mirror/runc
1
0
Fork 0
mirror of https://github.com/opencontainers/runc.git synced 2026-07-11 06:03:57 +08:00
Code Issues Packages Projects Releases Wiki Activity

Merge pull request #4393 from cyphar/mkdirall-inroot-securejoin

Browse Source 
utils: switch to securejoin.MkdirAllHandle
This commit is contained in:
Akihiro Suda
2024-09-12 14:04:36 +09:00
committed by GitHub
parent f9f5764175 dd827f7b71
commit e8e8c029c7
82 changed files with 10771 additions and 4308 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files
go.mod
+2 -2
View File
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ require (
github.com/cilium/ebpf v0.12.3
github.com/containerd/console v1.0.4
github.com/coreos/go-systemd/v22 v22.5.0
github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin v0.2.4
github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin v0.3.1
github.com/docker/go-units v0.5.0
github.com/godbus/dbus/v5 v5.1.0
github.com/moby/sys/mountinfo v0.7.1
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ require (
github.com/urfave/cli v1.22.14
github.com/vishvananda/netlink v1.1.0
golang.org/x/net v0.24.0
golang.org/x/sys v0.19.0
golang.org/x/sys v0.22.0
google.golang.org/protobuf v1.33.0
)
go.sum
+6 -5
View File
@@ -9,8 +9,8 @@ github.com/coreos/go-systemd/v22 v22.5.0 h1:RrqgGjYQKalulkV8NGVIfkXQf6YYmOyiJKk8
github.com/coreos/go-systemd/v22 v22.5.0/go.mod h1:Y58oyj3AT4RCenI/lSvhwexgC+NSVTIJ3seZv2GcEnc=
github.com/cpuguy83/go-md2man/v2 v2.0.2 h1:p1EgwI/C7NhT0JmVkwCD2ZBK8j4aeHQX2pMHHBfMQ6w=
github.com/cpuguy83/go-md2man/v2 v2.0.2/go.mod h1:tgQtvFlXSQOSOSIRvRPT7W67SCa46tRHOmNcaadrF8o=
github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin v0.2.4 h1:Ugdm7cg7i6ZK6x3xDF1oEu1nfkyfH53EtKeQYTC3kyg=
github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin v0.2.4/go.mod h1:aPGpWjXOXUn2NCNjFvBE6aRxGGx79pTxQpKOJNYHHl4=
github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin v0.3.1 h1:1V7cHiaW+C+39wEfpH6XlLBQo3j/PciWFrgfCLS8XrE=
github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin v0.3.1/go.mod h1:F7i41x/9cBF7lzCrVsYs9fuzwRZm4NQsGTBdpp6mETc=
github.com/davecgh/go-spew v1.1.0/go.mod h1:J7Y8YcW2NihsgmVo/mv3lAwl/skON4iLHjSsI+c5H38=
github.com/davecgh/go-spew v1.1.1 h1:vj9j/u1bqnvCEfJOwUhtlOARqs3+rkHYY13jYWTU97c=
github.com/davecgh/go-spew v1.1.1/go.mod h1:J7Y8YcW2NihsgmVo/mv3lAwl/skON4iLHjSsI+c5H38=
@@ -58,8 +58,9 @@ github.com/stretchr/objx v0.5.0/go.mod h1:Yh+to48EsGEfYuaHDzXPcE3xhTkx73EhmCGUpE
github.com/stretchr/testify v1.7.0/go.mod h1:6Fq8oRcR53rry900zMqJjRRixrwX3KX962/h/Wwjteg=
github.com/stretchr/testify v1.7.1/go.mod h1:6Fq8oRcR53rry900zMqJjRRixrwX3KX962/h/Wwjteg=
github.com/stretchr/testify v1.8.0/go.mod h1:yNjHg4UonilssWZ8iaSj1OCr/vHnekPRkoO+kdMU+MU=
github.com/stretchr/testify v1.8.4 h1:CcVxjf3Q8PM0mHUKJCdn+eZZtm5yQwehR5yeSVQQcUk=
github.com/stretchr/testify v1.8.4/go.mod h1:sz/lmYIOXD/1dqDmKjjqLyZ2RngseejIcXlSw2iwfAo=
github.com/stretchr/testify v1.9.0 h1:HtqpIVDClZ4nwg75+f6Lvsy/wHu+3BoSGCbBAcpTsTg=
github.com/stretchr/testify v1.9.0/go.mod h1:r2ic/lqez/lEtzL7wO/rwa5dbSLXVDPFyf8C91i36aY=
github.com/syndtr/gocapability v0.0.0-20200815063812-42c35b437635 h1:kdXcSzyDtseVEc4yCz2qF8ZrQvIDBJLl4S1c3GCXmoI=
github.com/syndtr/gocapability v0.0.0-20200815063812-42c35b437635/go.mod h1:hkRG7XYTFWNJGYcbNJQlaLq0fg1yr4J4t/NcTQtrfww=
github.com/urfave/cli v1.22.14 h1:ebbhrRiGK2i4naQJr+1Xj92HXZCrK7MsyTS/ob3HnAk=
@@ -77,8 +78,8 @@ golang.org/x/sys v0.0.0-20210124154548-22da62e12c0c/go.mod h1:h1NjWce9XRLGQEsW7w
golang.org/x/sys v0.0.0-20220520151302-bc2c85ada10a/go.mod h1:oPkhp1MJrh7nUepCBck5+mAzfO9JrbApNNgaTdGDITg=
golang.org/x/sys v0.0.0-20220715151400-c0bba94af5f8/go.mod h1:oPkhp1MJrh7nUepCBck5+mAzfO9JrbApNNgaTdGDITg=
golang.org/x/sys v0.1.0/go.mod h1:oPkhp1MJrh7nUepCBck5+mAzfO9JrbApNNgaTdGDITg=
golang.org/x/sys v0.19.0 h1:q5f1RH2jigJ1MoAWp2KTp3gm5zAGFUTarQZ5U386+4o=
golang.org/x/sys v0.19.0/go.mod h1:/VUhepiaJMQUp4+oa/7Zr1D23ma6VTLIYjOOTFZPUcA=
golang.org/x/sys v0.22.0 h1:RI27ohtqKCnwULzJLqkv897zojh5/DwS/ENaMzUOaWI=
golang.org/x/sys v0.22.0/go.mod h1:/VUhepiaJMQUp4+oa/7Zr1D23ma6VTLIYjOOTFZPUcA=
golang.org/x/xerrors v0.0.0-20191204190536-9bdfabe68543/go.mod h1:I/5z698sn9Ka8TeJc9MKroUUfqBBauWjQqLJ2OPfmY0=
google.golang.org/protobuf v1.26.0-rc.1/go.mod h1:jlhhOSvTdKEhbULTjvd4ARK9grFBp09yW+WbY/TyQbw=
google.golang.org/protobuf v1.28.1/go.mod h1:HV8QOd/L58Z+nl8r43ehVNZIU/HEI6OcFqwMG9pJV4I=
libcontainer/system/linux.go
-41
View File
@@ -6,9 +6,7 @@ import (
"fmt"
"io"
"os"
"runtime"
"strconv"
"strings"
"syscall"
"unsafe"
@@ -216,42 +214,3 @@ func SetLinuxPersonality(personality int) error {
}
return nil
}
func prepareAt(dir *os.File, path string) (int, string) {
if dir == nil {
return unix.AT_FDCWD, path
}
// Rather than just filepath.Join-ing path here, do it manually so the
// error and handle correctly indicate cases like path=".." as being
// relative to the correct directory. The handle.Name() might end up being
// wrong but because this is (currently) only used in MkdirAllInRoot, that
// isn't a problem.
dirName := dir.Name()
if !strings.HasSuffix(dirName, "/") {
dirName += "/"
}
fullPath := dirName + path
return int(dir.Fd()), fullPath
}
func Openat(dir *os.File, path string, flags int, mode uint32) (*os.File, error) {
dirFd, fullPath := prepareAt(dir, path)
fd, err := unix.Openat(dirFd, path, flags, mode)
if err != nil {
return nil, &os.PathError{Op: "openat", Path: fullPath, Err: err}
}
runtime.KeepAlive(dir)
return os.NewFile(uintptr(fd), fullPath), nil
}
func Mkdirat(dir *os.File, path string, mode uint32) error {
dirFd, fullPath := prepareAt(dir, path)
err := unix.Mkdirat(dirFd, path, mode)
if err != nil {
err = &os.PathError{Op: "mkdirat", Path: fullPath, Err: err}
}
runtime.KeepAlive(dir)
return err
}
libcontainer/utils/utils_unix.go
+16 -65
View File
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@
package utils
import (
"errors"
"fmt"
"math"
"os"
@@ -14,8 +13,6 @@ import (
"sync"
_ "unsafe" // for go:linkname
"github.com/opencontainers/runc/libcontainer/system"
securejoin "github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin"
"github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
"golang.org/x/sys/unix"
@@ -299,23 +296,23 @@ func IsLexicallyInRoot(root, path string) bool {
// This means that the path also must not contain ".." elements, otherwise an
// error will occur.
//
// This is a somewhat less safe alternative to
// <https://github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin/pull/13>, but it should
// detect attempts to trick us into creating directories outside of the root.
// We should migrate to securejoin.MkdirAll once it is merged.
// This uses securejoin.MkdirAllHandle under the hood, but it has special
// handling if unsafePath has already been scoped within the rootfs (this is
// needed for a lot of runc callers and fixing this would require reworking a
// lot of path logic).
func MkdirAllInRootOpen(root, unsafePath string, mode uint32) (_ *os.File, Err error) {
// If the path is already "within" the root, use it verbatim.
fullPath := unsafePath
if !IsLexicallyInRoot(root, unsafePath) {
var err error
fullPath, err = securejoin.SecureJoin(root, unsafePath)
// If the path is already "within" the root, get the path relative to the
// root and use that as the unsafe path. This is necessary because a lot of
// MkdirAllInRootOpen callers have already done SecureJoin, and refactoring
// all of them to stop using these SecureJoin'd paths would require a fair
// amount of work.
// TODO(cyphar): Do the refactor to libpathrs once it's ready.
if IsLexicallyInRoot(root, unsafePath) {
subPath, err := filepath.Rel(root, unsafePath)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
}
subPath, err := filepath.Rel(root, fullPath)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
unsafePath = subPath
}
// Check for any silly mode bits.
@@ -323,59 +320,13 @@ func MkdirAllInRootOpen(root, unsafePath string, mode uint32) (_ *os.File, Err e
return nil, fmt.Errorf("tried to include non-mode bits in MkdirAll mode: 0o%.3o", mode)
}
currentDir, err := os.OpenFile(root, unix.O_DIRECTORY|unix.O_CLOEXEC, 0)
rootDir, err := os.OpenFile(root, unix.O_DIRECTORY|unix.O_CLOEXEC, 0)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("open root handle: %w", err)
}
defer func() {
if Err != nil {
currentDir.Close()
}
}()
defer rootDir.Close()
for _, part := range strings.Split(subPath, string(filepath.Separator)) {
switch part {
case "", ".":
// Skip over no-op components.
continue
case "..":
return nil, fmt.Errorf("possible breakout detected: found %q component in SecureJoin subpath %s", part, subPath)
}
nextDir, err := system.Openat(currentDir, part, unix.O_DIRECTORY|unix.O_NOFOLLOW|unix.O_CLOEXEC, 0)
switch {
case err == nil:
// Update the currentDir.
_ = currentDir.Close()
currentDir = nextDir
case errors.Is(err, unix.ENOTDIR):
// This might be a symlink or some other random file. Either way,
// error out.
return nil, fmt.Errorf("cannot mkdir in %s/%s: %w", currentDir.Name(), part, unix.ENOTDIR)
case errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist):
// Luckily, mkdirat will not follow trailing symlinks, so this is
// safe to do as-is.
if err := system.Mkdirat(currentDir, part, mode); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
// Open the new directory. There is a race here where an attacker
// could swap the directory with a different directory, but
// MkdirAll's fuzzy semantics mean we don't care about that.
nextDir, err := system.Openat(currentDir, part, unix.O_DIRECTORY|unix.O_NOFOLLOW|unix.O_CLOEXEC, 0)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("open newly created directory: %w", err)
}
// Update the currentDir.
_ = currentDir.Close()
currentDir = nextDir
default:
return nil, err
}
}
return currentDir, nil
return securejoin.MkdirAllHandle(rootDir, unsafePath, int(mode))
}
// MkdirAllInRoot is a wrapper around MkdirAllInRootOpen which closes the
vendor/github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin/CHANGELOG.md
Generated Vendored
+138
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,138 @@
# Changelog #
All notable changes to this project will be documented in this file.
The format is based on [Keep a Changelog](http://keepachangelog.com/)
and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](http://semver.org/).
## [Unreleased] ##
## [0.3.1] - 2024-07-23 ##
### Changed ###
- By allowing `Open(at)InRoot` to opt-out of the extra work done by `MkdirAll`
to do the necessary "partial lookups", `Open(at)InRoot` now does less work
for both implementations (resulting in a many-fold decrease in the number of
operations for `openat2`, and a modest improvement for non-`openat2`) and is
far more guaranteed to match the correct `openat2(RESOLVE_IN_ROOT)`
behaviour.
- We now use `readlinkat(fd, "")` where possible. For `Open(at)InRoot` this
effectively just means that we no longer risk getting spurious errors during
rename races. However, for our hardened procfs handler, this in theory should
prevent mount attacks from tricking us when doing magic-link readlinks (even
when using the unsafe host `/proc` handle). Unfortunately `Reopen` is still
potentially vulnerable to those kinds of somewhat-esoteric attacks.
Technically this [will only work on post-2.6.39 kernels][linux-readlinkat-emptypath]
but it seems incredibly unlikely anyone is using `filepath-securejoin` on a
pre-2011 kernel.
### Fixed ###
- Several improvements were made to the errors returned by `Open(at)InRoot` and
`MkdirAll` when dealing with invalid paths under the emulated (ie.
non-`openat2`) implementation. Previously, some paths would return the wrong
error (`ENOENT` when the last component was a non-directory), and other paths
would be returned as though they were acceptable (trailing-slash components
after a non-directory would be ignored by `Open(at)InRoot`).
These changes were done to match `openat2`'s behaviour and purely is a
consistency fix (most users are going to be using `openat2` anyway).
[linux-readlinkat-emptypath]: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=65cfc6722361570bfe255698d9cd4dccaf47570d
## [0.3.0] - 2024-07-11 ##
### Added ###
- A new set of `*os.File`-based APIs have been added. These are adapted from
[libpathrs][] and we strongly suggest using them if possible (as they provide
far more protection against attacks than `SecureJoin`):
- `Open(at)InRoot` resolves a path inside a rootfs and returns an `*os.File`
handle to the path. Note that the handle returned is an `O_PATH` handle,
which cannot be used for reading or writing (as well as some other
operations -- [see open(2) for more details][open.2])
- `Reopen` takes an `O_PATH` file handle and safely re-opens it to upgrade
it to a regular handle. This can also be used with non-`O_PATH` handles,
but `O_PATH` is the most obvious application.
- `MkdirAll` is an implementation of `os.MkdirAll` that is safe to use to
create a directory tree within a rootfs.
As these are new APIs, they may change in the future. However, they should be
safe to start migrating to as we have extensive tests ensuring they behave
correctly and are safe against various races and other attacks.
[libpathrs]: https://github.com/openSUSE/libpathrs
[open.2]: https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/open.2.html
## [0.2.5] - 2024-05-03 ##
### Changed ###
- Some minor changes were made to how lexical components (like `..` and `.`)
are handled during path generation in `SecureJoin`. There is no behaviour
change as a result of this fix (the resulting paths are the same).
### Fixed ###
- The error returned when we hit a symlink loop now references the correct
path. (#10)
## [0.2.4] - 2023-09-06 ##
### Security ###
- This release fixes a potential security issue in filepath-securejoin when
used on Windows ([GHSA-6xv5-86q9-7xr8][], which could be used to generate
paths outside of the provided rootfs in certain cases), as well as improving
the overall behaviour of filepath-securejoin when dealing with Windows paths
that contain volume names. Thanks to Paulo Gomes for discovering and fixing
these issues.
### Fixed ###
- Switch to GitHub Actions for CI so we can test on Windows as well as Linux
and MacOS.
[GHSA-6xv5-86q9-7xr8]: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-6xv5-86q9-7xr8
## [0.2.3] - 2021-06-04 ##
### Changed ###
- Switch to Go 1.13-style `%w` error wrapping, letting us drop the dependency
on `github.com/pkg/errors`.
## [0.2.2] - 2018-09-05 ##
### Changed ###
- Use `syscall.ELOOP` as the base error for symlink loops, rather than our own
(internal) error. This allows callers to more easily use `errors.Is` to check
for this case.
## [0.2.1] - 2018-09-05 ##
### Fixed ###
- Use our own `IsNotExist` implementation, which lets us handle `ENOTDIR`
properly within `SecureJoin`.
## [0.2.0] - 2017-07-19 ##
We now have 100% test coverage!
### Added ###
- Add a `SecureJoinVFS` API that can be used for mocking (as we do in our new
tests) or for implementing custom handling of lookup operations (such as for
rootless containers, where work is necessary to access directories with weird
modes because we don't have `CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH` or `CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE`).
## 0.1.0 - 2017-07-19
This is our first release of `github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin`,
containing a full implementation with a coverage of 93.5% (the only missing
cases are the error cases, which are hard to mocktest at the moment).
[Unreleased]: https://github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin/compare/v0.3.1...HEAD
[0.3.1]: https://github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin/compare/v0.3.0...v0.3.1
[0.3.0]: https://github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin/compare/v0.2.5...v0.3.0
[0.2.5]: https://github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin/compare/v0.2.4...v0.2.5
[0.2.4]: https://github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin/compare/v0.2.3...v0.2.4
[0.2.3]: https://github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin/compare/v0.2.2...v0.2.3
[0.2.2]: https://github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin/compare/v0.2.1...v0.2.2
[0.2.1]: https://github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin/compare/v0.2.0...v0.2.1
[0.2.0]: https://github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin/compare/v0.1.0...v0.2.0
vendor/github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin/LICENSE
Generated Vendored
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
Copyright (C) 2014-2015 Docker Inc & Go Authors. All rights reserved.
Copyright (C) 2017 SUSE LLC. All rights reserved.
Copyright (C) 2017-2024 SUSE LLC. All rights reserved.
Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are
vendor/github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin/README.md
Generated Vendored
+112 -23
View File
@@ -2,31 +2,24 @@
[![Build Status](https://github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin/actions/workflows/ci.yml/badge.svg)](https://github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin/actions/workflows/ci.yml)
An implementation of `SecureJoin`, a [candidate for inclusion in the Go
standard library][go#20126]. The purpose of this function is to be a "secure"
alternative to `filepath.Join`, and in particular it provides certain
guarantees that are not provided by `filepath.Join`.
### Old API ###
> **NOTE**: This code is *only* safe if you are not at risk of other processes
> modifying path components after you've used `SecureJoin`. If it is possible
> for a malicious process to modify path components of the resolved path, then
> you will be vulnerable to some fairly trivial TOCTOU race conditions. [There
> are some Linux kernel patches I'm working on which might allow for a better
> solution.][lwn-obeneath]
>
> In addition, with a slightly modified API it might be possible to use
> `O_PATH` and verify that the opened path is actually the resolved one -- but
> I have not done that yet. I might add it in the future as a helper function
> to help users verify the path (we can't just return `/proc/self/fd/<foo>`
> because that doesn't always work transparently for all users).
This library was originally just an implementation of `SecureJoin` which was
[intended to be included in the Go standard library][go#20126] as a safer
`filepath.Join` that would restrict the path lookup to be inside a root
directory.
This is the function prototype:
The implementation was based on code that existed in several container
runtimes. Unfortunately, this API is **fundamentally unsafe** against attackers
that can modify path components after `SecureJoin` returns and before the
caller uses the path, allowing for some fairly trivial TOCTOU attacks.
```go
func SecureJoin(root, unsafePath string) (string, error)
```
`SecureJoin` (and `SecureJoinVFS`) are still provided by this library to
support legacy users, but new users are strongly suggested to avoid using
`SecureJoin` and instead use the [new api](#new-api) or switch to
[libpathrs][libpathrs].
This library **guarantees** the following:
With the above limitations in mind, this library guarantees the following:
* If no error is set, the resulting string **must** be a child path of
`root` and will not contain any symlink path components (they will all be
@@ -47,7 +40,7 @@ This library **guarantees** the following:
A (trivial) implementation of this function on GNU/Linux systems could be done
with the following (note that this requires root privileges and is far more
opaque than the implementation in this library, and also requires that
`readlink` is inside the `root` path):
`readlink` is inside the `root` path and is trustworthy):
```go
package securejoin
@@ -70,9 +63,105 @@ func SecureJoin(root, unsafePath string) (string, error) {
}
```
[lwn-obeneath]: https://lwn.net/Articles/767547/
[libpathrs]: https://github.com/openSUSE/libpathrs
[go#20126]: https://github.com/golang/go/issues/20126
### New API ###
While we recommend users switch to [libpathrs][libpathrs] as soon as it has a
stable release, some methods implemented by libpathrs have been ported to this
library to ease the transition. These APIs are only supported on Linux.
These APIs are implemented such that `filepath-securejoin` will
opportunistically use certain newer kernel APIs that make these operations far
more secure. In particular:
* All of the lookup operations will use [`openat2`][openat2.2] on new enough
kernels (Linux 5.6 or later) to restrict lookups through magic-links and
bind-mounts (for certain operations) and to make use of `RESOLVE_IN_ROOT` to
efficiently resolve symlinks within a rootfs.
* The APIs provide hardening against a malicious `/proc` mount to either detect
or avoid being tricked by a `/proc` that is not legitimate. This is done
using [`openat2`][openat2.2] for all users, and privileged users will also be
further protected by using [`fsopen`][fsopen.2] and [`open_tree`][open_tree.2]
(Linux 4.18 or later).
[openat2.2]: https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/openat2.2.html
[fsopen.2]: https://github.com/brauner/man-pages-md/blob/main/fsopen.md
[open_tree.2]: https://github.com/brauner/man-pages-md/blob/main/open_tree.md
#### `OpenInRoot` ####
```go
func OpenInRoot(root, unsafePath string) (*os.File, error)
func OpenatInRoot(root *os.File, unsafePath string) (*os.File, error)
func Reopen(handle *os.File, flags int) (*os.File, error)
```
`OpenInRoot` is a much safer version of
```go
path, err := securejoin.SecureJoin(root, unsafePath)
file, err := os.OpenFile(path, unix.O_PATH|unix.O_CLOEXEC)
```
that protects against various race attacks that could lead to serious security
issues, depending on the application. Note that the returned `*os.File` is an
`O_PATH` file descriptor, which is quite restricted. Callers will probably need
to use `Reopen` to get a more usable handle (this split is done to provide
useful features like PTY spawning and to avoid users accidentally opening bad
inodes that could cause a DoS).
Callers need to be careful in how they use the returned `*os.File`. Usually it
is only safe to operate on the handle directly, and it is very easy to create a
security issue. [libpathrs][libpathrs] provides far more helpers to make using
these handles safer -- there is currently no plan to port them to
`filepath-securejoin`.
`OpenatInRoot` is like `OpenInRoot` except that the root is provided using an
`*os.File`. This allows you to ensure that multiple `OpenatInRoot` (or
`MkdirAllHandle`) calls are operating on the same rootfs.
> **NOTE**: Unlike `SecureJoin`, `OpenInRoot` will error out as soon as it hits
> a dangling symlink or non-existent path. This is in contrast to `SecureJoin`
> which treated non-existent components as though they were real directories,
> and would allow for partial resolution of dangling symlinks. These behaviours
> are at odds with how Linux treats non-existent paths and dangling symlinks,
> and so these are no longer allowed.
#### `MkdirAll` ####
```go
func MkdirAll(root, unsafePath string, mode int) error
func MkdirAllHandle(root *os.File, unsafePath string, mode int) (*os.File, error)
```
`MkdirAll` is a much safer version of
```go
path, err := securejoin.SecureJoin(root, unsafePath)
err = os.MkdirAll(path, mode)
```
that protects against the same kinds of races that `OpenInRoot` protects
against.
`MkdirAllHandle` is like `MkdirAll` except that the root is provided using an
`*os.File` (the reason for this is the same as with `OpenatInRoot`) and an
`*os.File` of the final created directory is returned (this directory is
guaranteed to be effectively identical to the directory created by
`MkdirAllHandle`, which is not possible to ensure by just using `OpenatInRoot`
after `MkdirAll`).
> **NOTE**: Unlike `SecureJoin`, `MkdirAll` will error out as soon as it hits
> a dangling symlink or non-existent path. This is in contrast to `SecureJoin`
> which treated non-existent components as though they were real directories,
> and would allow for partial resolution of dangling symlinks. These behaviours
> are at odds with how Linux treats non-existent paths and dangling symlinks,
> and so these are no longer allowed. This means that `MkdirAll` will not
> create non-existent directories referenced by a dangling symlink.
### License ###
The license of this project is the same as Go, which is a BSD 3-clause license
vendor/github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin/VERSION
Generated Vendored
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1 +1 @@
0.2.4
0.3.1
vendor/github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin/join.go
Generated Vendored
+45 -40
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
// Copyright (C) 2014-2015 Docker Inc & Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Copyright (C) 2017 SUSE LLC. All rights reserved.
// Copyright (C) 2017-2024 SUSE LLC. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
@@ -11,7 +11,6 @@
package securejoin
import (
"bytes"
"errors"
"os"
"path/filepath"
@@ -19,6 +18,8 @@ import (
"syscall"
)
const maxSymlinkLimit = 255
// IsNotExist tells you if err is an error that implies that either the path
// accessed does not exist (or path components don't exist). This is
// effectively a more broad version of os.IsNotExist.
@@ -40,6 +41,12 @@ func IsNotExist(err error) bool {
// replaced with symlinks on the filesystem) after this function has returned.
// Such a symlink race is necessarily out-of-scope of SecureJoin.
//
// NOTE: Due to the above limitation, Linux users are strongly encouraged to
// use OpenInRoot instead, which does safely protect against these kinds of
// attacks. There is no way to solve this problem with SecureJoinVFS because
// the API is fundamentally wrong (you cannot return a "safe" path string and
// guarantee it won't be modified afterwards).
//
// Volume names in unsafePath are always discarded, regardless if they are
// provided via direct input or when evaluating symlinks. Therefore:
//
@@ -51,71 +58,69 @@ func SecureJoinVFS(root, unsafePath string, vfs VFS) (string, error) {
}
unsafePath = filepath.FromSlash(unsafePath)
var path bytes.Buffer
n := 0
for unsafePath != "" {
if n > 255 {
return "", &os.PathError{Op: "SecureJoin", Path: root + string(filepath.Separator) + unsafePath, Err: syscall.ELOOP}
var (
currentPath string
remainingPath = unsafePath
linksWalked int
)
for remainingPath != "" {
if v := filepath.VolumeName(remainingPath); v != "" {
remainingPath = remainingPath[len(v):]
}
if v := filepath.VolumeName(unsafePath); v != "" {
unsafePath = unsafePath[len(v):]
}
// Next path component, p.
i := strings.IndexRune(unsafePath, filepath.Separator)
var p string
if i == -1 {
p, unsafePath = unsafePath, ""
// Get the next path component.
var part string
if i := strings.IndexRune(remainingPath, filepath.Separator); i == -1 {
part, remainingPath = remainingPath, ""
} else {
p, unsafePath = unsafePath[:i], unsafePath[i+1:]
part, remainingPath = remainingPath[:i], remainingPath[i+1:]
}
// Create a cleaned path, using the lexical semantics of /../a, to
// create a "scoped" path component which can safely be joined to fullP
// for evaluation. At this point, path.String() doesn't contain any
// symlink components.
cleanP := filepath.Clean(string(filepath.Separator) + path.String() + p)
if cleanP == string(filepath.Separator) {
path.Reset()
// Apply the component lexically to the path we are building.
// currentPath does not contain any symlinks, and we are lexically
// dealing with a single component, so it's okay to do a filepath.Clean
// here.
nextPath := filepath.Join(string(filepath.Separator), currentPath, part)
if nextPath == string(filepath.Separator) {
currentPath = ""
continue
}
fullP := filepath.Clean(root + cleanP)
fullPath := root + string(filepath.Separator) + nextPath
// Figure out whether the path is a symlink.
fi, err := vfs.Lstat(fullP)
fi, err := vfs.Lstat(fullPath)
if err != nil && !IsNotExist(err) {
return "", err
}
// Treat non-existent path components the same as non-symlinks (we
// can't do any better here).
if IsNotExist(err) || fi.Mode()&os.ModeSymlink == 0 {
path.WriteString(p)
path.WriteRune(filepath.Separator)
currentPath = nextPath
continue
}
// Only increment when we actually dereference a link.
n++
// It's a symlink, so get its contents and expand it by prepending it
// to the yet-unparsed path.
linksWalked++
if linksWalked > maxSymlinkLimit {
return "", &os.PathError{Op: "SecureJoin", Path: root + string(filepath.Separator) + unsafePath, Err: syscall.ELOOP}
}
// It's a symlink, expand it by prepending it to the yet-unparsed path.
dest, err := vfs.Readlink(fullP)
dest, err := vfs.Readlink(fullPath)
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
remainingPath = dest + string(filepath.Separator) + remainingPath
// Absolute symlinks reset any work we've already done.
if filepath.IsAbs(dest) {
path.Reset()
currentPath = ""
}
unsafePath = dest + string(filepath.Separator) + unsafePath
}
// We have to clean path.String() here because it may contain '..'
