Pre-open container root directory

A lot of filesystem-related stuff happens inside the container root
directory, and we have used its name before. It makes sense to pre-open
it and use a *os.File handle instead.

Function names in internal/pathrs are kept as is for simplicity (and it
is an internal package), but they now accept root as *os.File.

Signed-off-by: Kir Kolyshkin <kolyshkin@gmail.com>

(cherry picked from commit 28cb321887)

It was also necessary to cherry-pick a missing hunk from commit
b88635e57e ("libct: close rootFd ASAP in maskPaths") that was not
backported to 1.3 in the backported patch commit 9a2fec0a9a ("libct:
close rootFd ASAP in maskPaths").

Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <aleksa@amutable.com>
This commit is contained in:
Kir Kolyshkin
2026-03-18 17:21:55 -07:00
committed by Aleksa Sarai
parent 2e9b6a8a16
commit 42cfcbe453
5 changed files with 62 additions and 39 deletions
+2 -2
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@@ -31,12 +31,12 @@ import (
// Callers need to be very careful operating on the trailing path, as trivial
// mistakes like following symlinks can cause security bugs. Most people
// should probably just use [MkdirAllInRoot] or [CreateInRoot].
func MkdirAllParentInRoot(root, unsafePath string, mode os.FileMode) (*os.File, string, error) {
func MkdirAllParentInRoot(root *os.File, unsafePath string, mode os.FileMode) (*os.File, string, error) {
// MkdirAllInRoot also does hallucinateUnsafePath, but we need to do it
// here first because when we split unsafePath into (dir, file) components
// we want to be doing so with the hallucinated path (so that trailing
// dangling symlinks are treated correctly).
unsafePath, err := hallucinateUnsafePath(root, unsafePath)
unsafePath, err := hallucinateUnsafePath(root.Name(), unsafePath)
if err != nil {
return nil, "", fmt.Errorf("failed to construct hallucinated target path: %w", err)
}
+4 -11
View File
@@ -24,12 +24,11 @@ import (
"github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin/pathrs-lite"
"github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
"golang.org/x/sys/unix"
)
// MkdirAllInRoot attempts to make
//
// path, _ := securejoin.SecureJoin(root, unsafePath)
// path, _ := securejoin.SecureJoin(root.Name(), unsafePath)
// os.MkdirAll(path, mode)
// os.Open(path)
//
@@ -48,8 +47,8 @@ import (
// handling if unsafePath has already been scoped within the rootfs (this is
// needed for a lot of runc callers and fixing this would require reworking a
// lot of path logic).
func MkdirAllInRoot(root, unsafePath string, mode os.FileMode) (*os.File, error) {
unsafePath, err := hallucinateUnsafePath(root, unsafePath)
func MkdirAllInRoot(root *os.File, unsafePath string, mode os.FileMode) (*os.File, error) {
unsafePath, err := hallucinateUnsafePath(root.Name(), unsafePath)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to construct hallucinated target path: %w", err)
}
@@ -67,13 +66,7 @@ func MkdirAllInRoot(root, unsafePath string, mode os.FileMode) (*os.File, error)
mode &= 0o1777
}
rootDir, err := os.OpenFile(root, unix.O_DIRECTORY|unix.O_CLOEXEC, 0)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("open root handle: %w", err)
}
defer rootDir.Close()
return retryEAGAIN(func() (*os.File, error) {
return pathrs.MkdirAllHandle(rootDir, unsafePath, mode)
return pathrs.MkdirAllHandle(root, unsafePath, mode)
})
}
+5 -5
View File
@@ -26,11 +26,11 @@ import (
)
// OpenInRoot opens the given path inside the root with the provided flags. It
// is effectively shorthand for [securejoin.OpenInRoot] followed by
// is effectively shorthand for [securejoin.OpenatInRoot] followed by
// [securejoin.Reopen].
