}
// There's nothing we can do about errors from close(2), and the
// only likely error to be seen is EBADF which indicates the fd was
// already closed (in which case, we got what we wanted).
_ = unix.Close(fd)
})
}
// NewSockPair returns a new SOCK_STREAM unix socket pair.
func NewSockPair(name string) (parent, child *os.File, err error) {
fds, err := unix.Socketpair(unix.AF_LOCAL, unix.SOCK_STREAM|unix.SOCK_CLOEXEC, 0)
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, err
}
return os.NewFile(uintptr(fds[1]), name+"-p"), os.NewFile(uintptr(fds[0]), name+"-c"), nil
}
// WithProcfd runs the passed closure with a procfd path (/proc/self/fd/...)
// corresponding to the unsafePath resolved within the root. Before passing the
// fd, this path is verified to have been inside the root -- so operating on it
// through the passed fdpath should be safe. Do not access this path through
// the original path strings, and do not attempt to use the pathname outside of
// the passed closure (the file handle will be freed once the closure returns).
func WithProcfd(root, unsafePath string, fn func(procfd string) error) error {
// Remove the root then forcefully resolve inside the root.
unsafePath = StripRoot(root, unsafePath)
fullPath, err := securejoin.SecureJoin(root, unsafePath)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("resolving path inside rootfs failed: %w", err)
}
procSelfFd, closer := ProcThreadSelf("fd/")
defer closer()
// Open the target path.
fh, err := os.OpenFile(fullPath, unix.O_PATH|unix.O_CLOEXEC, 0)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("open o_path procfd: %w", err)
}
defer fh.Close()
procfd := filepath.Join(procSelfFd, strconv.Itoa(int(fh.Fd())))
// Double-check the path is the one we expected.
if realpath, err := os.Readlink(procfd); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("procfd verification failed: %w", err)
} else if realpath != fullPath {
return fmt.Errorf("possibly malicious path detected -- refusing to operate on %s", realpath)
}
return fn(procfd)
}
// WithProcfdFile is a very minimal wrapper around [ProcThreadSelfFd], intended
// to make migrating from [WithProcfd] and [WithProcfdPath] usage easier. The
// caller is responsible for making sure that the provided file handle is
// actually safe to operate on.
func WithProcfdFile(file *os.File, fn func(procfd string) error) error {
fdpath, closer := ProcThreadSelfFd(file.Fd())
defer closer()
return fn(fdpath)
}
type ProcThreadSelfCloser func()
var (
haveProcThreadSelf bool
haveProcThreadSelfOnce sync.Once
)
// ProcThreadSelf returns a string that is equivalent to
// /proc/thread-self/<subpath>, with a graceful fallback on older kernels where
// /proc/thread-self doesn't exist. This method DOES NOT use SecureJoin,
// meaning that the passed string needs to be trusted. The caller _must_ call
// the returned procThreadSelfCloser function (which is runtime.UnlockOSThread)
// *only once* after it has finished using the returned path string.
func ProcThreadSelf(subpath string) (string, ProcThreadSelfCloser) {
haveProcThreadSelfOnce.Do(func() {
if _, err := os.Stat("/proc/thread-self/"); err == nil {
haveProcThreadSelf = true
} else {
logrus.Debugf("cannot stat /proc/thread-self (%v), falling back to /proc/self/task/<tid>", err)
}
})
// We need to lock our thread until the caller is done with the path string
// because any non-atomic operation on the path (such as opening a file,
// then reading it) could be interrupted by the Go runtime where the
// underlying thread is swapped out and the original thread is killed,
// resulting in pull-your-hair-out-hard-to-debug issues in the caller. In
// addition, the pre-3.17 fallback makes everything non-atomic because the
// same thing could happen between unix.Gettid() and the path operations.
//
// In theory, we don't need to lock in the atomic user case when using
// /proc/thread-self/, but it's better to be safe than sorry (and there are
// only one or two truly atomic users of /proc/thread-self/).
runtime.LockOSThread()
threadSelf := "/proc/thread-self/"
if !haveProcThreadSelf {
// Pre-3.17 kernels did not have /proc/thread-self, so do it manually.
threadSelf = "/proc/self/task/" + strconv.Itoa(unix.Gettid()) + "/"
if _, err := os.Stat(threadSelf); err != nil {
// Unfortunately, this code is called from rootfs_linux.go where we
// are running inside the pid namespace of the container but /proc
// is the host's procfs. Unfortunately there is no real way to get
// the correct tid to use here (the kernel age means we cannot do
// things like set up a private fsopen("proc") -- even scanning
// NSpid in all of the tasks in /proc/self/task/*/status requires
// Linux 4.1).
//
// So, we just have to assume that /proc/self is acceptable in this
// one specific case.
if os.Getpid() == 1 {
logrus.Debugf("/proc/thread-self (tid=%d) cannot be emulated inside the initial container setup -- using /proc/self instead: %v", unix.Gettid(), err)
} else {
// This should never happen, but the fallback should work in most cases...
logrus.Warnf("/proc/thread-self could not be emulated for pid=%d (tid=%d) -- using more buggy /proc/self fallback instead: %v", os.Getpid(), unix.Gettid(), err)
}
threadSelf = "/proc/self/"
}
}
return threadSelf + subpath, runtime.UnlockOSThread
}
// ProcThreadSelfFd is small wrapper around ProcThreadSelf to make it easier to
// create a /proc/thread-self handle for given file descriptor.
//
// It is basically equivalent to ProcThreadSelf(fmt.Sprintf("fd/%d", fd)), but
// without using fmt.Sprintf to avoid unneeded overhead.
func ProcThreadSelfFd(fd uintptr) (string, ProcThreadSelfCloser) {
return ProcThreadSelf("fd/" + strconv.FormatUint(uint64(fd), 10))
}
// Openat is a Go-friendly openat(2) wrapper.
func Openat(dir *os.File, path string, flags int, mode uint32) (*os.File, error) {
dirFd := unix.AT_FDCWD
if dir != nil {
dirFd = int(dir.Fd())
}
flags |= unix.O_CLOEXEC
fd, err := linux.Openat(dirFd, path, flags, mode)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return os.NewFile(uintptr(fd), dir.Name()+"/"+path), nil
}