// components that are entirely lexical, but would be misleading otherwise.
// And finally do a final clean to ensure that root is also lexically
// clean.
fullP := filepath.Clean(string(filepath.Separator) + path.String())
return filepath.Clean(root + fullP), nil
// There should be no lexical components like ".." left in the path here,
// but for safety clean up the path before joining it to the root.
finalPath := filepath.Join(string(filepath.Separator), currentPath)
return filepath.Join(root, finalPath), nil
}
// SecureJoin is a wrapper around SecureJoinVFS that just uses the os.* library
vendor/github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin/lookup_linux.go
Generated Vendored
+389
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,389 @@
//go:build linux
// Copyright (C) 2024 SUSE LLC. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
package securejoin
import (
"errors"
"fmt"
"os"
"path"
"path/filepath"
"slices"
"strings"
"golang.org/x/sys/unix"
)
type symlinkStackEntry struct {
// (dir, remainingPath) is what we would've returned if the link didn't
// exist. This matches what openat2(RESOLVE_IN_ROOT) would return in
// this case.
dir *os.File
remainingPath string
// linkUnwalked is the remaining path components from the original
// Readlink which we have yet to walk. When this slice is empty, we
// drop the link from the stack.
linkUnwalked []string
}
func (se symlinkStackEntry) String() string {
return fmt.Sprintf("<%s>/%s [->%s]", se.dir.Name(), se.remainingPath, strings.Join(se.linkUnwalked, "/"))
}
func (se symlinkStackEntry) Close() {
_ = se.dir.Close()
}
type symlinkStack []*symlinkStackEntry
func (s *symlinkStack) IsEmpty() bool {
return s == nil || len(*s) == 0
}
func (s *symlinkStack) Close() {
if s != nil {
for _, link := range *s {
link.Close()
}
// TODO: Switch to clear once we switch to Go 1.21.
*s = nil
}
}
var (
errEmptyStack = errors.New("[internal] stack is empty")
errBrokenSymlinkStack = errors.New("[internal error] broken symlink stack")
)
func (s *symlinkStack) popPart(part string) error {
if s == nil || s.IsEmpty() {
// If there is nothing in the symlink stack, then the part was from the
// real path provided by the user, and this is a no-op.
return errEmptyStack
}
if part == "." {
// "." components are no-ops -- we drop them when doing SwapLink.
return nil
}
tailEntry := (*s)[len(*s)-1]
// Double-check that we are popping the component we expect.
if len(tailEntry.linkUnwalked) == 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("%w: trying to pop component %q of empty stack entry %s", errBrokenSymlinkStack, part, tailEntry)
}
headPart := tailEntry.linkUnwalked[0]
if headPart != part {
return fmt.Errorf("%w: trying to pop component %q but the last stack entry is %s (%q)", errBrokenSymlinkStack, part, tailEntry, headPart)
}
// Drop the component, but keep the entry around in case we are dealing
// with a "tail-chained" symlink.
tailEntry.linkUnwalked = tailEntry.linkUnwalked[1:]
return nil
}
func (s *symlinkStack) PopPart(part string) error {
if err := s.popPart(part); err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, errEmptyStack) {
// Skip empty stacks.
err = nil
}
return err
}
// Clean up any of the trailing stack entries that are empty.
for lastGood := len(*s) - 1; lastGood >= 0; lastGood-- {
entry := (*s)[lastGood]
if len(entry.linkUnwalked) > 0 {
break
}
entry.Close()
(*s) = (*s)[:lastGood]
}
return nil
}
func (s *symlinkStack) push(dir *os.File, remainingPath, linkTarget string) error {
if s == nil {
return nil
}
// Split the link target and clean up any "" parts.
linkTargetParts := slices.DeleteFunc(
strings.Split(linkTarget, "/"),
func(part string) bool { return part == "" || part == "." })
// Copy the directory so the caller doesn't close our copy.
dirCopy, err := dupFile(dir)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// Add to the stack.
*s = append(*s, &symlinkStackEntry{
dir: dirCopy,
remainingPath: remainingPath,
linkUnwalked: linkTargetParts,
})
return nil
}
func (s *symlinkStack) SwapLink(linkPart string, dir *os.File, remainingPath, linkTarget string) error {
// If we are currently inside a symlink resolution, remove the symlink
// component from the last symlink entry, but don't remove the entry even
// if it's empty. If we are a "tail-chained" symlink (a trailing symlink we
// hit during a symlink resolution) we need to keep the old symlink until
// we finish the resolution.
if err := s.popPart(linkPart); err != nil {
if !errors.Is(err, errEmptyStack) {
return err
}
// Push the component regardless of whether the stack was empty.
}
return s.push(dir, remainingPath, linkTarget)
}
func (s *symlinkStack) PopTopSymlink() (*os.File, string, bool) {
if s == nil || s.IsEmpty() {
return nil, "", false
}
tailEntry := (*s)[0]
*s = (*s)[1:]
return tailEntry.dir, tailEntry.remainingPath, true
}
// partialLookupInRoot tries to lookup as much of the request path as possible
// within the provided root (a-la RESOLVE_IN_ROOT) and opens the final existing
// component of the requested path, returning a file handle to the final
// existing component and a string containing the remaining path components.
func partialLookupInRoot(root *os.File, unsafePath string) (*os.File, string, error) {
return lookupInRoot(root, unsafePath, true)
}
func completeLookupInRoot(root *os.File, unsafePath string) (*os.File, error) {
handle, remainingPath, err := lookupInRoot(root, unsafePath, false)
if remainingPath != "" && err == nil {
// should never happen
err = fmt.Errorf("[bug] non-empty remaining path when doing a non-partial lookup: %q", remainingPath)
}
// lookupInRoot(partial=false) will always close the handle if an error is
// returned, so no need to double-check here.
return handle, err
}
func lookupInRoot(root *os.File, unsafePath string, partial bool) (Handle *os.File, _ string, _ error) {
unsafePath = filepath.ToSlash(unsafePath) // noop
// This is very similar to SecureJoin, except that we operate on the
// components using file descriptors. We then return the last component we
// managed open, along with the remaining path components not opened.
// Try to use openat2 if possible.
if hasOpenat2() {
return lookupOpenat2(root, unsafePath, partial)
}
// Get the "actual" root path from /proc/self/fd. This is necessary if the
// root is some magic-link like /proc/$pid/root, in which case we want to
// make sure when we do checkProcSelfFdPath that we are using the correct
// root path.
logicalRootPath, err := procSelfFdReadlink(root)
if err != nil {
return nil, "", fmt.Errorf("get real root path: %w", err)
}
currentDir, err := dupFile(root)
if err != nil {
return nil, "", fmt.Errorf("clone root fd: %w", err)
}
defer func() {
// If a handle is not returned, close the internal handle.
if Handle == nil {
_ = currentDir.Close()
}
}()
// symlinkStack is used to emulate how openat2(RESOLVE_IN_ROOT) treats
// dangling symlinks. If we hit a non-existent path while resolving a
// symlink, we need to return the (dir, remainingPath) that we had when we
// hit the symlink (treating the symlink as though it were a regular file).
// The set of (dir, remainingPath) sets is stored within the symlinkStack
// and we add and remove parts when we hit symlink and non-symlink
// components respectively. We need a stack because of recursive symlinks
// (symlinks that contain symlink components in their target).
//
// Note that the stack is ONLY used for book-keeping. All of the actual
// path walking logic is still based on currentPath/remainingPath and
// currentDir (as in SecureJoin).
var symStack *symlinkStack
if partial {
symStack = new(symlinkStack)
defer symStack.Close()
}
var (
linksWalked int
currentPath string
remainingPath = unsafePath
)
for remainingPath != "" {
// Save the current remaining path so if the part is not real we can
// return the path including the component.
oldRemainingPath := remainingPath
// Get the next path component.
var part string
if i := strings.IndexByte(remainingPath, '/'); i == -1 {
part, remainingPath = remainingPath, ""
} else {
part, remainingPath = remainingPath[:i], remainingPath[i+1:]
}
// If we hit an empty component, we need to treat it as though it is
// "." so that trailing "/" and "//" components on a non-directory
// correctly return the right error code.
if part == "" {
part = "."
}
// Apply the component lexically to the path we are building.
// currentPath does not contain any symlinks, and we are lexically
// dealing with a single component, so it's okay to do a filepath.Clean
// here.
nextPath := path.Join("/", currentPath, part)
// If we logically hit the root, just clone the root rather than
// opening the part and doing all of the other checks.
if nextPath == "/" {
if err := symStack.PopPart(part); err != nil {
return nil, "", fmt.Errorf("walking into root with part %q failed: %w", part, err)
}
// Jump to root.
rootClone, err := dupFile(root)
if err != nil {
return nil, "", fmt.Errorf("clone root fd: %w", err)
}
_ = currentDir.Close()
currentDir = rootClone
currentPath = nextPath
continue
}
// Try to open the next component.
nextDir, err := openatFile(currentDir, part, unix.O_PATH|unix.O_NOFOLLOW|unix.O_CLOEXEC, 0)
switch {
case err == nil:
st, err := nextDir.Stat()
if err != nil {
_ = nextDir.Close()
return nil, "", fmt.Errorf("stat component %q: %w", part, err)
}
switch st.Mode() & os.ModeType {
case os.ModeSymlink:
// readlinkat implies AT_EMPTY_PATH since Linux 2.6.39. See
// Linux commit 65cfc6722361 ("readlinkat(), fchownat() and
// fstatat() with empty relative pathnames").
linkDest, err := readlinkatFile(nextDir, "")
// We don't need the handle anymore.
_ = nextDir.Close()
if err != nil {
return nil, "", err
}
linksWalked++
if linksWalked > maxSymlinkLimit {
return nil, "", &os.PathError{Op: "securejoin.lookupInRoot", Path: logicalRootPath + "/" + unsafePath, Err: unix.ELOOP}
}
// Swap out the symlink's component for the link entry itself.
if err := symStack.SwapLink(part, currentDir, oldRemainingPath, linkDest); err != nil {
return nil, "", fmt.Errorf("walking into symlink %q failed: push symlink: %w", part, err)
}
// Update our logical remaining path.
remainingPath = linkDest + "/" + remainingPath
// Absolute symlinks reset any work we've already done.
if path.IsAbs(linkDest) {
// Jump to root.
rootClone, err := dupFile(root)
if err != nil {
return nil, "", fmt.Errorf("clone root fd: %w", err)
}
_ = currentDir.Close()
currentDir = rootClone
currentPath = "/"
}
default:
// If we are dealing with a directory, simply walk into it.
_ = currentDir.Close()
currentDir = nextDir
currentPath = nextPath
// The part was real, so drop it from the symlink stack.
if err := symStack.PopPart(part); err != nil {
return nil, "", fmt.Errorf("walking into directory %q failed: %w", part, err)
}
// If we are operating on a .., make sure we haven't escaped.
// We only have to check for ".." here because walking down
// into a regular component component cannot cause you to
// escape. This mirrors the logic in RESOLVE_IN_ROOT, except we
// have to check every ".." rather than only checking after a
// rename or mount on the system.
if part == ".." {
// Make sure the root hasn't moved.
if err := checkProcSelfFdPath(logicalRootPath, root); err != nil {
return nil, "", fmt.Errorf("root path moved during lookup: %w", err)
}
// Make sure the path is what we expect.
fullPath := logicalRootPath + nextPath
if err := checkProcSelfFdPath(fullPath, currentDir); err != nil {
return nil, "", fmt.Errorf("walking into %q had unexpected result: %w", part, err)
}
}
}
default:
if !partial {
return nil, "", err
}
// If there are any remaining components in the symlink stack, we
// are still within a symlink resolution and thus we hit a dangling
// symlink. So pretend that the first symlink in the stack we hit
// was an ENOENT (to match openat2).
if oldDir, remainingPath, ok := symStack.PopTopSymlink(); ok {
_ = currentDir.Close()
return oldDir, remainingPath, err
}
// We have hit a final component that doesn't exist, so we have our
// partial open result. Note that we have to use the OLD remaining
// path, since the lookup failed.
return currentDir, oldRemainingPath, err
}
}
// If the unsafePath had a trailing slash, we need to make sure we try to
// do a relative "." open so that we will correctly return an error when
// the final component is a non-directory (to match openat2). In the
// context of openat2, a trailing slash and a trailing "/." are completely
// equivalent.
if strings.HasSuffix(unsafePath, "/") {
nextDir, err := openatFile(currentDir, ".", unix.O_PATH|unix.O_NOFOLLOW|unix.O_CLOEXEC, 0)
if err != nil {
if !partial {
_ = currentDir.Close()
currentDir = nil
}
return currentDir, "", err
}
_ = currentDir.Close()
currentDir = nextDir
}
// All of the components existed!
return currentDir, "", nil
}
vendor/github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin/mkdir_linux.go
Generated Vendored
+229
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,229 @@
//go:build linux
// Copyright (C) 2024 SUSE LLC. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
package securejoin
import (
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"slices"
"strings"
"golang.org/x/sys/unix"
)
var (
errInvalidMode = errors.New("invalid permission mode")
errPossibleAttack = errors.New("possible attack detected")
)
// MkdirAllHandle is equivalent to MkdirAll, except that it is safer to use in
// two respects:
//
// - The caller provides the root directory as an *os.File (preferably O_PATH)
// handle. This means that the caller can be sure which root directory is
// being used. Note that this can be emulated by using /proc/self/fd/... as
// the root path with MkdirAll.
//
// - Once all of the directories have been created, an *os.File (O_PATH) handle
// to the directory at unsafePath is returned to the caller. This is done in
// an effectively-race-free way (an attacker would only be able to swap the
// final directory component), which is not possible to emulate with
// MkdirAll.
//
// In addition, the returned handle is obtained far more efficiently than doing
// a brand new lookup of unsafePath (such as with SecureJoin or openat2) after
// doing MkdirAll. If you intend to open the directory after creating it, you
// should use MkdirAllHandle.
func MkdirAllHandle(root *os.File, unsafePath string, mode int) (_ *os.File, Err error) {
// Make sure there are no os.FileMode bits set.
if mode&^0o7777 != 0 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w for mkdir 0o%.3o", errInvalidMode, mode)
}
// Try to open as much of the path as possible.
currentDir, remainingPath, err := partialLookupInRoot(root, unsafePath)
defer func() {
if Err != nil {
_ = currentDir.Close()
}
}()
if err != nil && !errors.Is(err, unix.ENOENT) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("find existing subpath of %q: %w", unsafePath, err)
}
// If there is an attacker deleting directories as we walk into them,
// detect this proactively. Note this is guaranteed to detect if the
// attacker deleted any part of the tree up to currentDir.
//
// Once we walk into a dead directory, partialLookupInRoot would not be
// able to walk further down the tree (directories must be empty before
// they are deleted), and if the attacker has removed the entire tree we
// can be sure that anything that was originally inside a dead directory
// must also be deleted and thus is a dead directory in its own right.
//
// This is mostly a quality-of-life check, because mkdir will simply fail
// later if the attacker deletes the tree after this check.
if err := isDeadInode(currentDir); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("finding existing subpath of %q: %w", unsafePath, err)
}
// Re-open the path to match the O_DIRECTORY reopen loop later (so that we
// always return a non-O_PATH handle). We also check that we actually got a
// directory.
if reopenDir, err := Reopen(currentDir, unix.O_DIRECTORY|unix.O_CLOEXEC); errors.Is(err, unix.ENOTDIR) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("cannot create subdirectories in %q: %w", currentDir.Name(), unix.ENOTDIR)
} else if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("re-opening handle to %q: %w", currentDir.Name(), err)
} else {
_ = currentDir.Close()
currentDir = reopenDir
}
remainingParts := strings.Split(remainingPath, string(filepath.Separator))
if slices.Contains(remainingParts, "..") {
// The path contained ".." components after the end of the "real"
// components. We could try to safely resolve ".." here but that would
// add a bunch of extra logic for something that it's not clear even
// needs to be supported. So just return an error.
//
// If we do filepath.Clean(remainingPath) then we end up with the
// problem that ".." can erase a trailing dangling symlink and produce
// a path that doesn't quite match what the user asked for.
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: yet-to-be-created path %q contains '..' components", unix.ENOENT, remainingPath)
}
// Make sure the mode doesn't have any type bits.
mode &^= unix.S_IFMT
// What properties do we expect any newly created directories to have?
var (
// While umask(2) is a per-thread property, and thus this value could
// vary between threads, a functioning Go program would LockOSThread
// threads with different umasks and so we don't need to LockOSThread
// for this entire mkdirat loop (if we are in the locked thread with a
// different umask, we are already locked and there's nothing for us to
// do -- and if not then it doesn't matter which thread we run on and
// there's nothing for us to do).
expectedMode = uint32(unix.S_IFDIR | (mode &^ getUmask()))
// We would want to get the fs[ug]id here, but we can't access those
// from userspace. In practice, nobody uses setfs[ug]id() anymore, so
// just use the effective [ug]id (which is equivalent to the fs[ug]id
// for programs that don't use setfs[ug]id).
expectedUid = uint32(unix.Geteuid())
expectedGid = uint32(unix.Getegid())
)
// Create the remaining components.
for _, part := range remainingParts {
switch part {
case "", ".":
// Skip over no-op paths.
continue
}
// NOTE: mkdir(2) will not follow trailing symlinks, so we can safely
// create the finaly component without worrying about symlink-exchange
// attacks.
if err := unix.Mkdirat(int(currentDir.Fd()), part, uint32(mode)); err != nil {
err = &os.PathError{Op: "mkdirat", Path: currentDir.Name() + "/" + part, Err: err}
// Make the error a bit nicer if the directory is dead.
if err2 := isDeadInode(currentDir); err2 != nil {
err = fmt.Errorf("%w (%w)", err, err2)
}
return nil, err
}
// Get a handle to the next component. O_DIRECTORY means we don't need
// to use O_PATH.
var nextDir *os.File
if hasOpenat2() {
nextDir, err = openat2File(currentDir, part, &unix.OpenHow{
Flags: unix.O_NOFOLLOW | unix.O_DIRECTORY | unix.O_CLOEXEC,
Resolve: unix.RESOLVE_BENEATH | unix.RESOLVE_NO_SYMLINKS | unix.RESOLVE_NO_XDEV,
})
} else {
nextDir, err = openatFile(currentDir, part, unix.O_NOFOLLOW|unix.O_DIRECTORY|unix.O_CLOEXEC, 0)
}
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
_ = currentDir.Close()
currentDir = nextDir
// Make sure that the directory matches what we expect. An attacker
// could have swapped the directory between us making it and opening
// it. There's no way for us to be sure that the directory is
// _precisely_ the same as the directory we created, but if we are in
// an empty directory with the same owner and mode as the one we
// created then there is nothing the attacker could do with this new
// directory that they couldn't do with the old one.
if stat, err := fstat(currentDir); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("check newly created directory: %w", err)
} else {
if stat.Mode != expectedMode {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: newly created directory %q has incorrect mode 0o%.3o (expected 0o%.3o)", errPossibleAttack, currentDir.Name(), stat.Mode, expectedMode)
}
if stat.Uid != expectedUid || stat.Gid != expectedGid {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: newly created directory %q has incorrect owner %d:%d (expected %d:%d)", errPossibleAttack, currentDir.Name(), stat.Uid, stat.Gid, expectedUid, expectedGid)
}
// Check that the directory is empty. We only need to check for
// a single entry, and we should get EOF if the directory is
// empty.
_, err := currentDir.Readdirnames(1)
if !errors.Is(err, io.EOF) {
if err == nil {
err = fmt.Errorf("%w: newly created directory %q is non-empty", errPossibleAttack, currentDir.Name())
}
return nil, fmt.Errorf("check if newly created directory %q is empty: %w", currentDir.Name(), err)
}
// Reset the offset.
_, _ = currentDir.Seek(0, unix.SEEK_SET)
}
}
return currentDir, nil
}
// MkdirAll is a race-safe alternative to the Go stdlib's os.MkdirAll function,
// where the new directory is guaranteed to be within the root directory (if an
// attacker can move directories from inside the root to outside the root, the
// created directory tree might be outside of the root but the key constraint
// is that at no point will we walk outside of the directory tree we are
// creating).
//
// Effectively, MkdirAll(root, unsafePath, mode) is equivalent to
//
// path, _ := securejoin.SecureJoin(root, unsafePath)
// err := os.MkdirAll(path, mode)
//
// But is much safer. The above implementation is unsafe because if an attacker
// can modify the filesystem tree between SecureJoin and MkdirAll, it is
// possible for MkdirAll to resolve unsafe symlink components and create
// directories outside of the root.
//
// If you plan to open the directory after you have created it or want to use
// an open directory handle as the root, you should use MkdirAllHandle instead.
// This function is a wrapper around MkdirAllHandle.
//
// NOTE: The mode argument must be set the unix mode bits (unix.S_I...), not
// the Go generic mode bits (os.Mode...).
func MkdirAll(root, unsafePath string, mode int) error {
rootDir, err := os.OpenFile(root, unix.O_PATH|unix.O_DIRECTORY|unix.O_CLOEXEC, 0)
if err != nil {
return err
}
defer rootDir.Close()
f, err := MkdirAllHandle(rootDir, unsafePath, mode)
if err != nil {
return err
}
_ = f.Close()
return nil
}
vendor/github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin/open_linux.go
Generated Vendored
+101
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
//go:build linux
// Copyright (C) 2024 SUSE LLC. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
package securejoin
import (
"fmt"
"os"
"strconv"
"golang.org/x/sys/unix"
)
// OpenatInRoot is equivalent to OpenInRoot, except that the root is provided
// using an *os.File handle, to ensure that the correct root directory is used.
func OpenatInRoot(root *os.File, unsafePath string) (*os.File, error) {
handle, err := completeLookupInRoot(root, unsafePath)
if err != nil {
return nil, &os.PathError{Op: "securejoin.OpenInRoot", Path: unsafePath, Err: err}
}
return handle, nil
}
// OpenInRoot safely opens the provided unsafePath within the root.
// Effectively, OpenInRoot(root, unsafePath) is equivalent to
//
// path, _ := securejoin.SecureJoin(root, unsafePath)
// handle, err := os.OpenFile(path, unix.O_PATH|unix.O_CLOEXEC)
//
// But is much safer. The above implementation is unsafe because if an attacker
// can modify the filesystem tree between SecureJoin and OpenFile, it is
// possible for the returned file to be outside of the root.
//
// Note that the returned handle is an O_PATH handle, meaning that only a very
// limited set of operations will work on the handle. This is done to avoid
// accidentally opening an untrusted file that could cause issues (such as a
// disconnected TTY that could cause a DoS, or some other issue). In order to
// use the returned handle, you can "upgrade" it to a proper handle using
// Reopen.
func OpenInRoot(root, unsafePath string) (*os.File, error) {
rootDir, err := os.OpenFile(root, unix.O_PATH|unix.O_DIRECTORY|unix.O_CLOEXEC, 0)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
defer rootDir.Close()
return OpenatInRoot(rootDir, unsafePath)
}
// Reopen takes an *os.File handle and re-opens it through /proc/self/fd.
// Reopen(file, flags) is effectively equivalent to
//
// fdPath := fmt.Sprintf("/proc/self/fd/%d", file.Fd())
// os.OpenFile(fdPath, flags|unix.O_CLOEXEC)
//
// But with some extra hardenings to ensure that we are not tricked by a
// maliciously-configured /proc mount. While this attack scenario is not
// common, in container runtimes it is possible for higher-level runtimes to be
// tricked into configuring an unsafe /proc that can be used to attack file
// operations. See CVE-2019-19921 for more details.
func Reopen(handle *os.File, flags int) (*os.File, error) {
procRoot, err := getProcRoot()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
// We can't operate on /proc/thread-self/fd/$n directly when doing a
// re-open, so we need to open /proc/thread-self/fd and then open a single
// final component.
procFdDir, closer, err := procThreadSelf(procRoot, "fd/")
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("get safe /proc/thread-self/fd handle: %w", err)
}
defer procFdDir.Close()
defer closer()
// Try to detect if there is a mount on top of the magic-link we are about
// to open. If we are using unsafeHostProcRoot(), this could change after
// we check it (and there's nothing we can do about that) but for
// privateProcRoot() this should be guaranteed to be safe (at least since
// Linux 5.12[1], when anonymous mount namespaces were completely isolated
// from external mounts including mount propagation events).
//
// [1]: Linux commit ee2e3f50629f ("mount: fix mounting of detached mounts
// onto targets that reside on shared mounts").
fdStr := strconv.Itoa(int(handle.Fd()))
if err := checkSymlinkOvermount(procRoot, procFdDir, fdStr); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("check safety of /proc/thread-self/fd/%s magiclink: %w", fdStr, err)
}
flags |= unix.O_CLOEXEC
// Rather than just wrapping openatFile, open-code it so we can copy
// handle.Name().
reopenFd, err := unix.Openat(int(procFdDir.Fd()), fdStr, flags, 0)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("reopen fd %d: %w", handle.Fd(), err)
}
return os.NewFile(uintptr(reopenFd), handle.Name()), nil
}
vendor/github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin/openat2_linux.go
Generated Vendored
+141
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
//go:build linux
// Copyright (C) 2024 SUSE LLC. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
package securejoin
import (
"errors"
"fmt"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"sync"
"testing"
"golang.org/x/sys/unix"
)
var (
hasOpenat2Bool bool
hasOpenat2Once sync.Once
testingForceHasOpenat2 *bool
)
func hasOpenat2() bool {
if testing.Testing() && testingForceHasOpenat2 != nil {
return *testingForceHasOpenat2
}
hasOpenat2Once.Do(func() {
fd, err := unix.Openat2(unix.AT_FDCWD, ".", &unix.OpenHow{
Flags: unix.O_PATH | unix.O_CLOEXEC,
Resolve: unix.RESOLVE_NO_SYMLINKS | unix.RESOLVE_IN_ROOT,
})
if err == nil {
hasOpenat2Bool = true
_ = unix.Close(fd)
}
})
return hasOpenat2Bool
}
func scopedLookupShouldRetry(how *unix.OpenHow, err error) bool {
// RESOLVE_IN_ROOT (and RESOLVE_BENEATH) can return -EAGAIN if we resolve
// ".." while a mount or rename occurs anywhere on the system. This could
// happen spuriously, or as the result of an attacker trying to mess with
// us during lookup.
//
// In addition, scoped lookups have a "safety check" at the end of
// complete_walk which will return -EXDEV if the final path is not in the
// root.
return how.Resolve&(unix.RESOLVE_IN_ROOT|unix.RESOLVE_BENEATH) != 0 &&
(errors.Is(err, unix.EAGAIN) || errors.Is(err, unix.EXDEV))
}
const scopedLookupMaxRetries = 10
func openat2File(dir *os.File, path string, how *unix.OpenHow) (*os.File, error) {
fullPath := dir.Name() + "/" + path
// Make sure we always set O_CLOEXEC.
how.Flags |= unix.O_CLOEXEC
var tries int
for tries < scopedLookupMaxRetries {
fd, err := unix.Openat2(int(dir.Fd()), path, how)
if err != nil {
if scopedLookupShouldRetry(how, err) {
// We retry a couple of times to avoid the spurious errors, and
// if we are being attacked then returning -EAGAIN is the best
// we can do.
tries++
continue
}
return nil, &os.PathError{Op: "openat2", Path: fullPath, Err: err}
}
// If we are using RESOLVE_IN_ROOT, the name we generated may be wrong.