func OpenInRoot(root, subpath string, flags int) (*os.File, error) {
func OpenInRoot(root *os.File, subpath string, flags int) (*os.File, error) {
handle, err := retryEAGAIN(func() (*os.File, error) {
return pathrs.OpenInRoot(root, subpath)
return pathrs.OpenatInRoot(root, subpath)
})
if err != nil {
return nil, err
@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ func OpenInRoot(root, subpath string, flags int) (*os.File, error) {
// open(O_CREAT|O_NOFOLLOW) semantics. If you want the creation to use O_EXCL,
// include it in the passed flags. The fileMode argument uses unix.* mode bits,
// *not* os.FileMode.
func CreateInRoot(root, subpath string, flags int, fileMode uint32) (*os.File, error) {
func CreateInRoot(root *os.File, subpath string, flags int, fileMode uint32) (*os.File, error) {
dirFd, filename, err := MkdirAllParentInRoot(root, subpath, 0o755)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
@@ -61,5 +61,5 @@ func CreateInRoot(root, subpath string, flags int, fileMode uint32) (*os.File, e
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return os.NewFile(uintptr(fd), root+"/"+subpath), nil
return os.NewFile(uintptr(fd), root.Name()+"/"+subpath), nil
}
+8 -2
View File
@@ -540,10 +540,16 @@ func isOnTmpfs(path string, mounts []*configs.Mount) bool {
// This function also creates missing mountpoints as long as they
// are not on top of a tmpfs, as CRIU will restore tmpfs content anyway.
func (c *Container) prepareCriuRestoreMounts(mounts []*configs.Mount) error {
rootFd, err := os.OpenFile(c.config.Rootfs, unix.O_DIRECTORY|unix.O_CLOEXEC|unix.O_PATH, 0)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("open rootfs handle: %w", err)
}
defer rootFd.Close()
umounts := []string{}
defer func() {
for _, u := range umounts {
mntFile, err := pathrs.OpenInRoot(c.config.Rootfs, u, unix.O_PATH)
mntFile, err := pathrs.OpenInRoot(rootFd, u, unix.O_PATH)
if err != nil {
logrus.Warnf("Error during cleanup unmounting %s: open handle: %v", u, err)
continue
@@ -577,7 +583,7 @@ func (c *Container) prepareCriuRestoreMounts(mounts []*configs.Mount) error {
continue
}
me := mountEntry{Mount: m}
if err := me.createOpenMountpoint(c.config.Rootfs); err != nil {
if err := me.createOpenMountpoint(rootFd); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("create criu restore mountpoint for %s mount: %w", me.Destination, err)
}
if me.dstFile != nil {
+43 -19
View File
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ const defaultMountFlags = unix.MS_NOEXEC | unix.MS_NOSUID | unix.MS_NODEV
// mountConfig contains mount data not specific to a mount point.
type mountConfig struct {
root string
root *os.File
label string
cgroup2Path string
rootlessCgroups bool
@@ -105,8 +105,17 @@ func prepareRootfs(pipe *syncSocket, iConfig *initConfig) (err error) {
return fmt.Errorf("error preparing rootfs: %w", err)
}
// Pre-open rootfs. NOTE that if we need to re-enable support for mounting
// on top of container root (see issue 5070), we will need to reopen rootFd
// after such mounts.
rootFd, err := os.OpenFile(config.Rootfs, unix.O_DIRECTORY|unix.O_CLOEXEC|unix.O_PATH, 0)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("open rootfs handle: %w", err)
}
defer rootFd.Close()
mountConfig := &mountConfig{
root: config.Rootfs,
root: rootFd,
label: config.MountLabel,
cgroup2Path: iConfig.Cgroup2Path,
rootlessCgroups: config.RootlessCgroups,
@@ -166,7 +175,7 @@ func prepareRootfs(pipe *syncSocket, iConfig *initConfig) (err error) {
setupDev := needsSetupDev(config)
if setupDev {
if err := createDevices(config); err != nil {
if err := createDevices(config, rootFd); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("error creating device nodes: %w", err)
}
if err := setupPtmx(config); err != nil {
@@ -216,6 +225,7 @@ func prepareRootfs(pipe *syncSocket, iConfig *initConfig) (err error) {
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("error jailing process inside rootfs: %w", err)
}
rootFd.Close()
// Apply root mount propagation flags.