// NOTE: The procRoot code MUST NOT use RESOLVE_IN_ROOT, otherwise
// you'll get infinite recursion here.
if how.Resolve&unix.RESOLVE_IN_ROOT == unix.RESOLVE_IN_ROOT {
if actualPath, err := rawProcSelfFdReadlink(fd); err == nil {
fullPath = actualPath
}
}
return os.NewFile(uintptr(fd), fullPath), nil
}
return nil, &os.PathError{Op: "openat2", Path: fullPath, Err: errPossibleAttack}
}
func lookupOpenat2(root *os.File, unsafePath string, partial bool) (*os.File, string, error) {
if !partial {
file, err := openat2File(root, unsafePath, &unix.OpenHow{
Flags: unix.O_PATH | unix.O_CLOEXEC,
Resolve: unix.RESOLVE_IN_ROOT | unix.RESOLVE_NO_MAGICLINKS,
})
return file, "", err
}
return partialLookupOpenat2(root, unsafePath)
}
// partialLookupOpenat2 is an alternative implementation of
// partialLookupInRoot, using openat2(RESOLVE_IN_ROOT) to more safely get a
// handle to the deepest existing child of the requested path within the root.
func partialLookupOpenat2(root *os.File, unsafePath string) (*os.File, string, error) {
// TODO: Implement this as a git-bisect-like binary search.
unsafePath = filepath.ToSlash(unsafePath) // noop
endIdx := len(unsafePath)
var lastError error
for endIdx > 0 {
subpath := unsafePath[:endIdx]
handle, err := openat2File(root, subpath, &unix.OpenHow{
Flags: unix.O_PATH | unix.O_CLOEXEC,
Resolve: unix.RESOLVE_IN_ROOT | unix.RESOLVE_NO_MAGICLINKS,
})
if err == nil {
// Jump over the slash if we have a non-"" remainingPath.
if endIdx < len(unsafePath) {
endIdx += 1
}
// We found a subpath!
return handle, unsafePath[endIdx:], lastError
}
if errors.Is(err, unix.ENOENT) || errors.Is(err, unix.ENOTDIR) {
// That path doesn't exist, let's try the next directory up.
endIdx = strings.LastIndexByte(subpath, '/')
lastError = err
continue
}
return nil, "", fmt.Errorf("open subpath: %w", err)
}
// If we couldn't open anything, the whole subpath is missing. Return a
// copy of the root fd so that the caller doesn't close this one by
// accident.
rootClone, err := dupFile(root)
if err != nil {
return nil, "", err
}
return rootClone, unsafePath, lastError
}
vendor/github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin/openat_linux.go
Generated Vendored
+59
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
//go:build linux
// Copyright (C) 2024 SUSE LLC. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
package securejoin
import (
"os"
"path/filepath"
"golang.org/x/sys/unix"
)
func dupFile(f *os.File) (*os.File, error) {
fd, err := unix.FcntlInt(f.Fd(), unix.F_DUPFD_CLOEXEC, 0)
if err != nil {
return nil, os.NewSyscallError("fcntl(F_DUPFD_CLOEXEC)", err)
}
return os.NewFile(uintptr(fd), f.Name()), nil
}
func openatFile(dir *os.File, path string, flags int, mode int) (*os.File, error) {
// Make sure we always set O_CLOEXEC.
flags |= unix.O_CLOEXEC
fd, err := unix.Openat(int(dir.Fd()), path, flags, uint32(mode))
if err != nil {
return nil, &os.PathError{Op: "openat", Path: dir.Name() + "/" + path, Err: err}
}
// All of the paths we use with openatFile(2) are guaranteed to be
// lexically safe, so we can use path.Join here.
fullPath := filepath.Join(dir.Name(), path)
return os.NewFile(uintptr(fd), fullPath), nil
}
func fstatatFile(dir *os.File, path string, flags int) (unix.Stat_t, error) {
var stat unix.Stat_t
if err := unix.Fstatat(int(dir.Fd()), path, &stat, flags); err != nil {
return stat, &os.PathError{Op: "fstatat", Path: dir.Name() + "/" + path, Err: err}
}
return stat, nil
}
func readlinkatFile(dir *os.File, path string) (string, error) {
size := 4096
for {
linkBuf := make([]byte, size)
n, err := unix.Readlinkat(int(dir.Fd()), path, linkBuf)
if err != nil {
return "", &os.PathError{Op: "readlinkat", Path: dir.Name() + "/" + path, Err: err}
}
if n != size {
return string(linkBuf[:n]), nil
}
// Possible truncation, resize the buffer.
size *= 2
}
}
vendor/github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin/procfs_linux.go
Generated Vendored
+474
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,474 @@
//go:build linux
// Copyright (C) 2024 SUSE LLC. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
package securejoin
import (
"errors"
"fmt"
"os"
"runtime"
"strconv"
"sync"
"golang.org/x/sys/unix"
)
func fstat(f *os.File) (unix.Stat_t, error) {
var stat unix.Stat_t
if err := unix.Fstat(int(f.Fd()), &stat); err != nil {
return stat, &os.PathError{Op: "fstat", Path: f.Name(), Err: err}
}
return stat, nil
}
func fstatfs(f *os.File) (unix.Statfs_t, error) {
var statfs unix.Statfs_t
if err := unix.Fstatfs(int(f.Fd()), &statfs); err != nil {
return statfs, &os.PathError{Op: "fstatfs", Path: f.Name(), Err: err}
}
return statfs, nil
}
// The kernel guarantees that the root inode of a procfs mount has an
// f_type of PROC_SUPER_MAGIC and st_ino of PROC_ROOT_INO.
const (
procSuperMagic = 0x9fa0 // PROC_SUPER_MAGIC
procRootIno = 1 // PROC_ROOT_INO
)
func verifyProcRoot(procRoot *os.File) error {
if statfs, err := fstatfs(procRoot); err != nil {
return err
} else if statfs.Type != procSuperMagic {
return fmt.Errorf("%w: incorrect procfs root filesystem type 0x%x", errUnsafeProcfs, statfs.Type)
}
if stat, err := fstat(procRoot); err != nil {
return err
} else if stat.Ino != procRootIno {
return fmt.Errorf("%w: incorrect procfs root inode number %d", errUnsafeProcfs, stat.Ino)
}
return nil
}
var (
hasNewMountApiBool bool
hasNewMountApiOnce sync.Once
)
func hasNewMountApi() bool {
hasNewMountApiOnce.Do(func() {
// All of the pieces of the new mount API we use (fsopen, fsconfig,
// fsmount, open_tree) were added together in Linux 5.1[1,2], so we can
// just check for one of the syscalls and the others should also be
// available.
//
// Just try to use open_tree(2) to open a file without OPEN_TREE_CLONE.
// This is equivalent to openat(2), but tells us if open_tree is
// available (and thus all of the other basic new mount API syscalls).
// open_tree(2) is most light-weight syscall to test here.
//
// [1]: merge commit 400913252d09
// [2]: <https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/153754740781.17872.7869536526927736855.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/>
fd, err := unix.OpenTree(-int(unix.EBADF), "/", unix.OPEN_TREE_CLOEXEC)
if err == nil {
hasNewMountApiBool = true
_ = unix.Close(fd)
}
})
return hasNewMountApiBool
}
func fsopen(fsName string, flags int) (*os.File, error) {
// Make sure we always set O_CLOEXEC.
flags |= unix.FSOPEN_CLOEXEC
fd, err := unix.Fsopen(fsName, flags)
if err != nil {
return nil, os.NewSyscallError("fsopen "+fsName, err)
}
return os.NewFile(uintptr(fd), "fscontext:"+fsName), nil
}
func fsmount(ctx *os.File, flags, mountAttrs int) (*os.File, error) {
// Make sure we always set O_CLOEXEC.
flags |= unix.FSMOUNT_CLOEXEC
fd, err := unix.Fsmount(int(ctx.Fd()), flags, mountAttrs)
if err != nil {
return nil, os.NewSyscallError("fsmount "+ctx.Name(), err)
}
return os.NewFile(uintptr(fd), "fsmount:"+ctx.Name()), nil
}
func newPrivateProcMount() (*os.File, error) {
procfsCtx, err := fsopen("proc", unix.FSOPEN_CLOEXEC)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
defer procfsCtx.Close()
// Try to configure hidepid=ptraceable,subset=pid if possible, but ignore errors.
_ = unix.FsconfigSetString(int(procfsCtx.Fd()), "hidepid", "ptraceable")
_ = unix.FsconfigSetString(int(procfsCtx.Fd()), "subset", "pid")
// Get an actual handle.
if err := unix.FsconfigCreate(int(procfsCtx.Fd())); err != nil {
return nil, os.NewSyscallError("fsconfig create procfs", err)
}
return fsmount(procfsCtx, unix.FSMOUNT_CLOEXEC, unix.MS_RDONLY|unix.MS_NODEV|unix.MS_NOEXEC|unix.MS_NOSUID)
}
func openTree(dir *os.File, path string, flags uint) (*os.File, error) {
dirFd := -int(unix.EBADF)
dirName := "."
if dir != nil {
dirFd = int(dir.Fd())
dirName = dir.Name()
}
// Make sure we always set O_CLOEXEC.
flags |= unix.OPEN_TREE_CLOEXEC
fd, err := unix.OpenTree(dirFd, path, flags)
if err != nil {
return nil, &os.PathError{Op: "open_tree", Path: path, Err: err}
}
return os.NewFile(uintptr(fd), dirName+"/"+path), nil
}
func clonePrivateProcMount() (_ *os.File, Err error) {
// Try to make a clone without using AT_RECURSIVE if we can. If this works,
// we can be sure there are no over-mounts and so if the root is valid then
// we're golden. Otherwise, we have to deal with over-mounts.
procfsHandle, err := openTree(nil, "/proc", unix.OPEN_TREE_CLONE)
if err != nil || testingForcePrivateProcRootOpenTreeAtRecursive(procfsHandle) {
procfsHandle, err = openTree(nil, "/proc", unix.OPEN_TREE_CLONE|unix.AT_RECURSIVE)
}
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("creating a detached procfs clone: %w", err)
}
defer func() {
if Err != nil {
_ = procfsHandle.Close()
}
}()
if err := verifyProcRoot(procfsHandle); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return procfsHandle, nil
}
func privateProcRoot() (*os.File, error) {
if !hasNewMountApi() || testingForceGetProcRootUnsafe() {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("new mount api: %w", unix.ENOTSUP)
}
// Try to create a new procfs mount from scratch if we can. This ensures we
// can get a procfs mount even if /proc is fake (for whatever reason).
procRoot, err := newPrivateProcMount()
if err != nil || testingForcePrivateProcRootOpenTree(procRoot) {
// Try to clone /proc then...
procRoot, err = clonePrivateProcMount()
}
return procRoot, err
}
var (
procRootHandle *os.File
procRootError error
procRootOnce sync.Once
errUnsafeProcfs = errors.New("unsafe procfs detected")
)
func unsafeHostProcRoot() (_ *os.File, Err error) {
procRoot, err := os.OpenFile("/proc", unix.O_PATH|unix.O_NOFOLLOW|unix.O_DIRECTORY|unix.O_CLOEXEC, 0)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
defer func() {
if Err != nil {
_ = procRoot.Close()
}
}()
if err := verifyProcRoot(procRoot); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return procRoot, nil
}
func doGetProcRoot() (*os.File, error) {
procRoot, err := privateProcRoot()
if err != nil {
// Fall back to using a /proc handle if making a private mount failed.
// If we have openat2, at least we can avoid some kinds of over-mount
// attacks, but without openat2 there's not much we can do.
procRoot, err = unsafeHostProcRoot()
}
return procRoot, err
}
func getProcRoot() (*os.File, error) {
procRootOnce.Do(func() {
procRootHandle, procRootError = doGetProcRoot()
})
return procRootHandle, procRootError
}
var (
haveProcThreadSelf bool
haveProcThreadSelfOnce sync.Once
)
type procThreadSelfCloser func()
// procThreadSelf returns a handle to /proc/thread-self/<subpath> (or an
// equivalent handle on older kernels where /proc/thread-self doesn't exist).
// Once finished with the handle, you must call the returned closer function
// (runtime.UnlockOSThread). You must not pass the returned *os.File to other
// Go threads or use the handle after calling the closer.
//
// This is similar to ProcThreadSelf from runc, but with extra hardening
// applied and using *os.File.
func procThreadSelf(procRoot *os.File, subpath string) (_ *os.File, _ procThreadSelfCloser, Err error) {
haveProcThreadSelfOnce.Do(func() {
// If the kernel doesn't support thread-self, it doesn't matter which
// /proc handle we use.
_, err := fstatatFile(procRoot, "thread-self", unix.AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW)
haveProcThreadSelf = (err == nil)
})
// We need to lock our thread until the caller is done with the handle
// because between getting the handle and using it we could get interrupted
// by the Go runtime and hit the case where the underlying thread is
// swapped out and the original thread is killed, resulting in
// pull-your-hair-out-hard-to-debug issues in the caller.
runtime.LockOSThread()
defer func() {
if Err != nil {
runtime.UnlockOSThread()
}
}()
// Figure out what prefix we want to use.
threadSelf := "thread-self/"
if !haveProcThreadSelf || testingForceProcSelfTask() {
/// Pre-3.17 kernels don't have /proc/thread-self, so do it manually.
threadSelf = "self/task/" + strconv.Itoa(unix.Gettid()) + "/"
if _, err := fstatatFile(procRoot, threadSelf, unix.AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW); err != nil || testingForceProcSelf() {
// In this case, we running in a pid namespace that doesn't match
// the /proc mount we have. This can happen inside runc.
//
// Unfortunately, there is no nice way to get the correct TID to
// use here because of the age of the kernel, so we have to just
// use /proc/self and hope that it works.
threadSelf = "self/"
}
}
// Grab the handle.
var (
handle *os.File
err error
)
if hasOpenat2() {
// We prefer being able to use RESOLVE_NO_XDEV if we can, to be
// absolutely sure we are operating on a clean /proc handle that
// doesn't have any cheeky overmounts that could trick us (including
// symlink mounts on top of /proc/thread-self). RESOLVE_BENEATH isn't
// stricly needed, but just use it since we have it.
//
// NOTE: /proc/self is technically a magic-link (the contents of the
// symlink are generated dynamically), but it doesn't use
// nd_jump_link() so RESOLVE_NO_MAGICLINKS allows it.
//
// NOTE: We MUST NOT use RESOLVE_IN_ROOT here, as openat2File uses
// procSelfFdReadlink to clean up the returned f.Name() if we use
// RESOLVE_IN_ROOT (which would lead to an infinite recursion).
handle, err = openat2File(procRoot, threadSelf+subpath, &unix.OpenHow{
Flags: unix.O_PATH | unix.O_NOFOLLOW | unix.O_CLOEXEC,
Resolve: unix.RESOLVE_BENEATH | unix.RESOLVE_NO_XDEV | unix.RESOLVE_NO_MAGICLINKS,
})
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %w", errUnsafeProcfs, err)
}
} else {
handle, err = openatFile(procRoot, threadSelf+subpath, unix.O_PATH|unix.O_NOFOLLOW|unix.O_CLOEXEC, 0)
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %w", errUnsafeProcfs, err)
}
defer func() {
if Err != nil {
_ = handle.Close()
}
}()
// We can't detect bind-mounts of different parts of procfs on top of
// /proc (a-la RESOLVE_NO_XDEV), but we can at least be sure that we
// aren't on the wrong filesystem here.
if statfs, err := fstatfs(handle); err != nil {
return nil, nil, err
} else if statfs.Type != procSuperMagic {
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: incorrect /proc/self/fd filesystem type 0x%x", errUnsafeProcfs, statfs.Type)
}
}
return handle, runtime.UnlockOSThread, nil
}
var (
hasStatxMountIdBool bool
hasStatxMountIdOnce sync.Once
)
func hasStatxMountId() bool {
hasStatxMountIdOnce.Do(func() {
var (
stx unix.Statx_t
// We don't care which mount ID we get. The kernel will give us the
// unique one if it is supported.
wantStxMask uint32 = unix.STATX_MNT_ID_UNIQUE | unix.STATX_MNT_ID
)
err := unix.Statx(-int(unix.EBADF), "/", 0, int(wantStxMask), &stx)
hasStatxMountIdBool = (err == nil && (stx.Mask&wantStxMask != 0))
})
return hasStatxMountIdBool
}
func getMountId(dir *os.File, path string) (uint64, error) {
// If we don't have statx(STATX_MNT_ID*) support, we can't do anything.
if !hasStatxMountId() {
return 0, nil
}
var (
stx unix.Statx_t
// We don't care which mount ID we get. The kernel will give us the
// unique one if it is supported.
wantStxMask uint32 = unix.STATX_MNT_ID_UNIQUE | unix.STATX_MNT_ID
)
err := unix.Statx(int(dir.Fd()), path, unix.AT_EMPTY_PATH|unix.AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW, int(wantStxMask), &stx)
if stx.Mask&wantStxMask == 0 {
// It's not a kernel limitation, for some reason we couldn't get a
// mount ID. Assume it's some kind of attack.
err = fmt.Errorf("%w: could not get mount id", errUnsafeProcfs)
}
if err != nil {
return 0, &os.PathError{Op: "statx(STATX_MNT_ID_...)", Path: dir.Name() + "/" + path, Err: err}
}
return stx.Mnt_id, nil
}
func checkSymlinkOvermount(procRoot *os.File, dir *os.File, path string) error {
// Get the mntId of our procfs handle.
expectedMountId, err := getMountId(procRoot, "")
if err != nil {
return err
}
// Get the mntId of the target magic-link.
gotMountId, err := getMountId(dir, path)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// As long as the directory mount is alive, even with wrapping mount IDs,
// we would expect to see a different mount ID here. (Of course, if we're
// using unsafeHostProcRoot() then an attaker could change this after we
// did this check.)
if expectedMountId != gotMountId {
return fmt.Errorf("%w: symlink %s/%s has an overmount obscuring the real link (mount ids do not match %d != %d)", errUnsafeProcfs, dir.Name(), path, expectedMountId, gotMountId)
}
return nil
}
func doRawProcSelfFdReadlink(procRoot *os.File, fd int) (string, error) {
fdPath := fmt.Sprintf("fd/%d", fd)
procFdLink, closer, err := procThreadSelf(procRoot, fdPath)
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("get safe /proc/thread-self/%s handle: %w", fdPath, err)
}
defer procFdLink.Close()
defer closer()
// Try to detect if there is a mount on top of the magic-link. Since we use the handle directly
// provide to the closure. If the closure uses the handle directly, this
// should be safe in general (a mount on top of the path afterwards would
// not affect the handle itself) and will definitely be safe if we are
// using privateProcRoot() (at least since Linux 5.12[1], when anonymous
// mount namespaces were completely isolated from external mounts including
// mount propagation events).
//
// [1]: Linux commit ee2e3f50629f ("mount: fix mounting of detached mounts
// onto targets that reside on shared mounts").
if err := checkSymlinkOvermount(procRoot, procFdLink, ""); err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("check safety of /proc/thread-self/fd/%d magiclink: %w", fd, err)
}
// readlinkat implies AT_EMPTY_PATH since Linux 2.6.39. See Linux commit
// 65cfc6722361 ("readlinkat(), fchownat() and fstatat() with empty
// relative pathnames").
return readlinkatFile(procFdLink, "")
}
func rawProcSelfFdReadlink(fd int) (string, error) {
procRoot, err := getProcRoot()
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
return doRawProcSelfFdReadlink(procRoot, fd)
}
func procSelfFdReadlink(f *os.File) (string, error) {
return rawProcSelfFdReadlink(int(f.Fd()))
}
var (
errPossibleBreakout = errors.New("possible breakout detected")
errInvalidDirectory = errors.New("wandered into deleted directory")
errDeletedInode = errors.New("cannot verify path of deleted inode")
)
func isDeadInode(file *os.File) error {
// If the nlink of a file drops to 0, there is an attacker deleting
// directories during our walk, which could result in weird /proc values.
// It's better to error out in this case.
stat, err := fstat(file)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("check for dead inode: %w", err)
}
if stat.Nlink == 0 {
err := errDeletedInode
if stat.Mode&unix.S_IFMT == unix.S_IFDIR {
err = errInvalidDirectory
}
return fmt.Errorf("%w %q", err, file.Name())
}
return nil
}
func getUmask() int {
// umask is a per-thread property, but it is inherited by children, so we
// need to lock our OS thread to make sure that no other goroutine runs in
// this thread and no goroutines are spawned from this thread until we
// revert to the old umask.
//
// We could parse /proc/self/status to avoid this get-set problem, but
// /proc/thread-self requires LockOSThread anyway, so there's no real
// benefit over just using umask(2).
runtime.LockOSThread()
umask := unix.Umask(0)
unix.Umask(umask)
runtime.UnlockOSThread()
return umask
}
func checkProcSelfFdPath(path string, file *os.File) error {
if err := isDeadInode(file); err != nil {
return err
}
actualPath, err := procSelfFdReadlink(file)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("get path of handle: %w", err)
}
if actualPath != path {
return fmt.Errorf("%w: handle path %q doesn't match expected path %q", errPossibleBreakout, actualPath, path)
}
return nil
}
vendor/github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin/testing_mocks_linux.go
Generated Vendored
+68
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
//go:build linux
// Copyright (C) 2024 SUSE LLC. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
package securejoin
import (
"os"
"testing"
)
type forceGetProcRootLevel int
const (
forceGetProcRootDefault forceGetProcRootLevel = iota
forceGetProcRootOpenTree // force open_tree()
forceGetProcRootOpenTreeAtRecursive // force open_tree(AT_RECURSIVE)
forceGetProcRootUnsafe // force open()
)
var testingForceGetProcRoot *forceGetProcRootLevel
func testingCheckClose(check bool, f *os.File) bool {
if check {
if f != nil {
_ = f.Close()
}
return true
}
return false
}
func testingForcePrivateProcRootOpenTree(f *os.File) bool {
return testing.Testing() && testingForceGetProcRoot != nil &&
testingCheckClose(*testingForceGetProcRoot >= forceGetProcRootOpenTree, f)
}
func testingForcePrivateProcRootOpenTreeAtRecursive(f *os.File) bool {
return testing.Testing() && testingForceGetProcRoot != nil &&
testingCheckClose(*testingForceGetProcRoot >= forceGetProcRootOpenTreeAtRecursive, f)
}
func testingForceGetProcRootUnsafe() bool {
return testing.Testing() && testingForceGetProcRoot != nil &&
*testingForceGetProcRoot >= forceGetProcRootUnsafe
}
type forceProcThreadSelfLevel int
const (
forceProcThreadSelfDefault forceProcThreadSelfLevel = iota
forceProcSelfTask
forceProcSelf
)
var testingForceProcThreadSelf *forceProcThreadSelfLevel
func testingForceProcSelfTask() bool {
return testing.Testing() && testingForceProcThreadSelf != nil &&
*testingForceProcThreadSelf >= forceProcSelfTask
}
func testingForceProcSelf() bool {
return testing.Testing() && testingForceProcThreadSelf != nil &&
*testingForceProcThreadSelf >= forceProcSelf
}
vendor/github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin/vfs.go
Generated Vendored
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
// Copyright (C) 2017 SUSE LLC. All rights reserved.
// Copyright (C) 2017-2024 SUSE LLC. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/asm_zos_s390x.s
Generated Vendored
+317 -358
View File
@@ -9,9 +9,11 @@
#define PSALAA 1208(R0)
#define GTAB64(x) 80(x)
#define LCA64(x) 88(x)
#define SAVSTACK_ASYNC(x) 336(x) // in the LCA
#define CAA(x) 8(x)
#define EDCHPXV(x) 1016(x) // in the CAA
#define SAVSTACK_ASYNC(x) 336(x) // in the LCA
#define CEECAATHDID(x) 976(x) // in the CAA
#define EDCHPXV(x) 1016(x) // in the CAA
#define GOCB(x) 1104(x) // in the CAA
// SS_*, where x=SAVSTACK_ASYNC
#define SS_LE(x) 0(x)
@@ -19,394 +21,125 @@
#define SS_ERRNO(x) 16(x)
#define SS_ERRNOJR(x) 20(x)
#define LE_CALL BYTE $0x0D; BYTE $0x76; // BL R7, R6
// Function Descriptor Offsets
#define __errno 0x156*16
#define __err2ad 0x16C*16
TEXT ·clearErrno(SB),NOSPLIT,$0-0
BL addrerrno<>(SB)
MOVD $0, 0(R3)
// Call Instructions
#define LE_CALL BYTE $0x0D; BYTE $0x76 // BL R7, R6
#define SVC_LOAD BYTE $0x0A; BYTE $0x08 // SVC 08 LOAD
#define SVC_DELETE BYTE $0x0A; BYTE $0x09 // SVC 09 DELETE
DATA zosLibVec<>(SB)/8, $0
GLOBL zosLibVec<>(SB), NOPTR, $8
TEXT ·initZosLibVec(SB), NOSPLIT|NOFRAME, $0-0
MOVW PSALAA, R8
MOVD LCA64(R8), R8
MOVD CAA(R8), R8
MOVD EDCHPXV(R8), R8
MOVD R8, zosLibVec<>(SB)
RET
TEXT ·GetZosLibVec(SB), NOSPLIT|NOFRAME, $0-0
MOVD zosLibVec<>(SB), R8
MOVD R8, ret+0(FP)
RET
TEXT ·clearErrno(SB), NOSPLIT, $0-0
BL addrerrno<>(SB)
MOVD $0, 0(R3)
RET
// Returns the address of errno in R3.
TEXT addrerrno<>(SB),NOSPLIT|NOFRAME,$0-0
TEXT addrerrno<>(SB), NOSPLIT|NOFRAME, $0-0
// Get library control area (LCA).
MOVW PSALAA, R8
MOVD LCA64(R8), R8
MOVW PSALAA, R8
MOVD LCA64(R8), R8
// Get __errno FuncDesc.
MOVD CAA(R8), R9
MOVD EDCHPXV(R9), R9
ADD $(0x156*16), R9
LMG 0(R9), R5, R6
MOVD CAA(R8), R9
MOVD EDCHPXV(R9), R9
ADD $(__errno), R9
LMG 0(R9), R5, R6
// Switch to saved LE stack.
MOVD SAVSTACK_ASYNC(R8), R9
MOVD 0(R9), R4
MOVD $0, 0(R9)
MOVD SAVSTACK_ASYNC(R8), R9
MOVD 0(R9), R4
MOVD $0, 0(R9)
// Call __errno function.
LE_CALL
NOPH
// Switch back to Go stack.
XOR R0, R0 // Restore R0 to $0.
MOVD R4, 0(R9) // Save stack pointer.
RET
TEXT ·syscall_syscall(SB),NOSPLIT,$0-56
BL runtime·entersyscall(SB)
MOVD a1+8(FP), R1
MOVD a2+16(FP), R2
MOVD a3+24(FP), R3
// Get library control area (LCA).
MOVW PSALAA, R8
MOVD LCA64(R8), R8
// Get function.
MOVD CAA(R8), R9
MOVD EDCHPXV(R9), R9
MOVD trap+0(FP), R5
SLD $4, R5
ADD R5, R9
LMG 0(R9), R5, R6
// Restore LE stack.
MOVD SAVSTACK_ASYNC(R8), R9
MOVD 0(R9), R4
MOVD $0, 0(R9)
// Call function.
LE_CALL
NOPH
XOR R0, R0 // Restore R0 to $0.
MOVD R4, 0(R9) // Save stack pointer.
MOVD R3, r1+32(FP)
MOVD R0, r2+40(FP)
MOVD R0, err+48(FP)
MOVW R3, R4
CMP R4, $-1
BNE done
BL addrerrno<>(SB)
MOVWZ 0(R3), R3
MOVD R3, err+48(FP)
done:
BL runtime·exitsyscall(SB)
RET
TEXT ·syscall_rawsyscall(SB),NOSPLIT,$0-56
MOVD a1+8(FP), R1
MOVD a2+16(FP), R2
MOVD a3+24(FP), R3
// Get library control area (LCA).
MOVW PSALAA, R8
MOVD LCA64(R8), R8
// Get function.
MOVD CAA(R8), R9
MOVD EDCHPXV(R9), R9
MOVD trap+0(FP), R5
SLD $4, R5
ADD R5, R9
LMG 0(R9), R5, R6
// Restore LE stack.
MOVD SAVSTACK_ASYNC(R8), R9
MOVD 0(R9), R4
MOVD $0, 0(R9)
// Call function.
LE_CALL
NOPH
XOR R0, R0 // Restore R0 to $0.
MOVD R4, 0(R9) // Save stack pointer.
MOVD R3, r1+32(FP)
MOVD R0, r2+40(FP)
MOVD R0, err+48(FP)
MOVW R3, R4
CMP R4, $-1
BNE done
BL addrerrno<>(SB)
MOVWZ 0(R3), R3
MOVD R3, err+48(FP)
done:
RET
TEXT ·syscall_syscall6(SB),NOSPLIT,$0-80
BL runtime·entersyscall(SB)
MOVD a1+8(FP), R1
MOVD a2+16(FP), R2
MOVD a3+24(FP), R3
// Get library control area (LCA).
MOVW PSALAA, R8
MOVD LCA64(R8), R8
// Get function.
MOVD CAA(R8), R9
MOVD EDCHPXV(R9), R9
MOVD trap+0(FP), R5
SLD $4, R5
ADD R5, R9
LMG 0(R9), R5, R6
// Restore LE stack.
MOVD SAVSTACK_ASYNC(R8), R9
MOVD 0(R9), R4
MOVD $0, 0(R9)
// Fill in parameter list.
MOVD a4+32(FP), R12
MOVD R12, (2176+24)(R4)
MOVD a5+40(FP), R12
MOVD R12, (2176+32)(R4)
MOVD a6+48(FP), R12
MOVD R12, (2176+40)(R4)
// Call function.
LE_CALL
NOPH
XOR R0, R0 // Restore R0 to $0.
MOVD R4, 0(R9) // Save stack pointer.
MOVD R3, r1+56(FP)
MOVD R0, r2+64(FP)
MOVD R0, err+72(FP)
MOVW R3, R4
CMP R4, $-1
BNE done
BL addrerrno<>(SB)
MOVWZ 0(R3), R3
MOVD R3, err+72(FP)
done:
BL runtime·exitsyscall(SB)
RET
TEXT ·syscall_rawsyscall6(SB),NOSPLIT,$0-80
MOVD a1+8(FP), R1
MOVD a2+16(FP), R2
MOVD a3+24(FP), R3
// Get library control area (LCA).
MOVW PSALAA, R8
MOVD LCA64(R8), R8
// Get function.
MOVD CAA(R8), R9
MOVD EDCHPXV(R9), R9
MOVD trap+0(FP), R5
SLD $4, R5
ADD R5, R9
LMG 0(R9), R5, R6
// Restore LE stack.
MOVD SAVSTACK_ASYNC(R8), R9
MOVD 0(R9), R4
MOVD $0, 0(R9)
// Fill in parameter list.
MOVD a4+32(FP), R12
MOVD R12, (2176+24)(R4)
MOVD a5+40(FP), R12
MOVD R12, (2176+32)(R4)
MOVD a6+48(FP), R12
MOVD R12, (2176+40)(R4)
// Call function.
LE_CALL
NOPH
XOR R0, R0 // Restore R0 to $0.
MOVD R4, 0(R9) // Save stack pointer.
MOVD R3, r1+56(FP)
MOVD R0, r2+64(FP)
MOVD R0, err+72(FP)
MOVW R3, R4
CMP R4, $-1
BNE done
BL ·rrno<>(SB)
MOVWZ 0(R3), R3
MOVD R3, err+72(FP)
done:
RET
TEXT ·syscall_syscall9(SB),NOSPLIT,$0
BL runtime·entersyscall(SB)
MOVD a1+8(FP), R1
MOVD a2+16(FP), R2
MOVD a3+24(FP), R3
// Get library control area (LCA).
MOVW PSALAA, R8
MOVD LCA64(R8), R8
// Get function.
MOVD CAA(R8), R9
MOVD EDCHPXV(R9), R9
MOVD trap+0(FP), R5
SLD $4, R5
ADD R5, R9
LMG 0(R9), R5, R6
// Restore LE stack.
MOVD SAVSTACK_ASYNC(R8), R9
MOVD 0(R9), R4
MOVD $0, 0(R9)
// Fill in parameter list.
MOVD a4+32(FP), R12
MOVD R12, (2176+24)(R4)
MOVD a5+40(FP), R12
MOVD R12, (2176+32)(R4)
MOVD a6+48(FP), R12
MOVD R12, (2176+40)(R4)
MOVD a7+56(FP), R12
MOVD R12, (2176+48)(R4)
MOVD a8+64(FP), R12
MOVD R12, (2176+56)(R4)
MOVD a9+72(FP), R12
MOVD R12, (2176+64)(R4)
// Call function.
LE_CALL
NOPH
XOR R0, R0 // Restore R0 to $0.
MOVD R4, 0(R9) // Save stack pointer.
MOVD R3, r1+80(FP)
MOVD R0, r2+88(FP)
MOVD R0, err+96(FP)
MOVW R3, R4
CMP R4, $-1
BNE done
BL addrerrno<>(SB)
MOVWZ 0(R3), R3
MOVD R3, err+96(FP)
done:
BL runtime·exitsyscall(SB)
RET
TEXT ·syscall_rawsyscall9(SB),NOSPLIT,$0
MOVD a1+8(FP), R1
MOVD a2+16(FP), R2
MOVD a3+24(FP), R3
// Get library control area (LCA).
MOVW PSALAA, R8
MOVD LCA64(R8), R8
// Get function.
MOVD CAA(R8), R9
MOVD EDCHPXV(R9), R9
MOVD trap+0(FP), R5
SLD $4, R5
ADD R5, R9
LMG 0(R9), R5, R6
// Restore LE stack.
MOVD SAVSTACK_ASYNC(R8), R9
MOVD 0(R9), R4
MOVD $0, 0(R9)
// Fill in parameter list.
MOVD a4+32(FP), R12
MOVD R12, (2176+24)(R4)
MOVD a5+40(FP), R12
MOVD R12, (2176+32)(R4)
MOVD a6+48(FP), R12
MOVD R12, (2176+40)(R4)
MOVD a7+56(FP), R12
MOVD R12, (2176+48)(R4)
MOVD a8+64(FP), R12
MOVD R12, (2176+56)(R4)
MOVD a9+72(FP), R12
MOVD R12, (2176+64)(R4)
// Call function.
LE_CALL
NOPH
XOR R0, R0 // Restore R0 to $0.
MOVD R4, 0(R9) // Save stack pointer.
MOVD R3, r1+80(FP)
MOVD R0, r2+88(FP)
MOVD R0, err+96(FP)
MOVW R3, R4
CMP R4, $-1
BNE done
BL addrerrno<>(SB)
MOVWZ 0(R3), R3
MOVD R3, err+96(FP)
done:
XOR R0, R0 // Restore R0 to $0.
MOVD R4, 0(R9) // Save stack pointer.
RET
// func svcCall(fnptr unsafe.Pointer, argv *unsafe.Pointer, dsa *uint64)
TEXT ·svcCall(SB),NOSPLIT,$0
BL runtime·save_g(SB) // Save g and stack pointer
MOVW PSALAA, R8
MOVD LCA64(R8), R8
MOVD SAVSTACK_ASYNC(R8), R9
MOVD R15, 0(R9)
TEXT ·svcCall(SB), NOSPLIT, $0
BL runtime·save_g(SB) // Save g and stack pointer
MOVW PSALAA, R8
MOVD LCA64(R8), R8
MOVD SAVSTACK_ASYNC(R8), R9
MOVD R15, 0(R9)
MOVD argv+8(FP), R1 // Move function arguments into registers
MOVD dsa+16(FP), g
MOVD fnptr+0(FP), R15
MOVD argv+8(FP), R1 // Move function arguments into registers
MOVD dsa+16(FP), g
MOVD fnptr+0(FP), R15
BYTE $0x0D // Branch to function
BYTE $0xEF
BYTE $0x0D // Branch to function
BYTE $0xEF
BL runtime·load_g(SB) // Restore g and stack pointer
MOVW PSALAA, R8
MOVD LCA64(R8), R8
MOVD SAVSTACK_ASYNC(R8), R9
MOVD 0(R9), R15
BL runtime·load_g(SB) // Restore g and stack pointer
MOVW PSALAA, R8
MOVD LCA64(R8), R8
MOVD SAVSTACK_ASYNC(R8), R9
MOVD 0(R9), R15
RET
// func svcLoad(name *byte) unsafe.Pointer
TEXT ·svcLoad(SB),NOSPLIT,$0
MOVD R15, R2 // Save go stack pointer
MOVD name+0(FP), R0 // Move SVC args into registers
MOVD $0x80000000, R1
MOVD $0, R15
BYTE $0x0A // SVC 08 LOAD
BYTE $0x08
MOVW R15, R3 // Save return code from SVC
MOVD R2, R15 // Restore go stack pointer
CMP R3, $0 // Check SVC return code
BNE error
TEXT ·svcLoad(SB), NOSPLIT, $0
MOVD R15, R2 // Save go stack pointer
MOVD name+0(FP), R0 // Move SVC args into registers
MOVD $0x80000000, R1
MOVD $0, R15
SVC_LOAD
MOVW R15, R3 // Save return code from SVC
MOVD R2, R15 // Restore go stack pointer
CMP R3, $0 // Check SVC return code
BNE error
MOVD $-2, R3 // Reset last bit of entry point to zero
AND R0, R3
MOVD R3, addr+8(FP) // Return entry point returned by SVC
CMP R0, R3 // Check if last bit of entry point was set
BNE done
MOVD $-2, R3 // Reset last bit of entry point to zero
AND R0, R3
MOVD R3, ret+8(FP) // Return entry point returned by SVC
CMP R0, R3 // Check if last bit of entry point was set
BNE done
MOVD R15, R2 // Save go stack pointer
MOVD $0, R15 // Move SVC args into registers (entry point still in r0 from SVC 08)
BYTE $0x0A // SVC 09 DELETE
BYTE $0x09
MOVD R2, R15 // Restore go stack pointer
MOVD R15, R2 // Save go stack pointer
MOVD $0, R15 // Move SVC args into registers (entry point still in r0 from SVC 08)
SVC_DELETE
MOVD R2, R15 // Restore go stack pointer
error:
MOVD $0, addr+8(FP) // Return 0 on failure
MOVD $0, ret+8(FP) // Return 0 on failure
done:
XOR R0, R0 // Reset r0 to 0
XOR R0, R0 // Reset r0 to 0
RET
// func svcUnload(name *byte, fnptr unsafe.Pointer) int64
TEXT ·svcUnload(SB),NOSPLIT,$0
MOVD R15, R2 // Save go stack pointer
MOVD name+0(FP), R0 // Move SVC args into registers
MOVD addr+8(FP), R15
BYTE $0x0A // SVC 09
BYTE $0x09
XOR R0, R0 // Reset r0 to 0
MOVD R15, R1 // Save SVC return code
MOVD R2, R15 // Restore go stack pointer
MOVD R1, rc+0(FP) // Return SVC return code
TEXT ·svcUnload(SB), NOSPLIT, $0
MOVD R15, R2 // Save go stack pointer
MOVD name+0(FP), R0 // Move SVC args into registers
MOVD fnptr+8(FP), R15
SVC_DELETE
XOR R0, R0 // Reset r0 to 0
MOVD R15, R1 // Save SVC return code
MOVD R2, R15 // Restore go stack pointer
MOVD R1, ret+16(FP) // Return SVC return code
RET
// func gettid() uint64
@@ -417,7 +150,233 @@ TEXT ·gettid(SB), NOSPLIT, $0
// Get CEECAATHDID
MOVD CAA(R8), R9
MOVD 0x3D0(R9), R9
MOVD CEECAATHDID(R9), R9
MOVD R9, ret+0(FP)
RET
//
// Call LE function, if the return is -1
// errno and errno2 is retrieved
//
TEXT ·CallLeFuncWithErr(SB), NOSPLIT, $0
MOVW PSALAA, R8
MOVD LCA64(R8), R8
MOVD CAA(R8), R9
MOVD g, GOCB(R9)
// Restore LE stack.
MOVD SAVSTACK_ASYNC(R8), R9 // R9-> LE stack frame saving address
MOVD 0(R9), R4 // R4-> restore previously saved stack frame pointer
MOVD parms_base+8(FP), R7 // R7 -> argument array
MOVD parms_len+16(FP), R8 // R8 number of arguments
// arg 1 ---> R1
CMP R8, $0
BEQ docall
SUB $1, R8
MOVD 0(R7), R1
// arg 2 ---> R2
CMP R8, $0
BEQ docall
SUB $1, R8
ADD $8, R7
MOVD 0(R7), R2
// arg 3 --> R3
CMP R8, $0
BEQ docall
SUB $1, R8
ADD $8, R7
MOVD 0(R7), R3
CMP R8, $0
BEQ docall
MOVD $2176+16, R6 // starting LE stack address-8 to store 4th argument
repeat:
ADD $8, R7
MOVD 0(R7), R0 // advance arg pointer by 8 byte
ADD $8, R6 // advance LE argument address by 8 byte
MOVD R0, (R4)(R6*1) // copy argument from go-slice to le-frame
SUB $1, R8
CMP R8, $0
BNE repeat
docall:
MOVD funcdesc+0(FP), R8 // R8-> function descriptor
LMG 0(R8), R5, R6
MOVD $0, 0(R9) // R9 address of SAVSTACK_ASYNC
LE_CALL // balr R7, R6 (return #1)
NOPH
MOVD R3, ret+32(FP)
CMP R3, $-1 // compare result to -1
BNE done
// retrieve errno and errno2
MOVD zosLibVec<>(SB), R8
ADD $(__errno), R8
LMG 0(R8), R5, R6
LE_CALL // balr R7, R6 __errno (return #3)
NOPH
MOVWZ 0(R3), R3
MOVD R3, err+48(FP)
MOVD zosLibVec<>(SB), R8
ADD $(__err2ad), R8
LMG 0(R8), R5, R6
LE_CALL // balr R7, R6 __err2ad (return #2)
NOPH
MOVW (R3), R2 // retrieve errno2
MOVD R2, errno2+40(FP) // store in return area
done:
MOVD R4, 0(R9) // Save stack pointer.
RET
//
// Call LE function, if the return is 0
// errno and errno2 is retrieved
//
TEXT ·CallLeFuncWithPtrReturn(SB), NOSPLIT, $0
MOVW PSALAA, R8
MOVD LCA64(R8), R8
MOVD CAA(R8), R9
MOVD g, GOCB(R9)
// Restore LE stack.
MOVD SAVSTACK_ASYNC(R8), R9 // R9-> LE stack frame saving address
MOVD 0(R9), R4 // R4-> restore previously saved stack frame pointer
MOVD parms_base+8(FP), R7 // R7 -> argument array
MOVD parms_len+16(FP), R8 // R8 number of arguments
// arg 1 ---> R1
CMP R8, $0
BEQ docall
SUB $1, R8
MOVD 0(R7), R1
// arg 2 ---> R2
CMP R8, $0
BEQ docall
SUB $1, R8
ADD $8, R7
MOVD 0(R7), R2
// arg 3 --> R3
CMP R8, $0
BEQ docall
SUB $1, R8
ADD $8, R7
MOVD 0(R7), R3
CMP R8, $0
BEQ docall
MOVD $2176+16, R6 // starting LE stack address-8 to store 4th argument
repeat:
ADD $8, R7
MOVD 0(R7), R0 // advance arg pointer by 8 byte
ADD $8, R6 // advance LE argument address by 8 byte
MOVD R0, (R4)(R6*1) // copy argument from go-slice to le-frame
SUB $1, R8
CMP R8, $0
BNE repeat
docall:
MOVD funcdesc+0(FP), R8 // R8-> function descriptor
LMG 0(R8), R5, R6
MOVD $0, 0(R9) // R9 address of SAVSTACK_ASYNC
LE_CALL // balr R7, R6 (return #1)
NOPH
MOVD R3, ret+32(FP)
CMP R3, $0 // compare result to 0
BNE done
// retrieve errno and errno2
MOVD zosLibVec<>(SB), R8
ADD $(__errno), R8
LMG 0(R8), R5, R6
LE_CALL // balr R7, R6 __errno (return #3)
NOPH
MOVWZ 0(R3), R3
MOVD R3, err+48(FP)
MOVD zosLibVec<>(SB), R8
ADD $(__err2ad), R8
LMG 0(R8), R5, R6
LE_CALL // balr R7, R6 __err2ad (return #2)
NOPH
MOVW (R3), R2 // retrieve errno2
MOVD R2, errno2+40(FP) // store in return area
XOR R2, R2
MOVWZ R2, (R3) // clear errno2
done:
MOVD R4, 0(R9) // Save stack pointer.
RET
//
// function to test if a pointer can be safely dereferenced (content read)
// return 0 for succces
//
TEXT ·ptrtest(SB), NOSPLIT, $0-16
MOVD arg+0(FP), R10 // test pointer in R10
// set up R2 to point to CEECAADMC
BYTE $0xE3; BYTE $0x20; BYTE $0x04; BYTE $0xB8; BYTE $0x00; BYTE $0x17 // llgt 2,1208
BYTE $0xB9; BYTE $0x17; BYTE $0x00; BYTE $0x22 // llgtr 2,2
BYTE $0xA5; BYTE $0x26; BYTE $0x7F; BYTE $0xFF // nilh 2,32767
BYTE $0xE3; BYTE $0x22; BYTE $0x00; BYTE $0x58; BYTE $0x00; BYTE $0x04 // lg 2,88(2)
BYTE $0xE3; BYTE $0x22; BYTE $0x00; BYTE $0x08; BYTE $0x00; BYTE $0x04 // lg 2,8(2)
BYTE $0x41; BYTE $0x22; BYTE $0x03; BYTE $0x68 // la 2,872(2)
// set up R5 to point to the "shunt" path which set 1 to R3 (failure)
BYTE $0xB9; BYTE $0x82; BYTE $0x00; BYTE $0x33 // xgr 3,3
BYTE $0xA7; BYTE $0x55; BYTE $0x00; BYTE $0x04 // bras 5,lbl1
BYTE $0xA7; BYTE $0x39; BYTE $0x00; BYTE $0x01 // lghi 3,1
// if r3 is not zero (failed) then branch to finish
BYTE $0xB9; BYTE $0x02; BYTE $0x00; BYTE $0x33 // lbl1 ltgr 3,3
BYTE $0xA7; BYTE $0x74; BYTE $0x00; BYTE $0x08 // brc b'0111',lbl2
// stomic store shunt address in R5 into CEECAADMC
BYTE $0xE3; BYTE $0x52; BYTE $0x00; BYTE $0x00; BYTE $0x00; BYTE $0x24 // stg 5,0(2)
// now try reading from the test pointer in R10, if it fails it branches to the "lghi" instruction above
BYTE $0xE3; BYTE $0x9A; BYTE $0x00; BYTE $0x00; BYTE $0x00; BYTE $0x04 // lg 9,0(10)
// finish here, restore 0 into CEECAADMC
BYTE $0xB9; BYTE $0x82; BYTE $0x00; BYTE $0x99 // lbl2 xgr 9,9
BYTE $0xE3; BYTE $0x92; BYTE $0x00; BYTE $0x00; BYTE $0x00; BYTE $0x24 // stg 9,0(2)
MOVD R3, ret+8(FP) // result in R3
RET
//
// function to test if a untptr can be loaded from a pointer
// return 1: the 8-byte content
// 2: 0 for success, 1 for failure
//
// func safeload(ptr uintptr) ( value uintptr, error uintptr)
TEXT ·safeload(SB), NOSPLIT, $0-24
MOVD ptr+0(FP), R10 // test pointer in R10
MOVD $0x0, R6
BYTE $0xE3; BYTE $0x20; BYTE $0x04; BYTE $0xB8; BYTE $0x00; BYTE $0x17 // llgt 2,1208
BYTE $0xB9; BYTE $0x17; BYTE $0x00; BYTE $0x22 // llgtr 2,2
BYTE $0xA5; BYTE $0x26; BYTE $0x7F; BYTE $0xFF // nilh 2,32767
BYTE $0xE3; BYTE $0x22; BYTE $0x00; BYTE $0x58; BYTE $0x00; BYTE $0x04 // lg 2,88(2)
BYTE $0xE3; BYTE $0x22; BYTE $0x00; BYTE $0x08; BYTE $0x00; BYTE $0x04 // lg 2,8(2)
BYTE $0x41; BYTE $0x22; BYTE $0x03; BYTE $0x68 // la 2,872(2)
BYTE $0xB9; BYTE $0x82; BYTE $0x00; BYTE $0x33 // xgr 3,3
BYTE $0xA7; BYTE $0x55; BYTE $0x00; BYTE $0x04 // bras 5,lbl1
BYTE $0xA7; BYTE $0x39; BYTE $0x00; BYTE $0x01 // lghi 3,1
BYTE $0xB9; BYTE $0x02; BYTE $0x00; BYTE $0x33 // lbl1 ltgr 3,3
BYTE $0xA7; BYTE $0x74; BYTE $0x00; BYTE $0x08 // brc b'0111',lbl2
BYTE $0xE3; BYTE $0x52; BYTE $0x00; BYTE $0x00; BYTE $0x00; BYTE $0x24 // stg 5,0(2)
BYTE $0xE3; BYTE $0x6A; BYTE $0x00; BYTE $0x00; BYTE $0x00; BYTE $0x04 // lg 6,0(10)
BYTE $0xB9; BYTE $0x82; BYTE $0x00; BYTE $0x99 // lbl2 xgr 9,9
BYTE $0xE3; BYTE $0x92; BYTE $0x00; BYTE $0x00; BYTE $0x00; BYTE $0x24 // stg 9,0(2)
MOVD R6, value+8(FP) // result in R6
MOVD R3, error+16(FP) // error in R3
RET
vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/bpxsvc_zos.go
Generated Vendored
+657
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,657 @@
// Copyright 2024 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
//go:build zos
package unix
import (
"bytes"
"fmt"
"unsafe"
)
//go:noescape
func bpxcall(plist []unsafe.Pointer, bpx_offset int64)
//go:noescape
func A2e([]byte)
//go:noescape
func E2a([]byte)
const (
BPX4STA = 192 // stat
BPX4FST = 104 // fstat
BPX4LST = 132 // lstat
BPX4OPN = 156 // open
BPX4CLO = 72 // close
BPX4CHR = 500 // chattr
BPX4FCR = 504 // fchattr
BPX4LCR = 1180 // lchattr
BPX4CTW = 492 // cond_timed_wait
BPX4GTH = 1056 // __getthent
BPX4PTQ = 412 // pthread_quiesc
BPX4PTR = 320 // ptrace
)
const (
//options
//byte1
BPX_OPNFHIGH = 0x80
//byte2
BPX_OPNFEXEC = 0x80
//byte3
BPX_O_NOLARGEFILE = 0x08
BPX_O_LARGEFILE = 0x04
BPX_O_ASYNCSIG = 0x02
BPX_O_SYNC = 0x01
//byte4
BPX_O_CREXCL = 0xc0
BPX_O_CREAT = 0x80
BPX_O_EXCL = 0x40
BPX_O_NOCTTY = 0x20
BPX_O_TRUNC = 0x10
BPX_O_APPEND = 0x08
BPX_O_NONBLOCK = 0x04
BPX_FNDELAY = 0x04
BPX_O_RDWR = 0x03
BPX_O_RDONLY = 0x02
BPX_O_WRONLY = 0x01
BPX_O_ACCMODE = 0x03
BPX_O_GETFL = 0x0f
//mode
// byte1 (file type)
BPX_FT_DIR = 1
BPX_FT_CHARSPEC = 2
BPX_FT_REGFILE = 3
BPX_FT_FIFO = 4
BPX_FT_SYMLINK = 5
BPX_FT_SOCKET = 6
//byte3
BPX_S_ISUID = 0x08
BPX_S_ISGID = 0x04
BPX_S_ISVTX = 0x02
BPX_S_IRWXU1 = 0x01
BPX_S_IRUSR = 0x01
//byte4
BPX_S_IRWXU2 = 0xc0
BPX_S_IWUSR = 0x80
BPX_S_IXUSR = 0x40
BPX_S_IRWXG = 0x38
BPX_S_IRGRP = 0x20
BPX_S_IWGRP = 0x10
BPX_S_IXGRP = 0x08
BPX_S_IRWXOX = 0x07
BPX_S_IROTH = 0x04
BPX_S_IWOTH = 0x02
BPX_S_IXOTH = 0x01
CW_INTRPT = 1
CW_CONDVAR = 32
CW_TIMEOUT = 64
PGTHA_NEXT = 2
PGTHA_CURRENT = 1
PGTHA_FIRST = 0
PGTHA_LAST = 3
PGTHA_PROCESS = 0x80
PGTHA_CONTTY = 0x40
PGTHA_PATH = 0x20
PGTHA_COMMAND = 0x10
PGTHA_FILEDATA = 0x08
PGTHA_THREAD = 0x04
PGTHA_PTAG = 0x02
PGTHA_COMMANDLONG = 0x01
PGTHA_THREADFAST = 0x80
PGTHA_FILEPATH = 0x40
PGTHA_THDSIGMASK = 0x20
// thread quiece mode
QUIESCE_TERM int32 = 1
QUIESCE_FORCE int32 = 2
QUIESCE_QUERY int32 = 3
QUIESCE_FREEZE int32 = 4
QUIESCE_UNFREEZE int32 = 5
FREEZE_THIS_THREAD int32 = 6
FREEZE_EXIT int32 = 8
QUIESCE_SRB int32 = 9
)
type Pgtha struct {
Pid uint32 // 0
Tid0 uint32 // 4
Tid1 uint32
Accesspid byte // C
Accesstid byte // D
Accessasid uint16 // E
Loginname [8]byte // 10
Flag1 byte // 18
Flag1b2 byte // 19
}
type Bpxystat_t struct { // DSECT BPXYSTAT
St_id [4]uint8 // 0
St_length uint16 // 0x4
St_version uint16 // 0x6
St_mode uint32 // 0x8
St_ino uint32 // 0xc
St_dev uint32 // 0x10
St_nlink uint32 // 0x14
St_uid uint32 // 0x18
St_gid uint32 // 0x1c
St_size uint64 // 0x20
St_atime uint32 // 0x28
St_mtime uint32 // 0x2c
St_ctime uint32 // 0x30
St_rdev uint32 // 0x34
St_auditoraudit uint32 // 0x38
St_useraudit uint32 // 0x3c
St_blksize uint32 // 0x40
St_createtime uint32 // 0x44
St_auditid [4]uint32 // 0x48
St_res01 uint32 // 0x58
Ft_ccsid uint16 // 0x5c
Ft_flags uint16 // 0x5e
St_res01a [2]uint32 // 0x60
St_res02 uint32 // 0x68
St_blocks uint32 // 0x6c
St_opaque [3]uint8 // 0x70
St_visible uint8 // 0x73
St_reftime uint32 // 0x74
St_fid uint64 // 0x78
St_filefmt uint8 // 0x80
St_fspflag2 uint8 // 0x81
St_res03 [2]uint8 // 0x82
St_ctimemsec uint32 // 0x84
St_seclabel [8]uint8 // 0x88
St_res04 [4]uint8 // 0x90
// end of version 1
_ uint32 // 0x94
St_atime64 uint64 // 0x98
St_mtime64 uint64 // 0xa0
St_ctime64 uint64 // 0xa8
St_createtime64 uint64 // 0xb0
St_reftime64 uint64 // 0xb8
_ uint64 // 0xc0
St_res05 [16]uint8 // 0xc8
// end of version 2
}
type BpxFilestatus struct {
Oflag1 byte
Oflag2 byte
Oflag3 byte
Oflag4 byte
}
type BpxMode struct {
Ftype byte
Mode1 byte
Mode2 byte
Mode3 byte
}
// Thr attribute structure for extended attributes
type Bpxyatt_t struct { // DSECT BPXYATT
Att_id [4]uint8
Att_version uint16
Att_res01 [2]uint8
Att_setflags1 uint8
Att_setflags2 uint8
Att_setflags3 uint8
Att_setflags4 uint8
Att_mode uint32
Att_uid uint32
Att_gid uint32
Att_opaquemask [3]uint8
Att_visblmaskres uint8
Att_opaque [3]uint8
Att_visibleres uint8
Att_size_h uint32
Att_size_l uint32
Att_atime uint32
Att_mtime uint32
Att_auditoraudit uint32
Att_useraudit uint32
Att_ctime uint32
Att_reftime uint32
// end of version 1
Att_filefmt uint8
Att_res02 [3]uint8
Att_filetag uint32
Att_res03 [8]uint8
// end of version 2
Att_atime64 uint64
Att_mtime64 uint64
Att_ctime64 uint64
Att_reftime64 uint64
Att_seclabel [8]uint8
Att_ver3res02 [8]uint8
// end of version 3
}
func BpxOpen(name string, options *BpxFilestatus, mode *BpxMode) (rv int32, rc int32, rn int32) {
if len(name) < 1024 {
var namebuf [1024]byte
sz := int32(copy(namebuf[:], name))
A2e(namebuf[:sz])
var parms [7]unsafe.Pointer
parms[0] = unsafe.Pointer(&sz)
parms[1] = unsafe.Pointer(&namebuf[0])
parms[2] = unsafe.Pointer(options)
parms[3] = unsafe.Pointer(mode)
parms[4] = unsafe.Pointer(&rv)
parms[5] = unsafe.Pointer(&rc)
parms[6] = unsafe.Pointer(&rn)
bpxcall(parms[:], BPX4OPN)
return rv, rc, rn
}
return -1, -1, -1
}
func BpxClose(fd int32) (rv int32, rc int32, rn int32) {
var parms [4]unsafe.Pointer
parms[0] = unsafe.Pointer(&fd)
parms[1] = unsafe.Pointer(&rv)
parms[2] = unsafe.Pointer(&rc)
parms[3] = unsafe.Pointer(&rn)
bpxcall(parms[:], BPX4CLO)
return rv, rc, rn
}
func BpxFileFStat(fd int32, st *Bpxystat_t) (rv int32, rc int32, rn int32) {
st.St_id = [4]uint8{0xe2, 0xe3, 0xc1, 0xe3}
st.St_version = 2
stat_sz := uint32(unsafe.Sizeof(*st))
var parms [6]unsafe.Pointer
parms[0] = unsafe.Pointer(&fd)
parms[1] = unsafe.Pointer(&stat_sz)
parms[2] = unsafe.Pointer(st)
parms[3] = unsafe.Pointer(&rv)
parms[4] = unsafe.Pointer(&rc)
parms[5] = unsafe.Pointer(&rn)
bpxcall(parms[:], BPX4FST)
return rv, rc, rn
}
func BpxFileStat(name string, st *Bpxystat_t) (rv int32, rc int32, rn int32) {
if len(name) < 1024 {
var namebuf [1024]byte
sz := int32(copy(namebuf[:], name))
A2e(namebuf[:sz])
st.St_id = [4]uint8{0xe2, 0xe3, 0xc1, 0xe3}
st.St_version = 2
stat_sz := uint32(unsafe.Sizeof(*st))
var parms [7]unsafe.Pointer
parms[0] = unsafe.Pointer(&sz)
parms[1] = unsafe.Pointer(&namebuf[0])
parms[2] = unsafe.Pointer(&stat_sz)
parms[3] = unsafe.Pointer(st)
parms[4] = unsafe.Pointer(&rv)
parms[5] = unsafe.Pointer(&rc)
parms[6] = unsafe.Pointer(&rn)
bpxcall(parms[:], BPX4STA)
return rv, rc, rn
}
return -1, -1, -1
}
func BpxFileLStat(name string, st *Bpxystat_t) (rv int32, rc int32, rn int32) {
if len(name) < 1024 {
var namebuf [1024]byte
sz := int32(copy(namebuf[:], name))
A2e(namebuf[:sz])
st.St_id = [4]uint8{0xe2, 0xe3, 0xc1, 0xe3}
st.St_version = 2
stat_sz := uint32(unsafe.Sizeof(*st))
var parms [7]unsafe.Pointer
parms[0] = unsafe.Pointer(&sz)
parms[1] = unsafe.Pointer(&namebuf[0])
parms[2] = unsafe.Pointer(&stat_sz)
parms[3] = unsafe.Pointer(st)
parms[4] = unsafe.Pointer(&rv)
parms[5] = unsafe.Pointer(&rc)
parms[6] = unsafe.Pointer(&rn)
bpxcall(parms[:], BPX4LST)
return rv, rc, rn
}
return -1, -1, -1
}
func BpxChattr(path string, attr *Bpxyatt_t) (rv int32, rc int32, rn int32) {
if len(path) >= 1024 {
return -1, -1, -1
}
var namebuf [1024]byte
sz := int32(copy(namebuf[:], path))
A2e(namebuf[:sz])
attr_sz := uint32(unsafe.Sizeof(*attr))
var parms [7]unsafe.Pointer
parms[0] = unsafe.Pointer(&sz)
parms[1] = unsafe.Pointer(&namebuf[0])
parms[2] = unsafe.Pointer(&attr_sz)
parms[3] = unsafe.Pointer(attr)
parms[4] = unsafe.Pointer(&rv)