// This must be done after pivot_root/chroot because the mount propagation flag is applied
@@ -361,7 +371,7 @@ func mountCgroupV1(m mountEntry, c *mountConfig) error {
// symlink(2) is very dumb, it will just shove the path into
// the link and doesn't do any checks or relative path
// conversion. Also, don't error out if the cgroup already exists.
if err := os.Symlink(mc, filepath.Join(c.root, m.Destination, ss)); err != nil && !os.IsExist(err) {
if err := os.Symlink(mc, filepath.Join(c.root.Name(), m.Destination, ss)); err != nil && !errors.Is(err, os.ErrExist) {
return err
}
}
@@ -425,15 +435,22 @@ func doTmpfsCopyUp(m mountEntry, mountLabel string) (Err error) {
}
defer tmpDirFile.Close()
hostRootFd, err := os.OpenFile("/", unix.O_DIRECTORY|unix.O_CLOEXEC|unix.O_PATH, 0)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("tmpcopyup: open host root: %w", err)
}
defer hostRootFd.Close()
// Configure the *host* tmpdir as if it's the container mount. We change
// m.dstFile since we are going to mount *on the host*.
hostMount := mountEntry{
Mount: m.Mount,
dstFile: tmpDirFile,
}
if err := hostMount.mountPropagate("/", mountLabel); err != nil {
if err := hostMount.mountPropagate(hostRootFd, mountLabel); err != nil {
return err
}
hostRootFd.Close()
defer func() {
if Err != nil {
if err := unmount(tmpDir, unix.MNT_DETACH); err != nil {
@@ -502,9 +519,10 @@ func statfsToMountFlags(st unix.Statfs_t) int {
return flags
}
func (m *mountEntry) createOpenMountpoint(rootfs string) (Err error) {
func (m *mountEntry) createOpenMountpoint(root *os.File) (Err error) {
rootfs := root.Name()
unsafePath := pathrs.LexicallyStripRoot(rootfs, m.Destination)
dstFile, err := pathrs.OpenInRoot(rootfs, unsafePath, unix.O_PATH)
dstFile, err := pathrs.OpenInRoot(root, unsafePath, unix.O_PATH)
defer func() {
if dstFile != nil && Err != nil {
_ = dstFile.Close()
@@ -541,9 +559,9 @@ func (m *mountEntry) createOpenMountpoint(rootfs string) (Err error) {
dstIsFile = !fi.IsDir()
}
if dstIsFile {
dstFile, err = pathrs.CreateInRoot(rootfs, unsafePath, unix.O_CREAT|unix.O_EXCL|unix.O_NOFOLLOW, 0o644)
dstFile, err = pathrs.CreateInRoot(root, unsafePath, unix.O_CREAT|unix.O_EXCL|unix.O_NOFOLLOW, 0o644)
} else {
dstFile, err = pathrs.MkdirAllInRoot(rootfs, unsafePath, 0o755)
dstFile, err = pathrs.MkdirAllInRoot(root, unsafePath, 0o755)
}
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("make mountpoint %q: %w", m.Destination, err)
@@ -589,7 +607,7 @@ func mountToRootfs(c *mountConfig, m mountEntry) error {
// has been a "fun" attack scenario in the past.
// TODO: This won't be necessary once we switch to libpathrs and we can
// stop all of these symlink-exchange attacks.
rootfs := c.root
rootfs := c.root.Name()
dest := filepath.Clean(m.Destination)
if !pathrs.IsLexicallyInRoot(rootfs, dest) {
// Do not use securejoin as it resolves symlinks.