parms[5] = unsafe.Pointer(&rc)
parms[6] = unsafe.Pointer(&rn)
bpxcall(parms[:], BPX4CHR)
return rv, rc, rn
}
func BpxLchattr(path string, attr *Bpxyatt_t) (rv int32, rc int32, rn int32) {
if len(path) >= 1024 {
return -1, -1, -1
}
var namebuf [1024]byte
sz := int32(copy(namebuf[:], path))
A2e(namebuf[:sz])
attr_sz := uint32(unsafe.Sizeof(*attr))
var parms [7]unsafe.Pointer
parms[0] = unsafe.Pointer(&sz)
parms[1] = unsafe.Pointer(&namebuf[0])
parms[2] = unsafe.Pointer(&attr_sz)
parms[3] = unsafe.Pointer(attr)
parms[4] = unsafe.Pointer(&rv)
parms[5] = unsafe.Pointer(&rc)
parms[6] = unsafe.Pointer(&rn)
bpxcall(parms[:], BPX4LCR)
return rv, rc, rn
}
func BpxFchattr(fd int32, attr *Bpxyatt_t) (rv int32, rc int32, rn int32) {
attr_sz := uint32(unsafe.Sizeof(*attr))
var parms [6]unsafe.Pointer
parms[0] = unsafe.Pointer(&fd)
parms[1] = unsafe.Pointer(&attr_sz)
parms[2] = unsafe.Pointer(attr)
parms[3] = unsafe.Pointer(&rv)
parms[4] = unsafe.Pointer(&rc)
parms[5] = unsafe.Pointer(&rn)
bpxcall(parms[:], BPX4FCR)
return rv, rc, rn
}
func BpxCondTimedWait(sec uint32, nsec uint32, events uint32, secrem *uint32, nsecrem *uint32) (rv int32, rc int32, rn int32) {
var parms [8]unsafe.Pointer
parms[0] = unsafe.Pointer(&sec)
parms[1] = unsafe.Pointer(&nsec)
parms[2] = unsafe.Pointer(&events)
parms[3] = unsafe.Pointer(secrem)
parms[4] = unsafe.Pointer(nsecrem)
parms[5] = unsafe.Pointer(&rv)
parms[6] = unsafe.Pointer(&rc)
parms[7] = unsafe.Pointer(&rn)
bpxcall(parms[:], BPX4CTW)
return rv, rc, rn
}
func BpxGetthent(in *Pgtha, outlen *uint32, out unsafe.Pointer) (rv int32, rc int32, rn int32) {
var parms [7]unsafe.Pointer
inlen := uint32(26) // nothing else will work. Go says Pgtha is 28-byte because of alignment, but Pgtha is "packed" and must be 26-byte
parms[0] = unsafe.Pointer(&inlen)
parms[1] = unsafe.Pointer(&in)
parms[2] = unsafe.Pointer(outlen)
parms[3] = unsafe.Pointer(&out)
parms[4] = unsafe.Pointer(&rv)
parms[5] = unsafe.Pointer(&rc)
parms[6] = unsafe.Pointer(&rn)
bpxcall(parms[:], BPX4GTH)
return rv, rc, rn
}
func ZosJobname() (jobname string, err error) {
var pgtha Pgtha
pgtha.Pid = uint32(Getpid())
pgtha.Accesspid = PGTHA_CURRENT
pgtha.Flag1 = PGTHA_PROCESS
var out [256]byte
var outlen uint32
outlen = 256
rv, rc, rn := BpxGetthent(&pgtha, &outlen, unsafe.Pointer(&out[0]))
if rv == 0 {
gthc := []byte{0x87, 0xa3, 0x88, 0x83} // 'gthc' in ebcdic
ix := bytes.Index(out[:], gthc)
if ix == -1 {
err = fmt.Errorf("BPX4GTH: gthc return data not found")
return
}
jn := out[ix+80 : ix+88] // we didn't declare Pgthc, but jobname is 8-byte at offset 80
E2a(jn)
jobname = string(bytes.TrimRight(jn, " "))
} else {
err = fmt.Errorf("BPX4GTH: rc=%d errno=%d reason=code=0x%x", rv, rc, rn)
}
return
}
func Bpx4ptq(code int32, data string) (rv int32, rc int32, rn int32) {
var userdata [8]byte
var parms [5]unsafe.Pointer
copy(userdata[:], data+" ")
A2e(userdata[:])
parms[0] = unsafe.Pointer(&code)
parms[1] = unsafe.Pointer(&userdata[0])
parms[2] = unsafe.Pointer(&rv)
parms[3] = unsafe.Pointer(&rc)
parms[4] = unsafe.Pointer(&rn)
bpxcall(parms[:], BPX4PTQ)
return rv, rc, rn
}
const (
PT_TRACE_ME = 0 // Debug this process
PT_READ_I = 1 // Read a full word
PT_READ_D = 2 // Read a full word
PT_READ_U = 3 // Read control info
PT_WRITE_I = 4 //Write a full word
PT_WRITE_D = 5 //Write a full word
PT_CONTINUE = 7 //Continue the process
PT_KILL = 8 //Terminate the process
PT_READ_GPR = 11 // Read GPR, CR, PSW
PT_READ_FPR = 12 // Read FPR
PT_READ_VR = 13 // Read VR
PT_WRITE_GPR = 14 // Write GPR, CR, PSW
PT_WRITE_FPR = 15 // Write FPR
PT_WRITE_VR = 16 // Write VR
PT_READ_BLOCK = 17 // Read storage
PT_WRITE_BLOCK = 19 // Write storage
PT_READ_GPRH = 20 // Read GPRH
PT_WRITE_GPRH = 21 // Write GPRH
PT_REGHSET = 22 // Read all GPRHs
PT_ATTACH = 30 // Attach to a process
PT_DETACH = 31 // Detach from a process
PT_REGSET = 32 // Read all GPRs
PT_REATTACH = 33 // Reattach to a process
PT_LDINFO = 34 // Read loader info
PT_MULTI = 35 // Multi process mode
PT_LD64INFO = 36 // RMODE64 Info Area
PT_BLOCKREQ = 40 // Block request
PT_THREAD_INFO = 60 // Read thread info
PT_THREAD_MODIFY = 61
PT_THREAD_READ_FOCUS = 62
PT_THREAD_WRITE_FOCUS = 63
PT_THREAD_HOLD = 64
PT_THREAD_SIGNAL = 65
PT_EXPLAIN = 66
PT_EVENTS = 67
PT_THREAD_INFO_EXTENDED = 68
PT_REATTACH2 = 71
PT_CAPTURE = 72
PT_UNCAPTURE = 73
PT_GET_THREAD_TCB = 74
PT_GET_ALET = 75
PT_SWAPIN = 76
PT_EXTENDED_EVENT = 98
PT_RECOVER = 99 // Debug a program check
PT_GPR0 = 0 // General purpose register 0
PT_GPR1 = 1 // General purpose register 1
PT_GPR2 = 2 // General purpose register 2
PT_GPR3 = 3 // General purpose register 3
PT_GPR4 = 4 // General purpose register 4
PT_GPR5 = 5 // General purpose register 5
PT_GPR6 = 6 // General purpose register 6
PT_GPR7 = 7 // General purpose register 7
PT_GPR8 = 8 // General purpose register 8
PT_GPR9 = 9 // General purpose register 9
PT_GPR10 = 10 // General purpose register 10
PT_GPR11 = 11 // General purpose register 11
PT_GPR12 = 12 // General purpose register 12
PT_GPR13 = 13 // General purpose register 13
PT_GPR14 = 14 // General purpose register 14
PT_GPR15 = 15 // General purpose register 15
PT_FPR0 = 16 // Floating point register 0
PT_FPR1 = 17 // Floating point register 1
PT_FPR2 = 18 // Floating point register 2
PT_FPR3 = 19 // Floating point register 3
PT_FPR4 = 20 // Floating point register 4
PT_FPR5 = 21 // Floating point register 5
PT_FPR6 = 22 // Floating point register 6
PT_FPR7 = 23 // Floating point register 7
PT_FPR8 = 24 // Floating point register 8
PT_FPR9 = 25 // Floating point register 9
PT_FPR10 = 26 // Floating point register 10
PT_FPR11 = 27 // Floating point register 11
PT_FPR12 = 28 // Floating point register 12
PT_FPR13 = 29 // Floating point register 13
PT_FPR14 = 30 // Floating point register 14
PT_FPR15 = 31 // Floating point register 15
PT_FPC = 32 // Floating point control register
PT_PSW = 40 // PSW
PT_PSW0 = 40 // Left half of the PSW
PT_PSW1 = 41 // Right half of the PSW
PT_CR0 = 42 // Control register 0
PT_CR1 = 43 // Control register 1
PT_CR2 = 44 // Control register 2
PT_CR3 = 45 // Control register 3
PT_CR4 = 46 // Control register 4
PT_CR5 = 47 // Control register 5
PT_CR6 = 48 // Control register 6
PT_CR7 = 49 // Control register 7
PT_CR8 = 50 // Control register 8
PT_CR9 = 51 // Control register 9
PT_CR10 = 52 // Control register 10
PT_CR11 = 53 // Control register 11
PT_CR12 = 54 // Control register 12
PT_CR13 = 55 // Control register 13
PT_CR14 = 56 // Control register 14
PT_CR15 = 57 // Control register 15
PT_GPRH0 = 58 // GP High register 0
PT_GPRH1 = 59 // GP High register 1
PT_GPRH2 = 60 // GP High register 2
PT_GPRH3 = 61 // GP High register 3
PT_GPRH4 = 62 // GP High register 4
PT_GPRH5 = 63 // GP High register 5
PT_GPRH6 = 64 // GP High register 6
PT_GPRH7 = 65 // GP High register 7
PT_GPRH8 = 66 // GP High register 8
PT_GPRH9 = 67 // GP High register 9
PT_GPRH10 = 68 // GP High register 10
PT_GPRH11 = 69 // GP High register 11
PT_GPRH12 = 70 // GP High register 12
PT_GPRH13 = 71 // GP High register 13
PT_GPRH14 = 72 // GP High register 14
PT_GPRH15 = 73 // GP High register 15
PT_VR0 = 74 // Vector register 0
PT_VR1 = 75 // Vector register 1
PT_VR2 = 76 // Vector register 2
PT_VR3 = 77 // Vector register 3
PT_VR4 = 78 // Vector register 4
PT_VR5 = 79 // Vector register 5
PT_VR6 = 80 // Vector register 6
PT_VR7 = 81 // Vector register 7
PT_VR8 = 82 // Vector register 8
PT_VR9 = 83 // Vector register 9
PT_VR10 = 84 // Vector register 10
PT_VR11 = 85 // Vector register 11
PT_VR12 = 86 // Vector register 12
PT_VR13 = 87 // Vector register 13
PT_VR14 = 88 // Vector register 14
PT_VR15 = 89 // Vector register 15
PT_VR16 = 90 // Vector register 16
PT_VR17 = 91 // Vector register 17
PT_VR18 = 92 // Vector register 18
PT_VR19 = 93 // Vector register 19
PT_VR20 = 94 // Vector register 20
PT_VR21 = 95 // Vector register 21
PT_VR22 = 96 // Vector register 22
PT_VR23 = 97 // Vector register 23
PT_VR24 = 98 // Vector register 24
PT_VR25 = 99 // Vector register 25
PT_VR26 = 100 // Vector register 26
PT_VR27 = 101 // Vector register 27
PT_VR28 = 102 // Vector register 28
PT_VR29 = 103 // Vector register 29
PT_VR30 = 104 // Vector register 30
PT_VR31 = 105 // Vector register 31
PT_PSWG = 106 // PSWG
PT_PSWG0 = 106 // Bytes 0-3
PT_PSWG1 = 107 // Bytes 4-7
PT_PSWG2 = 108 // Bytes 8-11 (IA high word)
PT_PSWG3 = 109 // Bytes 12-15 (IA low word)
)
func Bpx4ptr(request int32, pid int32, addr unsafe.Pointer, data unsafe.Pointer, buffer unsafe.Pointer) (rv int32, rc int32, rn int32) {
var parms [8]unsafe.Pointer
parms[0] = unsafe.Pointer(&request)
parms[1] = unsafe.Pointer(&pid)
parms[2] = unsafe.Pointer(&addr)
parms[3] = unsafe.Pointer(&data)
parms[4] = unsafe.Pointer(&buffer)
parms[5] = unsafe.Pointer(&rv)
parms[6] = unsafe.Pointer(&rc)
parms[7] = unsafe.Pointer(&rn)
bpxcall(parms[:], BPX4PTR)
return rv, rc, rn
}
func copyU8(val uint8, dest []uint8) int {
if len(dest) < 1 {
return 0
}
dest[0] = val
return 1
}
func copyU8Arr(src, dest []uint8) int {
if len(dest) < len(src) {
return 0
}
for i, v := range src {
dest[i] = v
}
return len(src)
}
func copyU16(val uint16, dest []uint16) int {
if len(dest) < 1 {
return 0
}
dest[0] = val
return 1
}
func copyU32(val uint32, dest []uint32) int {
if len(dest) < 1 {
return 0
}
dest[0] = val
return 1
}
func copyU32Arr(src, dest []uint32) int {
if len(dest) < len(src) {
return 0
}
for i, v := range src {
dest[i] = v
}
return len(src)
}
func copyU64(val uint64, dest []uint64) int {
if len(dest) < 1 {
return 0
}
dest[0] = val
return 1
}
vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/bpxsvc_zos.s
Generated Vendored
+192
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,192 @@
// Copyright 2024 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
#include "go_asm.h"
#include "textflag.h"
// function to call USS assembly language services
//
// doc: https://www.ibm.com/support/knowledgecenter/en/SSLTBW_3.1.0/com.ibm.zos.v3r1.bpxb100/bit64env.htm
//
// arg1 unsafe.Pointer array that ressembles an OS PLIST
//
// arg2 function offset as in
// doc: https://www.ibm.com/support/knowledgecenter/en/SSLTBW_3.1.0/com.ibm.zos.v3r1.bpxb100/bpx2cr_List_of_offsets.htm
//
// func bpxcall(plist []unsafe.Pointer, bpx_offset int64)
TEXT ·bpxcall(SB), NOSPLIT|NOFRAME, $0
MOVD plist_base+0(FP), R1 // r1 points to plist
MOVD bpx_offset+24(FP), R2 // r2 offset to BPX vector table
MOVD R14, R7 // save r14
MOVD R15, R8 // save r15
MOVWZ 16(R0), R9
MOVWZ 544(R9), R9
MOVWZ 24(R9), R9 // call vector in r9
ADD R2, R9 // add offset to vector table
MOVWZ (R9), R9 // r9 points to entry point
BYTE $0x0D // BL R14,R9 --> basr r14,r9
BYTE $0xE9 // clobbers 0,1,14,15
MOVD R8, R15 // restore 15
JMP R7 // return via saved return address
// func A2e(arr [] byte)
// code page conversion from 819 to 1047
TEXT ·A2e(SB), NOSPLIT|NOFRAME, $0
MOVD arg_base+0(FP), R2 // pointer to arry of characters
MOVD arg_len+8(FP), R3 // count
XOR R0, R0
XOR R1, R1
BYTE $0xA7; BYTE $0x15; BYTE $0x00; BYTE $0x82 // BRAS 1,(2+(256/2))
// ASCII -> EBCDIC conversion table:
BYTE $0x00; BYTE $0x01; BYTE $0x02; BYTE $0x03
BYTE $0x37; BYTE $0x2d; BYTE $0x2e; BYTE $0x2f
BYTE $0x16; BYTE $0x05; BYTE $0x15; BYTE $0x0b
BYTE $0x0c; BYTE $0x0d; BYTE $0x0e; BYTE $0x0f
BYTE $0x10; BYTE $0x11; BYTE $0x12; BYTE $0x13
BYTE $0x3c; BYTE $0x3d; BYTE $0x32; BYTE $0x26
BYTE $0x18; BYTE $0x19; BYTE $0x3f; BYTE $0x27
BYTE $0x1c; BYTE $0x1d; BYTE $0x1e; BYTE $0x1f
BYTE $0x40; BYTE $0x5a; BYTE $0x7f; BYTE $0x7b
BYTE $0x5b; BYTE $0x6c; BYTE $0x50; BYTE $0x7d
BYTE $0x4d; BYTE $0x5d; BYTE $0x5c; BYTE $0x4e
BYTE $0x6b; BYTE $0x60; BYTE $0x4b; BYTE $0x61
BYTE $0xf0; BYTE $0xf1; BYTE $0xf2; BYTE $0xf3
BYTE $0xf4; BYTE $0xf5; BYTE $0xf6; BYTE $0xf7
BYTE $0xf8; BYTE $0xf9; BYTE $0x7a; BYTE $0x5e
BYTE $0x4c; BYTE $0x7e; BYTE $0x6e; BYTE $0x6f
BYTE $0x7c; BYTE $0xc1; BYTE $0xc2; BYTE $0xc3
BYTE $0xc4; BYTE $0xc5; BYTE $0xc6; BYTE $0xc7
BYTE $0xc8; BYTE $0xc9; BYTE $0xd1; BYTE $0xd2
BYTE $0xd3; BYTE $0xd4; BYTE $0xd5; BYTE $0xd6
BYTE $0xd7; BYTE $0xd8; BYTE $0xd9; BYTE $0xe2
BYTE $0xe3; BYTE $0xe4; BYTE $0xe5; BYTE $0xe6
BYTE $0xe7; BYTE $0xe8; BYTE $0xe9; BYTE $0xad
BYTE $0xe0; BYTE $0xbd; BYTE $0x5f; BYTE $0x6d
BYTE $0x79; BYTE $0x81; BYTE $0x82; BYTE $0x83
BYTE $0x84; BYTE $0x85; BYTE $0x86; BYTE $0x87
BYTE $0x88; BYTE $0x89; BYTE $0x91; BYTE $0x92
BYTE $0x93; BYTE $0x94; BYTE $0x95; BYTE $0x96
BYTE $0x97; BYTE $0x98; BYTE $0x99; BYTE $0xa2
BYTE $0xa3; BYTE $0xa4; BYTE $0xa5; BYTE $0xa6
BYTE $0xa7; BYTE $0xa8; BYTE $0xa9; BYTE $0xc0
BYTE $0x4f; BYTE $0xd0; BYTE $0xa1; BYTE $0x07
BYTE $0x20; BYTE $0x21; BYTE $0x22; BYTE $0x23
BYTE $0x24; BYTE $0x25; BYTE $0x06; BYTE $0x17
BYTE $0x28; BYTE $0x29; BYTE $0x2a; BYTE $0x2b
BYTE $0x2c; BYTE $0x09; BYTE $0x0a; BYTE $0x1b
BYTE $0x30; BYTE $0x31; BYTE $0x1a; BYTE $0x33
BYTE $0x34; BYTE $0x35; BYTE $0x36; BYTE $0x08
BYTE $0x38; BYTE $0x39; BYTE $0x3a; BYTE $0x3b
BYTE $0x04; BYTE $0x14; BYTE $0x3e; BYTE $0xff
BYTE $0x41; BYTE $0xaa; BYTE $0x4a; BYTE $0xb1
BYTE $0x9f; BYTE $0xb2; BYTE $0x6a; BYTE $0xb5
BYTE $0xbb; BYTE $0xb4; BYTE $0x9a; BYTE $0x8a
BYTE $0xb0; BYTE $0xca; BYTE $0xaf; BYTE $0xbc
BYTE $0x90; BYTE $0x8f; BYTE $0xea; BYTE $0xfa
BYTE $0xbe; BYTE $0xa0; BYTE $0xb6; BYTE $0xb3
BYTE $0x9d; BYTE $0xda; BYTE $0x9b; BYTE $0x8b
BYTE $0xb7; BYTE $0xb8; BYTE $0xb9; BYTE $0xab
BYTE $0x64; BYTE $0x65; BYTE $0x62; BYTE $0x66
BYTE $0x63; BYTE $0x67; BYTE $0x9e; BYTE $0x68
BYTE $0x74; BYTE $0x71; BYTE $0x72; BYTE $0x73
BYTE $0x78; BYTE $0x75; BYTE $0x76; BYTE $0x77
BYTE $0xac; BYTE $0x69; BYTE $0xed; BYTE $0xee
BYTE $0xeb; BYTE $0xef; BYTE $0xec; BYTE $0xbf
BYTE $0x80; BYTE $0xfd; BYTE $0xfe; BYTE $0xfb
BYTE $0xfc; BYTE $0xba; BYTE $0xae; BYTE $0x59
BYTE $0x44; BYTE $0x45; BYTE $0x42; BYTE $0x46
BYTE $0x43; BYTE $0x47; BYTE $0x9c; BYTE $0x48
BYTE $0x54; BYTE $0x51; BYTE $0x52; BYTE $0x53
BYTE $0x58; BYTE $0x55; BYTE $0x56; BYTE $0x57
BYTE $0x8c; BYTE $0x49; BYTE $0xcd; BYTE $0xce
BYTE $0xcb; BYTE $0xcf; BYTE $0xcc; BYTE $0xe1
BYTE $0x70; BYTE $0xdd; BYTE $0xde; BYTE $0xdb
BYTE $0xdc; BYTE $0x8d; BYTE $0x8e; BYTE $0xdf
retry:
WORD $0xB9931022 // TROO 2,2,b'0001'
BVS retry
RET
// func e2a(arr [] byte)
// code page conversion from 1047 to 819
TEXT ·E2a(SB), NOSPLIT|NOFRAME, $0
MOVD arg_base+0(FP), R2 // pointer to arry of characters
MOVD arg_len+8(FP), R3 // count
XOR R0, R0
XOR R1, R1
BYTE $0xA7; BYTE $0x15; BYTE $0x00; BYTE $0x82 // BRAS 1,(2+(256/2))
// EBCDIC -> ASCII conversion table:
BYTE $0x00; BYTE $0x01; BYTE $0x02; BYTE $0x03
BYTE $0x9c; BYTE $0x09; BYTE $0x86; BYTE $0x7f
BYTE $0x97; BYTE $0x8d; BYTE $0x8e; BYTE $0x0b
BYTE $0x0c; BYTE $0x0d; BYTE $0x0e; BYTE $0x0f
BYTE $0x10; BYTE $0x11; BYTE $0x12; BYTE $0x13
BYTE $0x9d; BYTE $0x0a; BYTE $0x08; BYTE $0x87
BYTE $0x18; BYTE $0x19; BYTE $0x92; BYTE $0x8f
BYTE $0x1c; BYTE $0x1d; BYTE $0x1e; BYTE $0x1f
BYTE $0x80; BYTE $0x81; BYTE $0x82; BYTE $0x83
BYTE $0x84; BYTE $0x85; BYTE $0x17; BYTE $0x1b
BYTE $0x88; BYTE $0x89; BYTE $0x8a; BYTE $0x8b
BYTE $0x8c; BYTE $0x05; BYTE $0x06; BYTE $0x07
BYTE $0x90; BYTE $0x91; BYTE $0x16; BYTE $0x93
BYTE $0x94; BYTE $0x95; BYTE $0x96; BYTE $0x04
BYTE $0x98; BYTE $0x99; BYTE $0x9a; BYTE $0x9b
BYTE $0x14; BYTE $0x15; BYTE $0x9e; BYTE $0x1a
BYTE $0x20; BYTE $0xa0; BYTE $0xe2; BYTE $0xe4
BYTE $0xe0; BYTE $0xe1; BYTE $0xe3; BYTE $0xe5
BYTE $0xe7; BYTE $0xf1; BYTE $0xa2; BYTE $0x2e
BYTE $0x3c; BYTE $0x28; BYTE $0x2b; BYTE $0x7c
BYTE $0x26; BYTE $0xe9; BYTE $0xea; BYTE $0xeb
BYTE $0xe8; BYTE $0xed; BYTE $0xee; BYTE $0xef
BYTE $0xec; BYTE $0xdf; BYTE $0x21; BYTE $0x24
BYTE $0x2a; BYTE $0x29; BYTE $0x3b; BYTE $0x5e
BYTE $0x2d; BYTE $0x2f; BYTE $0xc2; BYTE $0xc4
BYTE $0xc0; BYTE $0xc1; BYTE $0xc3; BYTE $0xc5
BYTE $0xc7; BYTE $0xd1; BYTE $0xa6; BYTE $0x2c
BYTE $0x25; BYTE $0x5f; BYTE $0x3e; BYTE $0x3f
BYTE $0xf8; BYTE $0xc9; BYTE $0xca; BYTE $0xcb
BYTE $0xc8; BYTE $0xcd; BYTE $0xce; BYTE $0xcf
BYTE $0xcc; BYTE $0x60; BYTE $0x3a; BYTE $0x23
BYTE $0x40; BYTE $0x27; BYTE $0x3d; BYTE $0x22
BYTE $0xd8; BYTE $0x61; BYTE $0x62; BYTE $0x63
BYTE $0x64; BYTE $0x65; BYTE $0x66; BYTE $0x67
BYTE $0x68; BYTE $0x69; BYTE $0xab; BYTE $0xbb
BYTE $0xf0; BYTE $0xfd; BYTE $0xfe; BYTE $0xb1
BYTE $0xb0; BYTE $0x6a; BYTE $0x6b; BYTE $0x6c
BYTE $0x6d; BYTE $0x6e; BYTE $0x6f; BYTE $0x70
BYTE $0x71; BYTE $0x72; BYTE $0xaa; BYTE $0xba
BYTE $0xe6; BYTE $0xb8; BYTE $0xc6; BYTE $0xa4
BYTE $0xb5; BYTE $0x7e; BYTE $0x73; BYTE $0x74
BYTE $0x75; BYTE $0x76; BYTE $0x77; BYTE $0x78
BYTE $0x79; BYTE $0x7a; BYTE $0xa1; BYTE $0xbf
BYTE $0xd0; BYTE $0x5b; BYTE $0xde; BYTE $0xae
BYTE $0xac; BYTE $0xa3; BYTE $0xa5; BYTE $0xb7
BYTE $0xa9; BYTE $0xa7; BYTE $0xb6; BYTE $0xbc
BYTE $0xbd; BYTE $0xbe; BYTE $0xdd; BYTE $0xa8
BYTE $0xaf; BYTE $0x5d; BYTE $0xb4; BYTE $0xd7
BYTE $0x7b; BYTE $0x41; BYTE $0x42; BYTE $0x43
BYTE $0x44; BYTE $0x45; BYTE $0x46; BYTE $0x47
BYTE $0x48; BYTE $0x49; BYTE $0xad; BYTE $0xf4
BYTE $0xf6; BYTE $0xf2; BYTE $0xf3; BYTE $0xf5
BYTE $0x7d; BYTE $0x4a; BYTE $0x4b; BYTE $0x4c
BYTE $0x4d; BYTE $0x4e; BYTE $0x4f; BYTE $0x50
BYTE $0x51; BYTE $0x52; BYTE $0xb9; BYTE $0xfb
BYTE $0xfc; BYTE $0xf9; BYTE $0xfa; BYTE $0xff
BYTE $0x5c; BYTE $0xf7; BYTE $0x53; BYTE $0x54
BYTE $0x55; BYTE $0x56; BYTE $0x57; BYTE $0x58
BYTE $0x59; BYTE $0x5a; BYTE $0xb2; BYTE $0xd4
BYTE $0xd6; BYTE $0xd2; BYTE $0xd3; BYTE $0xd5
BYTE $0x30; BYTE $0x31; BYTE $0x32; BYTE $0x33
BYTE $0x34; BYTE $0x35; BYTE $0x36; BYTE $0x37
BYTE $0x38; BYTE $0x39; BYTE $0xb3; BYTE $0xdb
BYTE $0xdc; BYTE $0xd9; BYTE $0xda; BYTE $0x9f
retry:
WORD $0xB9931022 // TROO 2,2,b'0001'
BVS retry
RET
vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/epoll_zos.go
Generated Vendored
-220
View File
@@ -1,220 +0,0 @@
// Copyright 2020 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
//go:build zos && s390x
package unix
import (
"sync"
)
// This file simulates epoll on z/OS using poll.
// Analogous to epoll_event on Linux.
// TODO(neeilan): Pad is because the Linux kernel expects a 96-bit struct. We never pass this to the kernel; remove?
type EpollEvent struct {
Events uint32
Fd int32
Pad int32
}
const (
EPOLLERR = 0x8
EPOLLHUP = 0x10
EPOLLIN = 0x1
EPOLLMSG = 0x400
EPOLLOUT = 0x4
EPOLLPRI = 0x2
EPOLLRDBAND = 0x80
EPOLLRDNORM = 0x40
EPOLLWRBAND = 0x200
EPOLLWRNORM = 0x100
EPOLL_CTL_ADD = 0x1
EPOLL_CTL_DEL = 0x2
EPOLL_CTL_MOD = 0x3
// The following constants are part of the epoll API, but represent
// currently unsupported functionality on z/OS.
// EPOLL_CLOEXEC = 0x80000
// EPOLLET = 0x80000000
// EPOLLONESHOT = 0x40000000
// EPOLLRDHUP = 0x2000 // Typically used with edge-triggered notis
// EPOLLEXCLUSIVE = 0x10000000 // Exclusive wake-up mode
// EPOLLWAKEUP = 0x20000000 // Relies on Linux's BLOCK_SUSPEND capability
)
// TODO(neeilan): We can eliminate these epToPoll / pToEpoll calls by using identical mask values for POLL/EPOLL
// constants where possible The lower 16 bits of epoll events (uint32) can fit any system poll event (int16).
// epToPollEvt converts epoll event field to poll equivalent.
// In epoll, Events is a 32-bit field, while poll uses 16 bits.
func epToPollEvt(events uint32) int16 {
var ep2p = map[uint32]int16{
EPOLLIN: POLLIN,
EPOLLOUT: POLLOUT,
EPOLLHUP: POLLHUP,
EPOLLPRI: POLLPRI,
EPOLLERR: POLLERR,
}
var pollEvts int16 = 0
for epEvt, pEvt := range ep2p {
if (events & epEvt) != 0 {
pollEvts |= pEvt
}
}
return pollEvts
}
// pToEpollEvt converts 16 bit poll event bitfields to 32-bit epoll event fields.
func pToEpollEvt(revents int16) uint32 {
var p2ep = map[int16]uint32{
POLLIN: EPOLLIN,
POLLOUT: EPOLLOUT,
POLLHUP: EPOLLHUP,
POLLPRI: EPOLLPRI,
POLLERR: EPOLLERR,
}
var epollEvts uint32 = 0
for pEvt, epEvt := range p2ep {
if (revents & pEvt) != 0 {
epollEvts |= epEvt
}
}
return epollEvts
}
// Per-process epoll implementation.
type epollImpl struct {
mu sync.Mutex
epfd2ep map[int]*eventPoll
nextEpfd int
}
// eventPoll holds a set of file descriptors being watched by the process. A process can have multiple epoll instances.
// On Linux, this is an in-kernel data structure accessed through a fd.
type eventPoll struct {
mu sync.Mutex
fds map[int]*EpollEvent
}
// epoll impl for this process.
var impl epollImpl = epollImpl{
epfd2ep: make(map[int]*eventPoll),
nextEpfd: 0,
}
func (e *epollImpl) epollcreate(size int) (epfd int, err error) {
e.mu.Lock()
defer e.mu.Unlock()
epfd = e.nextEpfd
e.nextEpfd++
e.epfd2ep[epfd] = &eventPoll{
fds: make(map[int]*EpollEvent),
}
return epfd, nil
}
func (e *epollImpl) epollcreate1(flag int) (fd int, err error) {
return e.epollcreate(4)
}
func (e *epollImpl) epollctl(epfd int, op int, fd int, event *EpollEvent) (err error) {
e.mu.Lock()
defer e.mu.Unlock()
ep, ok := e.epfd2ep[epfd]
if !ok {
return EBADF
}
switch op {
case EPOLL_CTL_ADD:
// TODO(neeilan): When we make epfds and fds disjoint, detect epoll
// loops here (instances watching each other) and return ELOOP.
if _, ok := ep.fds[fd]; ok {
return EEXIST
}
ep.fds[fd] = event
case EPOLL_CTL_MOD:
if _, ok := ep.fds[fd]; !ok {
return ENOENT
}
ep.fds[fd] = event
case EPOLL_CTL_DEL:
if _, ok := ep.fds[fd]; !ok {
return ENOENT
}
delete(ep.fds, fd)
}
return nil
}
// Must be called while holding ep.mu
func (ep *eventPoll) getFds() []int {
fds := make([]int, len(ep.fds))
for fd := range ep.fds {
fds = append(fds, fd)
}
return fds
}
func (e *epollImpl) epollwait(epfd int, events []EpollEvent, msec int) (n int, err error) {
e.mu.Lock() // in [rare] case of concurrent epollcreate + epollwait
ep, ok := e.epfd2ep[epfd]
if !ok {
e.mu.Unlock()
return 0, EBADF
}
pollfds := make([]PollFd, 4)
for fd, epollevt := range ep.fds {
pollfds = append(pollfds, PollFd{Fd: int32(fd), Events: epToPollEvt(epollevt.Events)})
}
e.mu.Unlock()
n, err = Poll(pollfds, msec)
if err != nil {
return n, err
}
i := 0
for _, pFd := range pollfds {
if pFd.Revents != 0 {
events[i] = EpollEvent{Fd: pFd.Fd, Events: pToEpollEvt(pFd.Revents)}
i++
}
if i == n {
break
}
}
return n, nil
}
func EpollCreate(size int) (fd int, err error) {
return impl.epollcreate(size)
}
func EpollCreate1(flag int) (fd int, err error) {
return impl.epollcreate1(flag)
}
func EpollCtl(epfd int, op int, fd int, event *EpollEvent) (err error) {
return impl.epollctl(epfd, op, fd, event)
}
// Because EpollWait mutates events, the caller is expected to coordinate
// concurrent access if calling with the same epfd from multiple goroutines.
func EpollWait(epfd int, events []EpollEvent, msec int) (n int, err error) {
return impl.epollwait(epfd, events, msec)
}
vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/fstatfs_zos.go
Generated Vendored
-163
View File
@@ -1,163 +0,0 @@
// Copyright 2020 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
//go:build zos && s390x
package unix
import (
"unsafe"
)
// This file simulates fstatfs on z/OS using fstatvfs and w_getmntent.
func Fstatfs(fd int, stat *Statfs_t) (err error) {
var stat_v Statvfs_t
err = Fstatvfs(fd, &stat_v)
if err == nil {
// populate stat
stat.Type = 0
stat.Bsize = stat_v.Bsize
stat.Blocks = stat_v.Blocks
stat.Bfree = stat_v.Bfree
stat.Bavail = stat_v.Bavail
stat.Files = stat_v.Files
stat.Ffree = stat_v.Ffree
stat.Fsid = stat_v.Fsid
stat.Namelen = stat_v.Namemax
stat.Frsize = stat_v.Frsize
stat.Flags = stat_v.Flag
for passn := 0; passn < 5; passn++ {
switch passn {
case 0:
err = tryGetmntent64(stat)
break
case 1:
err = tryGetmntent128(stat)
break
case 2:
err = tryGetmntent256(stat)
break
case 3:
err = tryGetmntent512(stat)
break
case 4:
err = tryGetmntent1024(stat)
break
default:
break
}
//proceed to return if: err is nil (found), err is nonnil but not ERANGE (another error occurred)
if err == nil || err != nil && err != ERANGE {
break
}
}
}
return err
}
func tryGetmntent64(stat *Statfs_t) (err error) {
var mnt_ent_buffer struct {
header W_Mnth
filesys_info [64]W_Mntent
}
var buffer_size int = int(unsafe.Sizeof(mnt_ent_buffer))
fs_count, err := W_Getmntent((*byte)(unsafe.Pointer(&mnt_ent_buffer)), buffer_size)
if err != nil {
return err
}
err = ERANGE //return ERANGE if no match is found in this batch
for i := 0; i < fs_count; i++ {
if stat.Fsid == uint64(mnt_ent_buffer.filesys_info[i].Dev) {
stat.Type = uint32(mnt_ent_buffer.filesys_info[i].Fstname[0])
err = nil
break
}
}
return err
}
func tryGetmntent128(stat *Statfs_t) (err error) {
var mnt_ent_buffer struct {
header W_Mnth
filesys_info [128]W_Mntent
}
var buffer_size int = int(unsafe.Sizeof(mnt_ent_buffer))
fs_count, err := W_Getmntent((*byte)(unsafe.Pointer(&mnt_ent_buffer)), buffer_size)
if err != nil {
return err
}
err = ERANGE //return ERANGE if no match is found in this batch
for i := 0; i < fs_count; i++ {
if stat.Fsid == uint64(mnt_ent_buffer.filesys_info[i].Dev) {
stat.Type = uint32(mnt_ent_buffer.filesys_info[i].Fstname[0])
err = nil
break
}
}
return err
}
func tryGetmntent256(stat *Statfs_t) (err error) {
var mnt_ent_buffer struct {
header W_Mnth
filesys_info [256]W_Mntent
}
var buffer_size int = int(unsafe.Sizeof(mnt_ent_buffer))
fs_count, err := W_Getmntent((*byte)(unsafe.Pointer(&mnt_ent_buffer)), buffer_size)
if err != nil {
return err
}
err = ERANGE //return ERANGE if no match is found in this batch
for i := 0; i < fs_count; i++ {
if stat.Fsid == uint64(mnt_ent_buffer.filesys_info[i].Dev) {
stat.Type = uint32(mnt_ent_buffer.filesys_info[i].Fstname[0])
err = nil
break
}
}
return err
}
func tryGetmntent512(stat *Statfs_t) (err error) {
var mnt_ent_buffer struct {
header W_Mnth
filesys_info [512]W_Mntent
}
var buffer_size int = int(unsafe.Sizeof(mnt_ent_buffer))
fs_count, err := W_Getmntent((*byte)(unsafe.Pointer(&mnt_ent_buffer)), buffer_size)
if err != nil {
return err
}
err = ERANGE //return ERANGE if no match is found in this batch
for i := 0; i < fs_count; i++ {
if stat.Fsid == uint64(mnt_ent_buffer.filesys_info[i].Dev) {
stat.Type = uint32(mnt_ent_buffer.filesys_info[i].Fstname[0])
err = nil
break
}
}
return err
}
func tryGetmntent1024(stat *Statfs_t) (err error) {
var mnt_ent_buffer struct {
header W_Mnth
filesys_info [1024]W_Mntent
}
var buffer_size int = int(unsafe.Sizeof(mnt_ent_buffer))
fs_count, err := W_Getmntent((*byte)(unsafe.Pointer(&mnt_ent_buffer)), buffer_size)
if err != nil {
return err
}
err = ERANGE //return ERANGE if no match is found in this batch
for i := 0; i < fs_count; i++ {
if stat.Fsid == uint64(mnt_ent_buffer.filesys_info[i].Dev) {
stat.Type = uint32(mnt_ent_buffer.filesys_info[i].Fstname[0])
err = nil
break
}
}
return err
}
vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/mkerrors.sh
Generated Vendored
+2
View File
@@ -263,6 +263,7 @@ struct ltchars {
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/seccomp.h>
#include <linux/serial.h>
#include <linux/sock_diag.h>
#include <linux/sockios.h>
#include <linux/taskstats.h>
#include <linux/tipc.h>
@@ -549,6 +550,7 @@ ccflags="$@"
$2 !~ "NLA_TYPE_MASK" &&
$2 !~ /^RTC_VL_(ACCURACY|BACKUP|DATA)/ &&
$2 ~ /^(NETLINK|NLM|NLMSG|NLA|IFA|IFAN|RT|RTC|RTCF|RTN|RTPROT|RTNH|ARPHRD|ETH_P|NETNSA)_/ ||
$2 ~ /^SOCK_|SK_DIAG_|SKNLGRP_$/ ||
$2 ~ /^FIORDCHK$/ ||
$2 ~ /^SIOC/ ||
$2 ~ /^TIOC/ ||
vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/mremap.go
Generated Vendored
+5
View File
@@ -50,3 +50,8 @@ func (m *mremapMmapper) Mremap(oldData []byte, newLength int, flags int) (data [
func Mremap(oldData []byte, newLength int, flags int) (data []byte, err error) {
return mapper.Mremap(oldData, newLength, flags)
}
func MremapPtr(oldAddr unsafe.Pointer, oldSize uintptr, newAddr unsafe.Pointer, newSize uintptr, flags int) (ret unsafe.Pointer, err error) {
xaddr, err := mapper.mremap(uintptr(oldAddr), oldSize, newSize, flags, uintptr(newAddr))
return unsafe.Pointer(xaddr), err
}
vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/pagesize_unix.go
Generated Vendored
+1 -1
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
//go:build aix || darwin || dragonfly || freebsd || linux || netbsd || openbsd || solaris
//go:build aix || darwin || dragonfly || freebsd || linux || netbsd || openbsd || solaris || zos
// For Unix, get the pagesize from the runtime.
vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/readdirent_getdirentries.go
Generated Vendored
+1 -1
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
//go:build darwin
//go:build darwin || zos
package unix
vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/sockcmsg_zos.go
Generated Vendored
+58
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
// Copyright 2024 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// Socket control messages
package unix
import "unsafe"
// UnixCredentials encodes credentials into a socket control message
// for sending to another process. This can be used for
// authentication.
func UnixCredentials(ucred *Ucred) []byte {
b := make([]byte, CmsgSpace(SizeofUcred))
h := (*Cmsghdr)(unsafe.Pointer(&b[0]))
h.Level = SOL_SOCKET
h.Type = SCM_CREDENTIALS
h.SetLen(CmsgLen(SizeofUcred))
*(*Ucred)(h.data(0)) = *ucred
return b
}
// ParseUnixCredentials decodes a socket control message that contains
// credentials in a Ucred structure. To receive such a message, the
// SO_PASSCRED option must be enabled on the socket.
func ParseUnixCredentials(m *SocketControlMessage) (*Ucred, error) {
if m.Header.Level != SOL_SOCKET {
return nil, EINVAL
}
if m.Header.Type != SCM_CREDENTIALS {
return nil, EINVAL
}
ucred := *(*Ucred)(unsafe.Pointer(&m.Data[0]))
return &ucred, nil
}
// PktInfo4 encodes Inet4Pktinfo into a socket control message of type IP_PKTINFO.
func PktInfo4(info *Inet4Pktinfo) []byte {
b := make([]byte, CmsgSpace(SizeofInet4Pktinfo))
h := (*Cmsghdr)(unsafe.Pointer(&b[0]))
h.Level = SOL_IP
h.Type = IP_PKTINFO
h.SetLen(CmsgLen(SizeofInet4Pktinfo))
*(*Inet4Pktinfo)(h.data(0)) = *info
return b
}
// PktInfo6 encodes Inet6Pktinfo into a socket control message of type IPV6_PKTINFO.
func PktInfo6(info *Inet6Pktinfo) []byte {
b := make([]byte, CmsgSpace(SizeofInet6Pktinfo))
h := (*Cmsghdr)(unsafe.Pointer(&b[0]))
h.Level = SOL_IPV6
h.Type = IPV6_PKTINFO
h.SetLen(CmsgLen(SizeofInet6Pktinfo))
*(*Inet6Pktinfo)(h.data(0)) = *info
return b
}
vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/symaddr_zos_s390x.s
Generated Vendored
+75
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
// Copyright 2024 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
//go:build zos && s390x && gc
#include "textflag.h"
// provide the address of function variable to be fixed up.
TEXT ·getPipe2Addr(SB), NOSPLIT|NOFRAME, $0-8
MOVD $·Pipe2(SB), R8
MOVD R8, ret+0(FP)
RET
TEXT ·get_FlockAddr(SB), NOSPLIT|NOFRAME, $0-8
MOVD $·Flock(SB), R8
MOVD R8, ret+0(FP)
RET
TEXT ·get_GetxattrAddr(SB), NOSPLIT|NOFRAME, $0-8
MOVD $·Getxattr(SB), R8
MOVD R8, ret+0(FP)
RET
TEXT ·get_NanosleepAddr(SB), NOSPLIT|NOFRAME, $0-8
MOVD $·Nanosleep(SB), R8
MOVD R8, ret+0(FP)
RET
TEXT ·get_SetxattrAddr(SB), NOSPLIT|NOFRAME, $0-8
MOVD $·Setxattr(SB), R8
MOVD R8, ret+0(FP)
RET
TEXT ·get_Wait4Addr(SB), NOSPLIT|NOFRAME, $0-8
MOVD $·Wait4(SB), R8
MOVD R8, ret+0(FP)
RET
TEXT ·get_MountAddr(SB), NOSPLIT|NOFRAME, $0-8
MOVD $·Mount(SB), R8
MOVD R8, ret+0(FP)
RET
TEXT ·get_UnmountAddr(SB), NOSPLIT|NOFRAME, $0-8
MOVD $·Unmount(SB), R8
MOVD R8, ret+0(FP)
RET
TEXT ·get_UtimesNanoAtAddr(SB), NOSPLIT|NOFRAME, $0-8
MOVD $·UtimesNanoAt(SB), R8
MOVD R8, ret+0(FP)
RET
TEXT ·get_UtimesNanoAddr(SB), NOSPLIT|NOFRAME, $0-8
MOVD $·UtimesNano(SB), R8
MOVD R8, ret+0(FP)
RET
TEXT ·get_MkfifoatAddr(SB), NOSPLIT|NOFRAME, $0-8
MOVD $·Mkfifoat(SB), R8
MOVD R8, ret+0(FP)
RET
TEXT ·get_ChtagAddr(SB), NOSPLIT|NOFRAME, $0-8
MOVD $·Chtag(SB), R8
MOVD R8, ret+0(FP)
RET
TEXT ·get_ReadlinkatAddr(SB), NOSPLIT|NOFRAME, $0-8
MOVD $·Readlinkat(SB), R8
MOVD R8, ret+0(FP)
RET
vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/syscall_darwin.go
Generated Vendored
+12
View File
@@ -542,6 +542,18 @@ func SysctlKinfoProcSlice(name string, args ...int) ([]KinfoProc, error) {
}
}
//sys pthread_chdir_np(path string) (err error)
func PthreadChdir(path string) (err error) {
return pthread_chdir_np(path)
}
//sys pthread_fchdir_np(fd int) (err error)
func PthreadFchdir(fd int) (err error) {
return pthread_fchdir_np(fd)
}
//sys sendfile(infd int, outfd int, offset int64, len *int64, hdtr unsafe.Pointer, flags int) (err error)
//sys shmat(id int, addr uintptr, flag int) (ret uintptr, err error)
vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/syscall_unix.go
Generated Vendored
+9
View File
@@ -154,6 +154,15 @@ func Munmap(b []byte) (err error) {
return mapper.Munmap(b)
}
func MmapPtr(fd int, offset int64, addr unsafe.Pointer, length uintptr, prot int, flags int) (ret unsafe.Pointer, err error) {
xaddr, err := mapper.mmap(uintptr(addr), length, prot, flags, fd, offset)
return unsafe.Pointer(xaddr), err
}
func MunmapPtr(addr unsafe.Pointer, length uintptr) (err error) {
return mapper.munmap(uintptr(addr), length)
}
func Read(fd int, p []byte) (n int, err error) {
n, err = read(fd, p)
if raceenabled {
vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/syscall_zos_s390x.go
Generated Vendored
+1320 -189
View File
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/sysvshm_unix.go
Generated Vendored
+1 -1
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
//go:build (darwin && !ios) || linux
//go:build (darwin && !ios) || linux || zos
package unix
vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/sysvshm_unix_other.go
Generated Vendored
+1 -1
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
//go:build darwin && !ios
//go:build (darwin && !ios) || zos
package unix
vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/zerrors_linux.go
Generated Vendored
+27 -2
View File
@@ -491,6 +491,7 @@ const (
BPF_F_REPLACE = 0x4
BPF_F_SLEEPABLE = 0x10
BPF_F_STRICT_ALIGNMENT = 0x1
BPF_F_TEST_REG_INVARIANTS = 0x80
BPF_F_TEST_RND_HI32 = 0x4
BPF_F_TEST_RUN_ON_CPU = 0x1
BPF_F_TEST_STATE_FREQ = 0x8
@@ -501,6 +502,7 @@ const (
BPF_IMM = 0x0
BPF_IND = 0x40
BPF_JA = 0x0
BPF_JCOND = 0xe0
BPF_JEQ = 0x10
BPF_JGE = 0x30
BPF_JGT = 0x20
@@ -656,6 +658,9 @@ const (
CAN_NPROTO = 0x8
CAN_RAW = 0x1
CAN_RAW_FILTER_MAX = 0x200
CAN_RAW_XL_VCID_RX_FILTER = 0x4
CAN_RAW_XL_VCID_TX_PASS = 0x2
CAN_RAW_XL_VCID_TX_SET = 0x1
CAN_RTR_FLAG = 0x40000000
CAN_SFF_ID_BITS = 0xb
CAN_SFF_MASK = 0x7ff
@@ -1338,6 +1343,7 @@ const (
F_OFD_SETLK = 0x25
F_OFD_SETLKW = 0x26
F_OK = 0x0
F_SEAL_EXEC = 0x20
F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE = 0x10
F_SEAL_GROW = 0x4
F_SEAL_SEAL = 0x1
@@ -1626,6 +1632,7 @@ const (
IP_FREEBIND = 0xf
IP_HDRINCL = 0x3
IP_IPSEC_POLICY = 0x10
IP_LOCAL_PORT_RANGE = 0x33
IP_MAXPACKET = 0xffff
IP_MAX_MEMBERSHIPS = 0x14
IP_MF = 0x2000
@@ -1652,6 +1659,7 @@ const (
IP_PMTUDISC_OMIT = 0x5
IP_PMTUDISC_PROBE = 0x3
IP_PMTUDISC_WANT = 0x1
IP_PROTOCOL = 0x34
IP_RECVERR = 0xb
IP_RECVERR_RFC4884 = 0x1a
IP_RECVFRAGSIZE = 0x19
@@ -1697,6 +1705,7 @@ const (
KEXEC_ARCH_S390 = 0x160000
KEXEC_ARCH_SH = 0x2a0000
KEXEC_ARCH_X86_64 = 0x3e0000
KEXEC_FILE_DEBUG = 0x8
KEXEC_FILE_NO_INITRAMFS = 0x4
KEXEC_FILE_ON_CRASH = 0x2
KEXEC_FILE_UNLOAD = 0x1
@@ -1898,6 +1907,7 @@ const (
MNT_DETACH = 0x2
MNT_EXPIRE = 0x4
MNT_FORCE = 0x1
MNT_ID_REQ_SIZE_VER0 = 0x18
MODULE_INIT_COMPRESSED_FILE = 0x4
MODULE_INIT_IGNORE_MODVERSIONS = 0x1
MODULE_INIT_IGNORE_VERMAGIC = 0x2
@@ -2166,7 +2176,7 @@ const (
NFT_SECMARK_CTX_MAXLEN = 0x100
NFT_SET_MAXNAMELEN = 0x100
NFT_SOCKET_MAX = 0x3
NFT_TABLE_F_MASK = 0x3
NFT_TABLE_F_MASK = 0x7
NFT_TABLE_MAXNAMELEN = 0x100
NFT_TRACETYPE_MAX = 0x3
NFT_TUNNEL_F_MASK = 0x7
@@ -2302,6 +2312,7 @@ const (
PERF_AUX_FLAG_PARTIAL = 0x4
PERF_AUX_FLAG_PMU_FORMAT_TYPE_MASK = 0xff00
PERF_AUX_FLAG_TRUNCATED = 0x1
PERF_BRANCH_ENTRY_INFO_BITS_MAX = 0x21
PERF_BR_ARM64_DEBUG_DATA = 0x7
PERF_BR_ARM64_DEBUG_EXIT = 0x5
PERF_BR_ARM64_DEBUG_HALT = 0x4
@@ -2399,6 +2410,7 @@ const (
PERF_RECORD_MISC_USER = 0x2
PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_PLM_ALL = 0x7
PERF_SAMPLE_WEIGHT_TYPE = 0x1004000
PID_FS_MAGIC = 0x50494446
PIPEFS_MAGIC = 0x50495045
PPPIOCGNPMODE = 0xc008744c
PPPIOCNEWUNIT = 0xc004743e
@@ -2892,8 +2904,9 @@ const (
RWF_APPEND = 0x10
RWF_DSYNC = 0x2
RWF_HIPRI = 0x1
RWF_NOAPPEND = 0x20
RWF_NOWAIT = 0x8
RWF_SUPPORTED = 0x1f
RWF_SUPPORTED = 0x3f
RWF_SYNC = 0x4
RWF_WRITE_LIFE_NOT_SET = 0x0
SCHED_BATCH = 0x3
@@ -2914,7 +2927,9 @@ const (
SCHED_RESET_ON_FORK = 0x40000000
SCHED_RR = 0x2
SCM_CREDENTIALS = 0x2
SCM_PIDFD = 0x4
SCM_RIGHTS = 0x1
SCM_SECURITY = 0x3
SCM_TIMESTAMP = 0x1d
SC_LOG_FLUSH = 0x100000
SECCOMP_ADDFD_FLAG_SEND = 0x2
@@ -3047,6 +3062,8 @@ const (
SIOCSMIIREG = 0x8949
SIOCSRARP = 0x8962
SIOCWANDEV = 0x894a
SK_DIAG_BPF_STORAGE_MAX = 0x3
SK_DIAG_BPF_STORAGE_REQ_MAX = 0x1
SMACK_MAGIC = 0x43415d53
SMART_AUTOSAVE = 0xd2
SMART_AUTO_OFFLINE = 0xdb
@@ -3067,6 +3084,8 @@ const (
SOCKFS_MAGIC = 0x534f434b
SOCK_BUF_LOCK_MASK = 0x3
SOCK_DCCP = 0x6
SOCK_DESTROY = 0x15
SOCK_DIAG_BY_FAMILY = 0x14
SOCK_IOC_TYPE = 0x89
SOCK_PACKET = 0xa
SOCK_RAW = 0x3
@@ -3168,6 +3187,7 @@ const (
STATX_GID = 0x10
STATX_INO = 0x100
STATX_MNT_ID = 0x1000
STATX_MNT_ID_UNIQUE = 0x4000
STATX_MODE = 0x2
STATX_MTIME = 0x40
STATX_NLINK = 0x4
@@ -3255,6 +3275,7 @@ const (
TCP_MAX_WINSHIFT = 0xe
TCP_MD5SIG = 0xe
TCP_MD5SIG_EXT = 0x20
TCP_MD5SIG_FLAG_IFINDEX = 0x2
TCP_MD5SIG_FLAG_PREFIX = 0x1
TCP_MD5SIG_MAXKEYLEN = 0x50
TCP_MSS = 0x200
@@ -3562,12 +3583,16 @@ const (
XDP_RX_RING = 0x2
XDP_SHARED_UMEM = 0x1
XDP_STATISTICS = 0x7
XDP_TXMD_FLAGS_CHECKSUM = 0x2
XDP_TXMD_FLAGS_TIMESTAMP = 0x1
XDP_TX_METADATA = 0x2
XDP_TX_RING = 0x3
XDP_UMEM_COMPLETION_RING = 0x6
XDP_UMEM_FILL_RING = 0x5
XDP_UMEM_PGOFF_COMPLETION_RING = 0x180000000
XDP_UMEM_PGOFF_FILL_RING = 0x100000000
XDP_UMEM_REG = 0x4
XDP_UMEM_TX_SW_CSUM = 0x2
XDP_UMEM_UNALIGNED_CHUNK_FLAG = 0x1
XDP_USE_NEED_WAKEUP = 0x8
XDP_USE_SG = 0x10
vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/zerrors_linux_386.go
Generated Vendored
+1
View File
@@ -118,6 +118,7 @@ const (
IXOFF = 0x1000
IXON = 0x400
MAP_32BIT = 0x40
MAP_ABOVE4G = 0x80
MAP_ANON = 0x20
MAP_ANONYMOUS = 0x20
MAP_DENYWRITE = 0x800
vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/zerrors_linux_amd64.go
Generated Vendored
+1
View File
@@ -118,6 +118,7 @@ const (
IXOFF = 0x1000
IXON = 0x400
MAP_32BIT = 0x40
MAP_ABOVE4G = 0x80
MAP_ANON = 0x20
MAP_ANONYMOUS = 0x20
MAP_DENYWRITE = 0x800
vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/zerrors_linux_arm64.go
Generated Vendored
+1
View File
@@ -87,6 +87,7 @@ const (
FICLONE = 0x40049409
FICLONERANGE = 0x4020940d
FLUSHO = 0x1000
FPMR_MAGIC = 0x46504d52
FPSIMD_MAGIC = 0x46508001
FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY = 0x40806685
FS_IOC_GETFLAGS = 0x80086601
vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/zerrors_zos_s390x.go
Generated Vendored
+181 -52
View File
@@ -10,41 +10,99 @@
package unix
const (
BRKINT = 0x0001
CLOCK_MONOTONIC = 0x1
CLOCK_PROCESS_CPUTIME_ID = 0x2
CLOCK_REALTIME = 0x0
CLOCK_THREAD_CPUTIME_ID = 0x3
CS8 = 0x0030
CSIZE = 0x0030
ECHO = 0x00000008
ECHONL = 0x00000001
FD_CLOEXEC = 0x01
FD_CLOFORK = 0x02
FNDELAY = 0x04
F_CLOSFD = 9
F_CONTROL_CVT = 13
F_DUPFD = 0