@@ -936,7 +954,7 @@ func reOpenDevNull() error {
}
// Create the device nodes in the container.
func createDevices(config *configs.Config) error {
func createDevices(config *configs.Config, rootFd *os.File) error {
useBindMount := userns.RunningInUserNS() || config.Namespaces.Contains(configs.NEWUSER)
for _, node := range config.Devices {
@@ -947,7 +965,7 @@ func createDevices(config *configs.Config) error {
// containers running in a user namespace are not allowed to mknod
// devices so we can just bind mount it from the host.
if err := createDeviceNode(config.Rootfs, node, useBindMount); err != nil {
if err := createDeviceNode(rootFd, node, useBindMount); err != nil {
return err
}
}
@@ -967,12 +985,12 @@ func bindMountDeviceNode(destDir *os.File, destName string, node *devices.Device
}
// Creates the device node in the rootfs of the container.
func createDeviceNode(rootfs string, node *devices.Device, bind bool) error {
func createDeviceNode(rootFd *os.File, node *devices.Device, bind bool) error {
if node.Path == "" {
// The node only exists for cgroup reasons, ignore it here.
return nil
}
destDir, destName, err := pathrs.MkdirAllParentInRoot(rootfs, node.Path, 0o755)
destDir, destName, err := pathrs.MkdirAllParentInRoot(rootFd, node.Path, 0o755)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("mkdir parent of device inode %q: %w", node.Path, err)
}
@@ -1384,7 +1402,12 @@ func maskPaths(rootFs string, paths []string, mountLabel string) error {
// resolves the underlying inode via procfs and re-opens it through
// rootFd, so the resulting fd is anchored to the real path inside the
// container rootfs even if path was a /proc/self/fd/N alias.
reopened, err := reopenAfterMount(rootFs, dstFh, unix.O_PATH|unix.O_CLOEXEC)
rootFd, err := os.OpenFile(rootFs, unix.O_DIRECTORY|unix.O_CLOEXEC|unix.O_PATH, 0)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("open rootfs handle for masked paths: %w", err)
}
reopened, err := reopenAfterMount(rootFd, dstFh, unix.O_PATH|unix.O_CLOEXEC)
rootFd.Close()
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("can't reopen shared directory mask: %w", err)
}
@@ -1407,16 +1430,17 @@ func maskPaths(rootFs string, paths []string, mountLabel string) error {
return nil
}
func reopenAfterMount(rootfs string, f *os.File, flags int) (_ *os.File, Err error) {
func reopenAfterMount(rootFd, f *os.File, flags int) (_ *os.File, Err error) {
fullPath, err := procfs.ProcSelfFdReadlink(f)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("get full path: %w", err)
}
rootfs := rootFd.Name()
if !pathrs.IsLexicallyInRoot(rootfs, fullPath) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("mountpoint %q is outside of rootfs %q", fullPath, rootfs)
}
unsafePath := pathrs.LexicallyStripRoot(rootfs, fullPath)
reopened, err := pathrs.OpenInRoot(rootfs, unsafePath, flags)
reopened, err := pathrs.OpenInRoot(rootFd, unsafePath, flags)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("re-open mountpoint %q: %w", unsafePath, err)
}
@@ -1446,7 +1470,7 @@ func reopenAfterMount(rootfs string, f *os.File, flags int) (_ *os.File, Err err
// Do the mount operation followed by additional mounts required to take care
// of propagation flags. This will always be scoped inside the container rootfs.
func (m *mountEntry) mountPropagate(rootfs string, mountLabel string) error {
func (m *mountEntry) mountPropagate(rootFd *os.File, mountLabel string) error {
var (
data = label.FormatMountLabel(m.Data, mountLabel)
flags = m.Flags
@@ -1472,7 +1496,7 @@ func (m *mountEntry) mountPropagate(rootfs string, mountLabel string) error {
//
// TODO: Use move_mount(2) on newer kernels so that this is no longer
// necessary on modern systems.
newDstFile, err := reopenAfterMount(rootfs, m.dstFile, unix.O_PATH)
newDstFile, err := reopenAfterMount(rootFd, m.dstFile, unix.O_PATH)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("reopen mountpoint after mount: %w", err)
}