F_DUPFD2 = 8
F_GETFD = 1
F_GETFL = 259
F_GETLK = 5
F_GETOWN = 10
F_OK = 0x0
F_RDLCK = 1
F_SETFD = 2
F_SETFL = 4
F_SETLK = 6
F_SETLKW = 7
F_SETOWN = 11
F_SETTAG = 12
F_UNLCK = 3
F_WRLCK = 2
FSTYPE_ZFS = 0xe9 //"Z"
FSTYPE_HFS = 0xc8 //"H"
FSTYPE_NFS = 0xd5 //"N"
FSTYPE_TFS = 0xe3 //"T"
FSTYPE_AUTOMOUNT = 0xc1 //"A"
BRKINT = 0x0001
CLOCAL = 0x1
CLOCK_MONOTONIC = 0x1
CLOCK_PROCESS_CPUTIME_ID = 0x2
CLOCK_REALTIME = 0x0
CLOCK_THREAD_CPUTIME_ID = 0x3
CLONE_NEWIPC = 0x08000000
CLONE_NEWNET = 0x40000000
CLONE_NEWNS = 0x00020000
CLONE_NEWPID = 0x20000000
CLONE_NEWUTS = 0x04000000
CLONE_PARENT = 0x00008000
CS8 = 0x0030
CSIZE = 0x0030
ECHO = 0x00000008
ECHONL = 0x00000001
EFD_SEMAPHORE = 0x00002000
EFD_CLOEXEC = 0x00001000
EFD_NONBLOCK = 0x00000004
EPOLL_CLOEXEC = 0x00001000
EPOLL_CTL_ADD = 0
EPOLL_CTL_MOD = 1
EPOLL_CTL_DEL = 2
EPOLLRDNORM = 0x0001
EPOLLRDBAND = 0x0002
EPOLLIN = 0x0003
EPOLLOUT = 0x0004
EPOLLWRBAND = 0x0008
EPOLLPRI = 0x0010
EPOLLERR = 0x0020
EPOLLHUP = 0x0040
EPOLLEXCLUSIVE = 0x20000000
EPOLLONESHOT = 0x40000000
FD_CLOEXEC = 0x01
FD_CLOFORK = 0x02
FD_SETSIZE = 0x800
FNDELAY = 0x04
F_CLOSFD = 9
F_CONTROL_CVT = 13
F_DUPFD = 0
F_DUPFD2 = 8
F_GETFD = 1
F_GETFL = 259
F_GETLK = 5
F_GETOWN = 10
F_OK = 0x0
F_RDLCK = 1
F_SETFD = 2
F_SETFL = 4
F_SETLK = 6
F_SETLKW = 7
F_SETOWN = 11
F_SETTAG = 12
F_UNLCK = 3
F_WRLCK = 2
FSTYPE_ZFS = 0xe9 //"Z"
FSTYPE_HFS = 0xc8 //"H"
FSTYPE_NFS = 0xd5 //"N"
FSTYPE_TFS = 0xe3 //"T"
FSTYPE_AUTOMOUNT = 0xc1 //"A"
GRND_NONBLOCK = 1
GRND_RANDOM = 2
HUPCL = 0x0100 // Hang up on last close
IN_CLOEXEC = 0x00001000
IN_NONBLOCK = 0x00000004
IN_ACCESS = 0x00000001
IN_MODIFY = 0x00000002
IN_ATTRIB = 0x00000004
IN_CLOSE_WRITE = 0x00000008
IN_CLOSE_NOWRITE = 0x00000010
IN_OPEN = 0x00000020
IN_MOVED_FROM = 0x00000040
IN_MOVED_TO = 0x00000080
IN_CREATE = 0x00000100
IN_DELETE = 0x00000200
IN_DELETE_SELF = 0x00000400
IN_MOVE_SELF = 0x00000800
IN_UNMOUNT = 0x00002000
IN_Q_OVERFLOW = 0x00004000
IN_IGNORED = 0x00008000
IN_CLOSE = (IN_CLOSE_WRITE | IN_CLOSE_NOWRITE)
IN_MOVE = (IN_MOVED_FROM | IN_MOVED_TO)
IN_ALL_EVENTS = (IN_ACCESS | IN_MODIFY | IN_ATTRIB |
IN_CLOSE | IN_OPEN | IN_MOVE |
IN_CREATE | IN_DELETE | IN_DELETE_SELF |
IN_MOVE_SELF)
IN_ONLYDIR = 0x01000000
IN_DONT_FOLLOW = 0x02000000
IN_EXCL_UNLINK = 0x04000000
IN_MASK_CREATE = 0x10000000
IN_MASK_ADD = 0x20000000
IN_ISDIR = 0x40000000
IN_ONESHOT = 0x80000000
IP6F_MORE_FRAG = 0x0001
IP6F_OFF_MASK = 0xfff8
IP6F_RESERVED_MASK = 0x0006
@@ -152,10 +210,18 @@ const (
IP_PKTINFO = 101
IP_RECVPKTINFO = 102
IP_TOS = 2
IP_TTL = 3
IP_TTL = 14
IP_UNBLOCK_SOURCE = 11
ICMP6_FILTER = 1
MCAST_INCLUDE = 0
MCAST_EXCLUDE = 1
MCAST_JOIN_GROUP = 40
MCAST_LEAVE_GROUP = 41
MCAST_JOIN_SOURCE_GROUP = 42
MCAST_LEAVE_SOURCE_GROUP = 43
MCAST_BLOCK_SOURCE = 44
MCAST_UNBLOCK_SOURCE = 46
ICANON = 0x0010
ICMP6_FILTER = 0x26
ICRNL = 0x0002
IEXTEN = 0x0020
IGNBRK = 0x0004
@@ -165,10 +231,10 @@ const (
ISTRIP = 0x0080
IXON = 0x0200
IXOFF = 0x0100
LOCK_SH = 0x1 // Not exist on zOS
LOCK_EX = 0x2 // Not exist on zOS
LOCK_NB = 0x4 // Not exist on zOS
LOCK_UN = 0x8 // Not exist on zOS
LOCK_SH = 0x1
LOCK_EX = 0x2
LOCK_NB = 0x4
LOCK_UN = 0x8
POLLIN = 0x0003
POLLOUT = 0x0004
POLLPRI = 0x0010
@@ -182,15 +248,29 @@ const (
MAP_PRIVATE = 0x1 // changes are private
MAP_SHARED = 0x2 // changes are shared
MAP_FIXED = 0x4 // place exactly
MCAST_JOIN_GROUP = 40
MCAST_LEAVE_GROUP = 41
MCAST_JOIN_SOURCE_GROUP = 42
MCAST_LEAVE_SOURCE_GROUP = 43
MCAST_BLOCK_SOURCE = 44
MCAST_UNBLOCK_SOURCE = 45
__MAP_MEGA = 0x8
__MAP_64 = 0x10
MAP_ANON = 0x20
MAP_ANONYMOUS = 0x20
MS_SYNC = 0x1 // msync - synchronous writes
MS_ASYNC = 0x2 // asynchronous writes
MS_INVALIDATE = 0x4 // invalidate mappings
MS_BIND = 0x00001000
MS_MOVE = 0x00002000
MS_NOSUID = 0x00000002
MS_PRIVATE = 0x00040000
MS_REC = 0x00004000
MS_REMOUNT = 0x00008000
MS_RDONLY = 0x00000001
MS_UNBINDABLE = 0x00020000
MNT_DETACH = 0x00000004
ZOSDSFS_SUPER_MAGIC = 0x44534653 // zOS DSFS
NFS_SUPER_MAGIC = 0x6969 // NFS
NSFS_MAGIC = 0x6e736673 // PROCNS
PROC_SUPER_MAGIC = 0x9fa0 // proc FS
ZOSTFS_SUPER_MAGIC = 0x544653 // zOS TFS
ZOSUFS_SUPER_MAGIC = 0x554653 // zOS UFS
ZOSZFS_SUPER_MAGIC = 0x5A4653 // zOS ZFS
MTM_RDONLY = 0x80000000
MTM_RDWR = 0x40000000
MTM_UMOUNT = 0x10000000
@@ -205,13 +285,20 @@ const (
MTM_REMOUNT = 0x00000100
MTM_NOSECURITY = 0x00000080
NFDBITS = 0x20
ONLRET = 0x0020 // NL performs CR function
O_ACCMODE = 0x03
O_APPEND = 0x08
O_ASYNCSIG = 0x0200
O_CREAT = 0x80
O_DIRECT = 0x00002000
O_NOFOLLOW = 0x00004000
O_DIRECTORY = 0x00008000
O_PATH = 0x00080000
O_CLOEXEC = 0x00001000
O_EXCL = 0x40
O_GETFL = 0x0F
O_LARGEFILE = 0x0400
O_NDELAY = 0x4
O_NONBLOCK = 0x04
O_RDONLY = 0x02
O_RDWR = 0x03
@@ -248,6 +335,7 @@ const (
AF_IUCV = 17
AF_LAT = 14
AF_LINK = 18
AF_LOCAL = AF_UNIX // AF_LOCAL is an alias for AF_UNIX
AF_MAX = 30
AF_NBS = 7
AF_NDD = 23
@@ -285,15 +373,33 @@ const (
RLIMIT_AS = 5
RLIMIT_NOFILE = 6
RLIMIT_MEMLIMIT = 7
RLIMIT_MEMLOCK = 0x8
RLIM_INFINITY = 2147483647
SCHED_FIFO = 0x2
SCM_CREDENTIALS = 0x2
SCM_RIGHTS = 0x01
SF_CLOSE = 0x00000002
SF_REUSE = 0x00000001
SHM_RND = 0x2
SHM_RDONLY = 0x1
SHMLBA = 0x1000
IPC_STAT = 0x3
IPC_SET = 0x2
IPC_RMID = 0x1
IPC_PRIVATE = 0x0
IPC_CREAT = 0x1000000
__IPC_MEGA = 0x4000000
__IPC_SHAREAS = 0x20000000
__IPC_BELOWBAR = 0x10000000
IPC_EXCL = 0x2000000
__IPC_GIGA = 0x8000000
SHUT_RD = 0
SHUT_RDWR = 2
SHUT_WR = 1
SOCK_CLOEXEC = 0x00001000
SOCK_CONN_DGRAM = 6
SOCK_DGRAM = 2
SOCK_NONBLOCK = 0x800
SOCK_RAW = 3
SOCK_RDM = 4
SOCK_SEQPACKET = 5
@@ -378,8 +484,6 @@ const (
S_IFMST = 0x00FF0000
TCP_KEEPALIVE = 0x8
TCP_NODELAY = 0x1
TCP_INFO = 0xb
TCP_USER_TIMEOUT = 0x1
TIOCGWINSZ = 0x4008a368
TIOCSWINSZ = 0x8008a367
TIOCSBRK = 0x2000a77b
@@ -427,7 +531,10 @@ const (
VSUSP = 9
VTIME = 10
WCONTINUED = 0x4
WEXITED = 0x8
WNOHANG = 0x1
WNOWAIT = 0x20
WSTOPPED = 0x10
WUNTRACED = 0x2
_BPX_SWAP = 1
_BPX_NONSWAP = 2
@@ -452,8 +559,28 @@ const (
MADV_FREE = 15 // for Linux compatibility -- no zos semantics
MADV_WIPEONFORK = 16 // for Linux compatibility -- no zos semantics
MADV_KEEPONFORK = 17 // for Linux compatibility -- no zos semantics
AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW = 1 // for Unix compatibility -- no zos semantics
AT_FDCWD = 2 // for Unix compatibility -- no zos semantics
AT_SYMLINK_FOLLOW = 0x400
AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW = 0x100
XATTR_CREATE = 0x1
XATTR_REPLACE = 0x2
P_PID = 0
P_PGID = 1
P_ALL = 2
PR_SET_NAME = 15
PR_GET_NAME = 16
PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS = 38
PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIVS = 39
PR_SET_DUMPABLE = 4
PR_GET_DUMPABLE = 3
PR_SET_PDEATHSIG = 1
PR_GET_PDEATHSIG = 2
PR_SET_CHILD_SUBREAPER = 36
PR_GET_CHILD_SUBREAPER = 37
AT_FDCWD = -100
AT_EACCESS = 0x200
AT_EMPTY_PATH = 0x1000
AT_REMOVEDIR = 0x200
RENAME_NOREPLACE = 1 << 0
)
const (
@@ -476,6 +603,7 @@ const (
EMLINK = Errno(125)
ENAMETOOLONG = Errno(126)
ENFILE = Errno(127)
ENOATTR = Errno(265)
ENODEV = Errno(128)
ENOENT = Errno(129)
ENOEXEC = Errno(130)
@@ -700,7 +828,7 @@ var errorList = [...]struct {
{145, "EDC5145I", "The parameter list is too long, or the message to receive was too large for the buffer."},
{146, "EDC5146I", "Too many levels of symbolic links."},
{147, "EDC5147I", "Illegal byte sequence."},
{148, "", ""},
{148, "EDC5148I", "The named attribute or data not available."},
{149, "EDC5149I", "Value Overflow Error."},
{150, "EDC5150I", "UNIX System Services is not active."},
{151, "EDC5151I", "Dynamic allocation error."},
@@ -743,6 +871,7 @@ var errorList = [...]struct {
{259, "EDC5259I", "A CUN_RS_NO_CONVERSION error was issued by Unicode Services."},
{260, "EDC5260I", "A CUN_RS_TABLE_NOT_ALIGNED error was issued by Unicode Services."},
{262, "EDC5262I", "An iconv() function encountered an unexpected error while using Unicode Services."},
{265, "EDC5265I", "The named attribute not available."},
{1000, "EDC8000I", "A bad socket-call constant was found in the IUCV header."},
{1001, "EDC8001I", "An error was found in the IUCV header."},
{1002, "EDC8002I", "A socket descriptor is out of range."},
vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/zsymaddr_zos_s390x.s
Generated Vendored
+364
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,364 @@
// go run mksyscall_zos_s390x.go -o_sysnum zsysnum_zos_s390x.go -o_syscall zsyscall_zos_s390x.go -i_syscall syscall_zos_s390x.go -o_asm zsymaddr_zos_s390x.s
// Code generated by the command above; see README.md. DO NOT EDIT.
//go:build zos && s390x
#include "textflag.h"
// provide the address of function variable to be fixed up.
// THIS FILE IS GENERATED BY THE COMMAND AT THE TOP; DO NOT EDIT
TEXT ·get_FlistxattrAddr(SB), NOSPLIT|NOFRAME, $0-8
MOVD $·Flistxattr(SB), R8
MOVD R8, ret+0(FP)
RET
// THIS FILE IS GENERATED BY THE COMMAND AT THE TOP; DO NOT EDIT
TEXT ·get_FremovexattrAddr(SB), NOSPLIT|NOFRAME, $0-8
MOVD $·Fremovexattr(SB), R8
MOVD R8, ret+0(FP)
RET
// THIS FILE IS GENERATED BY THE COMMAND AT THE TOP; DO NOT EDIT
TEXT ·get_FgetxattrAddr(SB), NOSPLIT|NOFRAME, $0-8
MOVD $·Fgetxattr(SB), R8
MOVD R8, ret+0(FP)
RET
// THIS FILE IS GENERATED BY THE COMMAND AT THE TOP; DO NOT EDIT
TEXT ·get_FsetxattrAddr(SB), NOSPLIT|NOFRAME, $0-8
MOVD $·Fsetxattr(SB), R8
MOVD R8, ret+0(FP)
RET
// THIS FILE IS GENERATED BY THE COMMAND AT THE TOP; DO NOT EDIT
TEXT ·get_accept4Addr(SB), NOSPLIT|NOFRAME, $0-8
MOVD $·accept4(SB), R8
MOVD R8, ret+0(FP)
RET
// THIS FILE IS GENERATED BY THE COMMAND AT THE TOP; DO NOT EDIT
TEXT ·get_RemovexattrAddr(SB), NOSPLIT|NOFRAME, $0-8
MOVD $·Removexattr(SB), R8
MOVD R8, ret+0(FP)
RET
// THIS FILE IS GENERATED BY THE COMMAND AT THE TOP; DO NOT EDIT
TEXT ·get_Dup3Addr(SB), NOSPLIT|NOFRAME, $0-8
MOVD $·Dup3(SB), R8
MOVD R8, ret+0(FP)
RET
// THIS FILE IS GENERATED BY THE COMMAND AT THE TOP; DO NOT EDIT
TEXT ·get_DirfdAddr(SB), NOSPLIT|NOFRAME, $0-8
MOVD $·Dirfd(SB), R8
MOVD R8, ret+0(FP)
RET
// THIS FILE IS GENERATED BY THE COMMAND AT THE TOP; DO NOT EDIT
TEXT ·get_EpollCreateAddr(SB), NOSPLIT|NOFRAME, $0-8
MOVD $·EpollCreate(SB), R8
MOVD R8, ret+0(FP)
RET
// THIS FILE IS GENERATED BY THE COMMAND AT THE TOP; DO NOT EDIT
TEXT ·get_EpollCreate1Addr(SB), NOSPLIT|NOFRAME, $0-8
MOVD $·EpollCreate1(SB), R8
MOVD R8, ret+0(FP)
RET
// THIS FILE IS GENERATED BY THE COMMAND AT THE TOP; DO NOT EDIT
TEXT ·get_EpollCtlAddr(SB), NOSPLIT|NOFRAME, $0-8
MOVD $·EpollCtl(SB), R8
MOVD R8, ret+0(FP)
RET
// THIS FILE IS GENERATED BY THE COMMAND AT THE TOP; DO NOT EDIT
TEXT ·get_EpollPwaitAddr(SB), NOSPLIT|NOFRAME, $0-8
MOVD $·EpollPwait(SB), R8
MOVD R8, ret+0(FP)
RET
// THIS FILE IS GENERATED BY THE COMMAND AT THE TOP; DO NOT EDIT
TEXT ·get_EpollWaitAddr(SB), NOSPLIT|NOFRAME, $0-8
MOVD $·EpollWait(SB), R8
MOVD R8, ret+0(FP)
RET
// THIS FILE IS GENERATED BY THE COMMAND AT THE TOP; DO NOT EDIT
TEXT ·get_EventfdAddr(SB), NOSPLIT|NOFRAME, $0-8
MOVD $·Eventfd(SB), R8
MOVD R8, ret+0(FP)
RET
// THIS FILE IS GENERATED BY THE COMMAND AT THE TOP; DO NOT EDIT
TEXT ·get_FaccessatAddr(SB), NOSPLIT|NOFRAME, $0-8
MOVD $·Faccessat(SB), R8
MOVD R8, ret+0(FP)
RET
// THIS FILE IS GENERATED BY THE COMMAND AT THE TOP; DO NOT EDIT
TEXT ·get_FchmodatAddr(SB), NOSPLIT|NOFRAME, $0-8
MOVD $·Fchmodat(SB), R8
MOVD R8, ret+0(FP)
RET
// THIS FILE IS GENERATED BY THE COMMAND AT THE TOP; DO NOT EDIT
TEXT ·get_FchownatAddr(SB), NOSPLIT|NOFRAME, $0-8
MOVD $·Fchownat(SB), R8
MOVD R8, ret+0(FP)
RET
// THIS FILE IS GENERATED BY THE COMMAND AT THE TOP; DO NOT EDIT
TEXT ·get_FdatasyncAddr(SB), NOSPLIT|NOFRAME, $0-8
MOVD $·Fdatasync(SB), R8
MOVD R8, ret+0(FP)
RET
// THIS FILE IS GENERATED BY THE COMMAND AT THE TOP; DO NOT EDIT
TEXT ·get_fstatatAddr(SB), NOSPLIT|NOFRAME, $0-8
MOVD $·fstatat(SB), R8
MOVD R8, ret+0(FP)
RET
// THIS FILE IS GENERATED BY THE COMMAND AT THE TOP; DO NOT EDIT
TEXT ·get_LgetxattrAddr(SB), NOSPLIT|NOFRAME, $0-8
MOVD $·Lgetxattr(SB), R8
MOVD R8, ret+0(FP)
RET
// THIS FILE IS GENERATED BY THE COMMAND AT THE TOP; DO NOT EDIT
TEXT ·get_LsetxattrAddr(SB), NOSPLIT|NOFRAME, $0-8
MOVD $·Lsetxattr(SB), R8
MOVD R8, ret+0(FP)
RET
// THIS FILE IS GENERATED BY THE COMMAND AT THE TOP; DO NOT EDIT
TEXT ·get_FstatfsAddr(SB), NOSPLIT|NOFRAME, $0-8
MOVD $·Fstatfs(SB), R8
MOVD R8, ret+0(FP)
RET
// THIS FILE IS GENERATED BY THE COMMAND AT THE TOP; DO NOT EDIT
TEXT ·get_FutimesAddr(SB), NOSPLIT|NOFRAME, $0-8
MOVD $·Futimes(SB), R8
MOVD R8, ret+0(FP)
RET
// THIS FILE IS GENERATED BY THE COMMAND AT THE TOP; DO NOT EDIT
TEXT ·get_FutimesatAddr(SB), NOSPLIT|NOFRAME, $0-8
MOVD $·Futimesat(SB), R8
MOVD R8, ret+0(FP)
RET
// THIS FILE IS GENERATED BY THE COMMAND AT THE TOP; DO NOT EDIT
TEXT ·get_GetrandomAddr(SB), NOSPLIT|NOFRAME, $0-8
MOVD $·Getrandom(SB), R8
MOVD R8, ret+0(FP)
RET
// THIS FILE IS GENERATED BY THE COMMAND AT THE TOP; DO NOT EDIT
TEXT ·get_InotifyInitAddr(SB), NOSPLIT|NOFRAME, $0-8
MOVD $·InotifyInit(SB), R8
MOVD R8, ret+0(FP)
RET
// THIS FILE IS GENERATED BY THE COMMAND AT THE TOP; DO NOT EDIT
TEXT ·get_InotifyInit1Addr(SB), NOSPLIT|NOFRAME, $0-8
MOVD $·InotifyInit1(SB), R8
MOVD R8, ret+0(FP)
RET
// THIS FILE IS GENERATED BY THE COMMAND AT THE TOP; DO NOT EDIT
TEXT ·get_InotifyAddWatchAddr(SB), NOSPLIT|NOFRAME, $0-8
MOVD $·InotifyAddWatch(SB), R8
MOVD R8, ret+0(FP)
RET
// THIS FILE IS GENERATED BY THE COMMAND AT THE TOP; DO NOT EDIT
TEXT ·get_InotifyRmWatchAddr(SB), NOSPLIT|NOFRAME, $0-8
MOVD $·InotifyRmWatch(SB), R8
MOVD R8, ret+0(FP)
RET
// THIS FILE IS GENERATED BY THE COMMAND AT THE TOP; DO NOT EDIT
TEXT ·get_ListxattrAddr(SB), NOSPLIT|NOFRAME, $0-8
MOVD $·Listxattr(SB), R8
MOVD R8, ret+0(FP)
RET
// THIS FILE IS GENERATED BY THE COMMAND AT THE TOP; DO NOT EDIT
TEXT ·get_LlistxattrAddr(SB), NOSPLIT|NOFRAME, $0-8
MOVD $·Llistxattr(SB), R8
MOVD R8, ret+0(FP)
RET
// THIS FILE IS GENERATED BY THE COMMAND AT THE TOP; DO NOT EDIT
TEXT ·get_LremovexattrAddr(SB), NOSPLIT|NOFRAME, $0-8
MOVD $·Lremovexattr(SB), R8
MOVD R8, ret+0(FP)
RET
// THIS FILE IS GENERATED BY THE COMMAND AT THE TOP; DO NOT EDIT
TEXT ·get_LutimesAddr(SB), NOSPLIT|NOFRAME, $0-8
MOVD $·Lutimes(SB), R8
MOVD R8, ret+0(FP)
RET
// THIS FILE IS GENERATED BY THE COMMAND AT THE TOP; DO NOT EDIT
TEXT ·get_StatfsAddr(SB), NOSPLIT|NOFRAME, $0-8
MOVD $·Statfs(SB), R8
MOVD R8, ret+0(FP)
RET
// THIS FILE IS GENERATED BY THE COMMAND AT THE TOP; DO NOT EDIT
TEXT ·get_SyncfsAddr(SB), NOSPLIT|NOFRAME, $0-8
MOVD $·Syncfs(SB), R8
MOVD R8, ret+0(FP)
RET
// THIS FILE IS GENERATED BY THE COMMAND AT THE TOP; DO NOT EDIT
TEXT ·get_UnshareAddr(SB), NOSPLIT|NOFRAME, $0-8
MOVD $·Unshare(SB), R8
MOVD R8, ret+0(FP)
RET
// THIS FILE IS GENERATED BY THE COMMAND AT THE TOP; DO NOT EDIT
TEXT ·get_LinkatAddr(SB), NOSPLIT|NOFRAME, $0-8
MOVD $·Linkat(SB), R8
MOVD R8, ret+0(FP)
RET
// THIS FILE IS GENERATED BY THE COMMAND AT THE TOP; DO NOT EDIT
TEXT ·get_MkdiratAddr(SB), NOSPLIT|NOFRAME, $0-8
MOVD $·Mkdirat(SB), R8
MOVD R8, ret+0(FP)
RET
// THIS FILE IS GENERATED BY THE COMMAND AT THE TOP; DO NOT EDIT
TEXT ·get_MknodatAddr(SB), NOSPLIT|NOFRAME, $0-8
MOVD $·Mknodat(SB), R8
MOVD R8, ret+0(FP)
RET
// THIS FILE IS GENERATED BY THE COMMAND AT THE TOP; DO NOT EDIT
TEXT ·get_PivotRootAddr(SB), NOSPLIT|NOFRAME, $0-8
MOVD $·PivotRoot(SB), R8
MOVD R8, ret+0(FP)
RET
// THIS FILE IS GENERATED BY THE COMMAND AT THE TOP; DO NOT EDIT
TEXT ·get_PrctlAddr(SB), NOSPLIT|NOFRAME, $0-8
MOVD $·Prctl(SB), R8
MOVD R8, ret+0(FP)
RET
// THIS FILE IS GENERATED BY THE COMMAND AT THE TOP; DO NOT EDIT
TEXT ·get_PrlimitAddr(SB), NOSPLIT|NOFRAME, $0-8
MOVD $·Prlimit(SB), R8
MOVD R8, ret+0(FP)
RET
// THIS FILE IS GENERATED BY THE COMMAND AT THE TOP; DO NOT EDIT
TEXT ·get_RenameatAddr(SB), NOSPLIT|NOFRAME, $0-8
MOVD $·Renameat(SB), R8
MOVD R8, ret+0(FP)
RET
// THIS FILE IS GENERATED BY THE COMMAND AT THE TOP; DO NOT EDIT
TEXT ·get_Renameat2Addr(SB), NOSPLIT|NOFRAME, $0-8
MOVD $·Renameat2(SB), R8
MOVD R8, ret+0(FP)
RET
// THIS FILE IS GENERATED BY THE COMMAND AT THE TOP; DO NOT EDIT
TEXT ·get_SethostnameAddr(SB), NOSPLIT|NOFRAME, $0-8
MOVD $·Sethostname(SB), R8
MOVD R8, ret+0(FP)
RET
// THIS FILE IS GENERATED BY THE COMMAND AT THE TOP; DO NOT EDIT
TEXT ·get_SetnsAddr(SB), NOSPLIT|NOFRAME, $0-8
MOVD $·Setns(SB), R8
MOVD R8, ret+0(FP)
RET
// THIS FILE IS GENERATED BY THE COMMAND AT THE TOP; DO NOT EDIT
TEXT ·get_SymlinkatAddr(SB), NOSPLIT|NOFRAME, $0-8
MOVD $·Symlinkat(SB), R8
MOVD R8, ret+0(FP)
RET
// THIS FILE IS GENERATED BY THE COMMAND AT THE TOP; DO NOT EDIT
TEXT ·get_UnlinkatAddr(SB), NOSPLIT|NOFRAME, $0-8
MOVD $·Unlinkat(SB), R8
MOVD R8, ret+0(FP)
RET
// THIS FILE IS GENERATED BY THE COMMAND AT THE TOP; DO NOT EDIT
TEXT ·get_openatAddr(SB), NOSPLIT|NOFRAME, $0-8
MOVD $·openat(SB), R8
MOVD R8, ret+0(FP)
RET
// THIS FILE IS GENERATED BY THE COMMAND AT THE TOP; DO NOT EDIT
TEXT ·get_openat2Addr(SB), NOSPLIT|NOFRAME, $0-8
MOVD $·openat2(SB), R8
MOVD R8, ret+0(FP)
RET
// THIS FILE IS GENERATED BY THE COMMAND AT THE TOP; DO NOT EDIT
TEXT ·get_utimensatAddr(SB), NOSPLIT|NOFRAME, $0-8
MOVD $·utimensat(SB), R8
MOVD R8, ret+0(FP)
RET
vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/zsyscall_darwin_amd64.go
Generated Vendored
+33
View File
@@ -760,6 +760,39 @@ var libc_sysctl_trampoline_addr uintptr
// THIS FILE IS GENERATED BY THE COMMAND AT THE TOP; DO NOT EDIT
func pthread_chdir_np(path string) (err error) {
var _p0 *byte
_p0, err = BytePtrFromString(path)
if err != nil {
return
}
_, _, e1 := syscall_syscall(libc_pthread_chdir_np_trampoline_addr, uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(_p0)), 0, 0)
if e1 != 0 {
err = errnoErr(e1)
}
return
}
var libc_pthread_chdir_np_trampoline_addr uintptr
//go:cgo_import_dynamic libc_pthread_chdir_np pthread_chdir_np "/usr/lib/libSystem.B.dylib"
// THIS FILE IS GENERATED BY THE COMMAND AT THE TOP; DO NOT EDIT
func pthread_fchdir_np(fd int) (err error) {
_, _, e1 := syscall_syscall(libc_pthread_fchdir_np_trampoline_addr, uintptr(fd), 0, 0)
if e1 != 0 {
err = errnoErr(e1)
}
return
}
var libc_pthread_fchdir_np_trampoline_addr uintptr
//go:cgo_import_dynamic libc_pthread_fchdir_np pthread_fchdir_np "/usr/lib/libSystem.B.dylib"
// THIS FILE IS GENERATED BY THE COMMAND AT THE TOP; DO NOT EDIT
func sendfile(infd int, outfd int, offset int64, len *int64, hdtr unsafe.Pointer, flags int) (err error) {
_, _, e1 := syscall_syscall6(libc_sendfile_trampoline_addr, uintptr(infd), uintptr(outfd), uintptr(offset), uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(len)), uintptr(hdtr), uintptr(flags))
if e1 != 0 {
vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/zsyscall_darwin_amd64.s
Generated Vendored
+10
View File
@@ -228,6 +228,16 @@ TEXT libc_sysctl_trampoline<>(SB),NOSPLIT,$0-0
GLOBL ·libc_sysctl_trampoline_addr(SB), RODATA, $8
DATA ·libc_sysctl_trampoline_addr(SB)/8, $libc_sysctl_trampoline<>(SB)
TEXT libc_pthread_chdir_np_trampoline<>(SB),NOSPLIT,$0-0
JMP libc_pthread_chdir_np(SB)
GLOBL ·libc_pthread_chdir_np_trampoline_addr(SB), RODATA, $8
DATA ·libc_pthread_chdir_np_trampoline_addr(SB)/8, $libc_pthread_chdir_np_trampoline<>(SB)
TEXT libc_pthread_fchdir_np_trampoline<>(SB),NOSPLIT,$0-0
JMP libc_pthread_fchdir_np(SB)
GLOBL ·libc_pthread_fchdir_np_trampoline_addr(SB), RODATA, $8
DATA ·libc_pthread_fchdir_np_trampoline_addr(SB)/8, $libc_pthread_fchdir_np_trampoline<>(SB)
TEXT libc_sendfile_trampoline<>(SB),NOSPLIT,$0-0
JMP libc_sendfile(SB)
GLOBL ·libc_sendfile_trampoline_addr(SB), RODATA, $8
vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/zsyscall_darwin_arm64.go
Generated Vendored
+33
View File
@@ -760,6 +760,39 @@ var libc_sysctl_trampoline_addr uintptr
// THIS FILE IS GENERATED BY THE COMMAND AT THE TOP; DO NOT EDIT
func pthread_chdir_np(path string) (err error) {
var _p0 *byte
_p0, err = BytePtrFromString(path)
if err != nil {
return
}
_, _, e1 := syscall_syscall(libc_pthread_chdir_np_trampoline_addr, uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(_p0)), 0, 0)
if e1 != 0 {
err = errnoErr(e1)
}
return
}
var libc_pthread_chdir_np_trampoline_addr uintptr
//go:cgo_import_dynamic libc_pthread_chdir_np pthread_chdir_np "/usr/lib/libSystem.B.dylib"
// THIS FILE IS GENERATED BY THE COMMAND AT THE TOP; DO NOT EDIT
func pthread_fchdir_np(fd int) (err error) {
_, _, e1 := syscall_syscall(libc_pthread_fchdir_np_trampoline_addr, uintptr(fd), 0, 0)
if e1 != 0 {
err = errnoErr(e1)
}
return
}
var libc_pthread_fchdir_np_trampoline_addr uintptr
//go:cgo_import_dynamic libc_pthread_fchdir_np pthread_fchdir_np "/usr/lib/libSystem.B.dylib"
// THIS FILE IS GENERATED BY THE COMMAND AT THE TOP; DO NOT EDIT
func sendfile(infd int, outfd int, offset int64, len *int64, hdtr unsafe.Pointer, flags int) (err error) {
_, _, e1 := syscall_syscall6(libc_sendfile_trampoline_addr, uintptr(infd), uintptr(outfd), uintptr(offset), uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(len)), uintptr(hdtr), uintptr(flags))
if e1 != 0 {
vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/zsyscall_darwin_arm64.s
Generated Vendored
+10
View File
@@ -228,6 +228,16 @@ TEXT libc_sysctl_trampoline<>(SB),NOSPLIT,$0-0
GLOBL ·libc_sysctl_trampoline_addr(SB), RODATA, $8
DATA ·libc_sysctl_trampoline_addr(SB)/8, $libc_sysctl_trampoline<>(SB)
TEXT libc_pthread_chdir_np_trampoline<>(SB),NOSPLIT,$0-0
JMP libc_pthread_chdir_np(SB)
GLOBL ·libc_pthread_chdir_np_trampoline_addr(SB), RODATA, $8
DATA ·libc_pthread_chdir_np_trampoline_addr(SB)/8, $libc_pthread_chdir_np_trampoline<>(SB)
TEXT libc_pthread_fchdir_np_trampoline<>(SB),NOSPLIT,$0-0
JMP libc_pthread_fchdir_np(SB)
GLOBL ·libc_pthread_fchdir_np_trampoline_addr(SB), RODATA, $8
DATA ·libc_pthread_fchdir_np_trampoline_addr(SB)/8, $libc_pthread_fchdir_np_trampoline<>(SB)
TEXT libc_sendfile_trampoline<>(SB),NOSPLIT,$0-0
JMP libc_sendfile(SB)
GLOBL ·libc_sendfile_trampoline_addr(SB), RODATA, $8
vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/zsyscall_zos_s390x.go
Generated Vendored
+2521 -316
View File
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/zsysnum_linux_386.go
Generated Vendored
+5
View File
@@ -452,4 +452,9 @@ const (
SYS_FUTEX_WAKE = 454
SYS_FUTEX_WAIT = 455
SYS_FUTEX_REQUEUE = 456
SYS_STATMOUNT = 457
SYS_LISTMOUNT = 458
SYS_LSM_GET_SELF_ATTR = 459
SYS_LSM_SET_SELF_ATTR = 460
SYS_LSM_LIST_MODULES = 461
)
vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/zsysnum_linux_amd64.go
Generated Vendored
+5
View File
@@ -374,4 +374,9 @@ const (
SYS_FUTEX_WAKE = 454
SYS_FUTEX_WAIT = 455
SYS_FUTEX_REQUEUE = 456
SYS_STATMOUNT = 457
SYS_LISTMOUNT = 458
SYS_LSM_GET_SELF_ATTR = 459
SYS_LSM_SET_SELF_ATTR = 460
SYS_LSM_LIST_MODULES = 461
)
vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/zsysnum_linux_arm.go
Generated Vendored
+5
View File
@@ -416,4 +416,9 @@ const (
SYS_FUTEX_WAKE = 454
SYS_FUTEX_WAIT = 455
SYS_FUTEX_REQUEUE = 456
SYS_STATMOUNT = 457
SYS_LISTMOUNT = 458
SYS_LSM_GET_SELF_ATTR = 459
SYS_LSM_SET_SELF_ATTR = 460
SYS_LSM_LIST_MODULES = 461
)
vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/zsysnum_linux_arm64.go
Generated Vendored
+5
View File
@@ -319,4 +319,9 @@ const (
SYS_FUTEX_WAKE = 454
SYS_FUTEX_WAIT = 455
SYS_FUTEX_REQUEUE = 456
SYS_STATMOUNT = 457
SYS_LISTMOUNT = 458
SYS_LSM_GET_SELF_ATTR = 459
SYS_LSM_SET_SELF_ATTR = 460
SYS_LSM_LIST_MODULES = 461
)
vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/zsysnum_linux_loong64.go
Generated Vendored
+5
View File
@@ -313,4 +313,9 @@ const (
SYS_FUTEX_WAKE = 454
SYS_FUTEX_WAIT = 455
SYS_FUTEX_REQUEUE = 456
SYS_STATMOUNT = 457
SYS_LISTMOUNT = 458
SYS_LSM_GET_SELF_ATTR = 459
SYS_LSM_SET_SELF_ATTR = 460
SYS_LSM_LIST_MODULES = 461
)
vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/zsysnum_linux_mips.go
Generated Vendored
+5
View File
@@ -436,4 +436,9 @@ const (
SYS_FUTEX_WAKE = 4454
SYS_FUTEX_WAIT = 4455
SYS_FUTEX_REQUEUE = 4456
SYS_STATMOUNT = 4457
SYS_LISTMOUNT = 4458
SYS_LSM_GET_SELF_ATTR = 4459
SYS_LSM_SET_SELF_ATTR = 4460
SYS_LSM_LIST_MODULES = 4461
)
vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/zsysnum_linux_mips64.go
Generated Vendored
+5
View File
@@ -366,4 +366,9 @@ const (
SYS_FUTEX_WAKE = 5454
SYS_FUTEX_WAIT = 5455
SYS_FUTEX_REQUEUE = 5456
SYS_STATMOUNT = 5457
SYS_LISTMOUNT = 5458
SYS_LSM_GET_SELF_ATTR = 5459
SYS_LSM_SET_SELF_ATTR = 5460
SYS_LSM_LIST_MODULES = 5461
)
vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/zsysnum_linux_mips64le.go
Generated Vendored
+5
View File
@@ -366,4 +366,9 @@ const (
SYS_FUTEX_WAKE = 5454
SYS_FUTEX_WAIT = 5455
SYS_FUTEX_REQUEUE = 5456
SYS_STATMOUNT = 5457
SYS_LISTMOUNT = 5458
SYS_LSM_GET_SELF_ATTR = 5459
SYS_LSM_SET_SELF_ATTR = 5460
SYS_LSM_LIST_MODULES = 5461
)
vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/zsysnum_linux_mipsle.go
Generated Vendored
+5
View File
@@ -436,4 +436,9 @@ const (
SYS_FUTEX_WAKE = 4454
SYS_FUTEX_WAIT = 4455
SYS_FUTEX_REQUEUE = 4456
SYS_STATMOUNT = 4457
SYS_LISTMOUNT = 4458
SYS_LSM_GET_SELF_ATTR = 4459
SYS_LSM_SET_SELF_ATTR = 4460
SYS_LSM_LIST_MODULES = 4461
)
vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/zsysnum_linux_ppc.go
Generated Vendored
+5
View File
@@ -443,4 +443,9 @@ const (
SYS_FUTEX_WAKE = 454
SYS_FUTEX_WAIT = 455
SYS_FUTEX_REQUEUE = 456
SYS_STATMOUNT = 457
SYS_LISTMOUNT = 458
SYS_LSM_GET_SELF_ATTR = 459
SYS_LSM_SET_SELF_ATTR = 460
SYS_LSM_LIST_MODULES = 461
)
vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/zsysnum_linux_ppc64.go
Generated Vendored
+5
View File
@@ -415,4 +415,9 @@ const (
SYS_FUTEX_WAKE = 454
SYS_FUTEX_WAIT = 455
SYS_FUTEX_REQUEUE = 456
SYS_STATMOUNT = 457
SYS_LISTMOUNT = 458
SYS_LSM_GET_SELF_ATTR = 459
SYS_LSM_SET_SELF_ATTR = 460
SYS_LSM_LIST_MODULES = 461
)
vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/zsysnum_linux_ppc64le.go
Generated Vendored
+5
View File
@@ -415,4 +415,9 @@ const (
SYS_FUTEX_WAKE = 454
SYS_FUTEX_WAIT = 455
SYS_FUTEX_REQUEUE = 456
SYS_STATMOUNT = 457
SYS_LISTMOUNT = 458
SYS_LSM_GET_SELF_ATTR = 459
SYS_LSM_SET_SELF_ATTR = 460
SYS_LSM_LIST_MODULES = 461
)
vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/zsysnum_linux_riscv64.go
Generated Vendored
+5
View File
@@ -320,4 +320,9 @@ const (
SYS_FUTEX_WAKE = 454
SYS_FUTEX_WAIT = 455
SYS_FUTEX_REQUEUE = 456
SYS_STATMOUNT = 457
SYS_LISTMOUNT = 458
SYS_LSM_GET_SELF_ATTR = 459
SYS_LSM_SET_SELF_ATTR = 460
SYS_LSM_LIST_MODULES = 461
)
vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/zsysnum_linux_s390x.go
Generated Vendored
+5
View File
@@ -381,4 +381,9 @@ const (
SYS_FUTEX_WAKE = 454
SYS_FUTEX_WAIT = 455
SYS_FUTEX_REQUEUE = 456
SYS_STATMOUNT = 457
SYS_LISTMOUNT = 458
SYS_LSM_GET_SELF_ATTR = 459
SYS_LSM_SET_SELF_ATTR = 460
SYS_LSM_LIST_MODULES = 461
)
vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/zsysnum_linux_sparc64.go
Generated Vendored
+5
View File
@@ -394,4 +394,9 @@ const (
SYS_FUTEX_WAKE = 454
SYS_FUTEX_WAIT = 455
SYS_FUTEX_REQUEUE = 456
SYS_STATMOUNT = 457
SYS_LISTMOUNT = 458
SYS_LSM_GET_SELF_ATTR = 459
SYS_LSM_SET_SELF_ATTR = 460
SYS_LSM_LIST_MODULES = 461
)
vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/zsysnum_zos_s390x.go
Generated Vendored
+2845 -2662
View File
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/ztypes_linux.go
Generated Vendored
+50 -9
View File
@@ -1178,7 +1178,8 @@ const (
PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_TYPE_SAVE_SHIFT = 0x10
PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_HW_INDEX_SHIFT = 0x11
PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_PRIV_SAVE_SHIFT = 0x12
PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_MAX_SHIFT = 0x13
PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_COUNTERS = 0x80000
PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_MAX_SHIFT = 0x14
PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_USER = 0x1
PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_KERNEL = 0x2
PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_HV = 0x4
@@ -1198,7 +1199,7 @@ const (
PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_TYPE_SAVE = 0x10000
PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_HW_INDEX = 0x20000
PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_PRIV_SAVE = 0x40000
PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_MAX = 0x80000
PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_MAX = 0x100000
PERF_BR_UNKNOWN = 0x0
PERF_BR_COND = 0x1
PERF_BR_UNCOND = 0x2
@@ -2481,6 +2482,15 @@ type XDPMmapOffsets struct {
Cr XDPRingOffset
}
type XDPUmemReg struct {
Addr uint64
Len uint64
Chunk_size uint32
Headroom uint32
Flags uint32
Tx_metadata_len uint32
}
type XDPStatistics struct {
Rx_dropped uint64
Rx_invalid_descs uint64
@@ -2935,7 +2945,7 @@ const (
BPF_TCP_LISTEN = 0xa
BPF_TCP_CLOSING = 0xb
BPF_TCP_NEW_SYN_RECV = 0xc
BPF_TCP_MAX_STATES = 0xd
BPF_TCP_MAX_STATES = 0xe
TCP_BPF_IW = 0x3e9
TCP_BPF_SNDCWND_CLAMP = 0x3ea
TCP_BPF_DELACK_MAX = 0x3eb
@@ -3211,7 +3221,7 @@ const (
DEVLINK_CMD_LINECARD_NEW = 0x50
DEVLINK_CMD_LINECARD_DEL = 0x51
DEVLINK_CMD_SELFTESTS_GET = 0x52
DEVLINK_CMD_MAX = 0x53
DEVLINK_CMD_MAX = 0x54
DEVLINK_PORT_TYPE_NOTSET = 0x0
DEVLINK_PORT_TYPE_AUTO = 0x1
DEVLINK_PORT_TYPE_ETH = 0x2
@@ -4595,7 +4605,7 @@ const (
NL80211_ATTR_MAC_HINT = 0xc8
NL80211_ATTR_MAC_MASK = 0xd7
NL80211_ATTR_MAX_AP_ASSOC_STA = 0xca
NL80211_ATTR_MAX = 0x146
NL80211_ATTR_MAX = 0x14a
NL80211_ATTR_MAX_CRIT_PROT_DURATION = 0xb4
NL80211_ATTR_MAX_CSA_COUNTERS = 0xce
NL80211_ATTR_MAX_MATCH_SETS = 0x85
@@ -4861,7 +4871,7 @@ const (
NL80211_BSS_FREQUENCY_OFFSET = 0x14
NL80211_BSS_INFORMATION_ELEMENTS = 0x6
NL80211_BSS_LAST_SEEN_BOOTTIME = 0xf
NL80211_BSS_MAX = 0x16
NL80211_BSS_MAX = 0x18
NL80211_BSS_MLD_ADDR = 0x16
NL80211_BSS_MLO_LINK_ID = 0x15
NL80211_BSS_PAD = 0x10
@@ -4965,7 +4975,7 @@ const (
NL80211_CMD_LEAVE_IBSS = 0x2c
NL80211_CMD_LEAVE_MESH = 0x45
NL80211_CMD_LEAVE_OCB = 0x6d
NL80211_CMD_MAX = 0x9a
NL80211_CMD_MAX = 0x9b
NL80211_CMD_MICHAEL_MIC_FAILURE = 0x29
NL80211_CMD_MODIFY_LINK_STA = 0x97
NL80211_CMD_NAN_MATCH = 0x78
@@ -5199,7 +5209,7 @@ const (
NL80211_FREQUENCY_ATTR_GO_CONCURRENT = 0xf
NL80211_FREQUENCY_ATTR_INDOOR_ONLY = 0xe
NL80211_FREQUENCY_ATTR_IR_CONCURRENT = 0xf
NL80211_FREQUENCY_ATTR_MAX = 0x1c
NL80211_FREQUENCY_ATTR_MAX = 0x20
NL80211_FREQUENCY_ATTR_MAX_TX_POWER = 0x6
NL80211_FREQUENCY_ATTR_NO_10MHZ = 0x11
NL80211_FREQUENCY_ATTR_NO_160MHZ = 0xc
@@ -5693,7 +5703,7 @@ const (
NL80211_STA_FLAG_ASSOCIATED = 0x7
NL80211_STA_FLAG_AUTHENTICATED = 0x5
NL80211_STA_FLAG_AUTHORIZED = 0x1
NL80211_STA_FLAG_MAX = 0x7
NL80211_STA_FLAG_MAX = 0x8
NL80211_STA_FLAG_MAX_OLD_API = 0x6
NL80211_STA_FLAG_MFP = 0x4
NL80211_STA_FLAG_SHORT_PREAMBLE = 0x2
@@ -5991,3 +6001,34 @@ type CachestatRange struct {
Off uint64
Len uint64
}
const (
SK_MEMINFO_RMEM_ALLOC = 0x0
SK_MEMINFO_RCVBUF = 0x1
SK_MEMINFO_WMEM_ALLOC = 0x2
SK_MEMINFO_SNDBUF = 0x3
SK_MEMINFO_FWD_ALLOC = 0x4
SK_MEMINFO_WMEM_QUEUED = 0x5
SK_MEMINFO_OPTMEM = 0x6
SK_MEMINFO_BACKLOG = 0x7
SK_MEMINFO_DROPS = 0x8
SK_MEMINFO_VARS = 0x9
SKNLGRP_NONE = 0x0
SKNLGRP_INET_TCP_DESTROY = 0x1
SKNLGRP_INET_UDP_DESTROY = 0x2
SKNLGRP_INET6_TCP_DESTROY = 0x3
SKNLGRP_INET6_UDP_DESTROY = 0x4
SK_DIAG_BPF_STORAGE_REQ_NONE = 0x0
SK_DIAG_BPF_STORAGE_REQ_MAP_FD = 0x1
SK_DIAG_BPF_STORAGE_REP_NONE = 0x0
SK_DIAG_BPF_STORAGE = 0x1
SK_DIAG_BPF_STORAGE_NONE = 0x0
SK_DIAG_BPF_STORAGE_PAD = 0x1
SK_DIAG_BPF_STORAGE_MAP_ID = 0x2
SK_DIAG_BPF_STORAGE_MAP_VALUE = 0x3
)
type SockDiagReq struct {
Family uint8
Protocol uint8
}
vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/ztypes_linux_386.go
Generated Vendored
-8
View File
@@ -477,14 +477,6 @@ const (
BLKPG = 0x1269
)
type XDPUmemReg struct {
Addr uint64
Len uint64
Size uint32
Headroom uint32
Flags uint32
}
type CryptoUserAlg struct {
Name [64]int8
Driver_name [64]int8
vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/ztypes_linux_amd64.go
Generated Vendored
-9
View File
@@ -492,15 +492,6 @@ const (
BLKPG = 0x1269
)
type XDPUmemReg struct {
Addr uint64
Len uint64
Size uint32
Headroom uint32
Flags uint32
_ [4]byte
}
type CryptoUserAlg struct {
Name [64]int8
Driver_name [64]int8
vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/ztypes_linux_arm.go
Generated Vendored
-9
View File
@@ -470,15 +470,6 @@ const (
BLKPG = 0x1269
)
type XDPUmemReg struct {
Addr uint64
Len uint64
Size uint32
Headroom uint32
Flags uint32
_ [4]byte
}
type CryptoUserAlg struct {
Name [64]uint8
Driver_name [64]uint8
vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/ztypes_linux_arm64.go
Generated Vendored
-9
View File
@@ -471,15 +471,6 @@ const (
BLKPG = 0x1269
)
type XDPUmemReg struct {
Addr uint64
Len uint64
Size uint32
Headroom uint32
Flags uint32
_ [4]byte
}
type CryptoUserAlg struct {
Name [64]int8
Driver_name [64]int8
vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/ztypes_linux_loong64.go
Generated Vendored
-9
View File
@@ -472,15 +472,6 @@ const (
BLKPG = 0x1269
)
type XDPUmemReg struct {
Addr uint64
Len uint64
Size uint32
Headroom uint32
Flags uint32
_ [4]byte
}
type CryptoUserAlg struct {
Name [64]int8
Driver_name [64]int8
vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/ztypes_linux_mips.go
Generated Vendored
-9
View File
@@ -476,15 +476,6 @@ const (
BLKPG = 0x20001269
)
type XDPUmemReg struct {
Addr uint64
Len uint64
Size uint32
Headroom uint32
Flags uint32
_ [4]byte
}
type CryptoUserAlg struct {
Name [64]int8
Driver_name [64]int8
vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/ztypes_linux_mips64.go
Generated Vendored
-9
View File
@@ -474,15 +474,6 @@ const (
BLKPG = 0x20001269
)
type XDPUmemReg struct {
Addr uint64
Len uint64
Size uint32
Headroom uint32
Flags uint32
_ [4]byte
}
type CryptoUserAlg struct {
Name [64]int8
Driver_name [64]int8
vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/ztypes_linux_mips64le.go
Generated Vendored
-9
View File
@@ -474,15 +474,6 @@ const (
BLKPG = 0x20001269
)
type XDPUmemReg struct {
Addr uint64
Len uint64
Size uint32
Headroom uint32
Flags uint32
_ [4]byte
}
type CryptoUserAlg struct {
Name [64]int8
Driver_name [64]int8
vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/ztypes_linux_mipsle.go
Generated Vendored
-9
View File
@@ -476,15 +476,6 @@ const (
BLKPG = 0x20001269
)
type XDPUmemReg struct {
Addr uint64
Len uint64
Size uint32
Headroom uint32
Flags uint32
_ [4]byte
}
type CryptoUserAlg struct {
Name [64]int8
Driver_name [64]int8
vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/ztypes_linux_ppc.go
Generated Vendored
-9
View File
@@ -482,15 +482,6 @@ const (
BLKPG = 0x20001269
)
type XDPUmemReg struct {
Addr uint64
Len uint64
Size uint32
Headroom uint32
Flags uint32
_ [4]byte
}
type CryptoUserAlg struct {
Name [64]uint8
Driver_name [64]uint8
vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/ztypes_linux_ppc64.go
Generated Vendored
-9
View File
@@ -481,15 +481,6 @@ const (
BLKPG = 0x20001269
)
type XDPUmemReg struct {
Addr uint64
Len uint64
Size uint32
Headroom uint32
Flags uint32
_ [4]byte
}
type CryptoUserAlg struct {
Name [64]uint8
Driver_name [64]uint8
vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/ztypes_linux_ppc64le.go
Generated Vendored
-9
View File
@@ -481,15 +481,6 @@ const (
BLKPG = 0x20001269
)
type XDPUmemReg struct {
Addr uint64
Len uint64
Size uint32
Headroom uint32
Flags uint32
_ [4]byte
}
type CryptoUserAlg struct {
Name [64]uint8
Driver_name [64]uint8
vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/ztypes_linux_riscv64.go
Generated Vendored
-9
View File
@@ -499,15 +499,6 @@ const (
BLKPG = 0x1269
)
type XDPUmemReg struct {
Addr uint64
Len uint64
Size uint32
Headroom uint32
Flags uint32
_ [4]byte
}
type CryptoUserAlg struct {
Name [64]uint8
Driver_name [64]uint8
vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/ztypes_linux_s390x.go
Generated Vendored
-9
View File
@@ -495,15 +495,6 @@ const (
BLKPG = 0x1269
)
type XDPUmemReg struct {
Addr uint64
Len uint64
Size uint32
Headroom uint32
Flags uint32
_ [4]byte
}
type CryptoUserAlg struct {
Name [64]int8
Driver_name [64]int8
vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/ztypes_linux_sparc64.go
Generated Vendored
-9
View File
@@ -476,15 +476,6 @@ const (
BLKPG = 0x20001269
)
type XDPUmemReg struct {
Addr uint64
Len uint64
Size uint32
Headroom uint32
Flags uint32
_ [4]byte
}
type CryptoUserAlg struct {
Name [64]int8
Driver_name [64]int8
vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/ztypes_zos_s390x.go
Generated Vendored
+139 -7
View File
@@ -25,10 +25,13 @@ const (
SizeofIPv6Mreq = 20
SizeofICMPv6Filter = 32
SizeofIPv6MTUInfo = 32
SizeofInet4Pktinfo = 8
SizeofInet6Pktinfo = 20
SizeofLinger = 8
SizeofSockaddrInet4 = 16
SizeofSockaddrInet6 = 28
SizeofTCPInfo = 0x68
SizeofUcred = 12
)
type (
@@ -69,12 +72,17 @@ type Utimbuf struct {
}
type Utsname struct {
Sysname [65]byte
Nodename [65]byte
Release [65]byte
Version [65]byte
Machine [65]byte
Domainname [65]byte
Sysname [16]byte
Nodename [32]byte
Release [8]byte
Version [8]byte
Machine [16]byte
}
type Ucred struct {
Pid int32
Uid uint32
Gid uint32
}
type RawSockaddrInet4 struct {
@@ -325,7 +333,7 @@ type Statvfs_t struct {
}
type Statfs_t struct {
Type uint32
Type uint64
Bsize uint64
Blocks uint64
Bfree uint64
@@ -336,6 +344,7 @@ type Statfs_t struct {
Namelen uint64
Frsize uint64
Flags uint64
_ [4]uint64
}
type direntLE struct {
@@ -412,3 +421,126 @@ type W_Mntent struct {
Quiesceowner [8]byte
_ [38]byte
}
type EpollEvent struct {
Events uint32
_ int32
Fd int32
Pad int32
}
type InotifyEvent struct {
Wd int32
Mask uint32
Cookie uint32
Len uint32
Name string
}
const (
SizeofInotifyEvent = 0x10
)
type ConsMsg2 struct {
Cm2Format uint16
Cm2R1 uint16
Cm2Msglength uint32
Cm2Msg *byte
Cm2R2 [4]byte
Cm2R3 [4]byte
Cm2Routcde *uint32
Cm2Descr *uint32
Cm2Msgflag uint32
Cm2Token uint32
Cm2Msgid *uint32
Cm2R4 [4]byte
Cm2DomToken uint32
Cm2DomMsgid *uint32
Cm2ModCartptr *byte
Cm2ModConsidptr *byte
Cm2MsgCart [8]byte
Cm2MsgConsid [4]byte
Cm2R5 [12]byte
}
const (
CC_modify = 1
CC_stop = 2
CONSOLE_FORMAT_2 = 2
CONSOLE_FORMAT_3 = 3
CONSOLE_HRDCPY = 0x80000000
)
type OpenHow struct {
Flags uint64
Mode uint64
Resolve uint64
}
const SizeofOpenHow = 0x18
const (
RESOLVE_CACHED = 0x20
RESOLVE_BENEATH = 0x8
RESOLVE_IN_ROOT = 0x10
RESOLVE_NO_MAGICLINKS = 0x2
RESOLVE_NO_SYMLINKS = 0x4
RESOLVE_NO_XDEV = 0x1
)
type Siginfo struct {
Signo int32
Errno int32
Code int32
Pid int32
Uid uint32
_ [44]byte
}
type SysvIpcPerm struct {
Uid uint32
Gid uint32
Cuid uint32
Cgid uint32
Mode int32
}
type SysvShmDesc struct {
Perm SysvIpcPerm
_ [4]byte
Lpid int32
Cpid int32
Nattch uint32
_ [4]byte
_ [4]byte
_ [4]byte
_ int32
_ uint8
_ uint8
_ uint16
_ *byte
Segsz uint64
Atime Time_t
Dtime Time_t
Ctime Time_t
}
type SysvShmDesc64 struct {
Perm SysvIpcPerm
_ [4]byte
Lpid int32
Cpid int32
Nattch uint32
_ [4]byte
_ [4]byte
_ [4]byte
_ int32
_ byte
_ uint8
_ uint16
_ *byte
Segsz uint64
Atime int64
Dtime int64
Ctime int64
}
vendor/golang.org/x/sys/windows/aliases.go
Generated Vendored
+1 -1
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
//go:build windows && go1.9
//go:build windows
package windows
vendor/golang.org/x/sys/windows/empty.s
Generated Vendored
-8
View File
@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
// Copyright 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
//go:build !go1.12
// This file is here to allow bodyless functions with go:linkname for Go 1.11
// and earlier (see https://golang.org/issue/23311).
vendor/golang.org/x/sys/windows/security_windows.go
Generated Vendored
+24 -1
View File
@@ -68,6 +68,7 @@ type UserInfo10 struct {
//sys NetUserGetInfo(serverName *uint16, userName *uint16, level uint32, buf **byte) (neterr error) = netapi32.NetUserGetInfo
//sys NetGetJoinInformation(server *uint16, name **uint16, bufType *uint32) (neterr error) = netapi32.NetGetJoinInformation
//sys NetApiBufferFree(buf *byte) (neterr error) = netapi32.NetApiBufferFree
//sys NetUserEnum(serverName *uint16, level uint32, filter uint32, buf **byte, prefMaxLen uint32, entriesRead *uint32, totalEntries *uint32, resumeHandle *uint32) (neterr error) = netapi32.NetUserEnum
const (
// do not reorder
@@ -893,7 +894,7 @@ type ACL struct {
aclRevision byte
sbz1 byte
aclSize uint16
aceCount uint16
AceCount uint16
sbz2 uint16
}
@@ -1086,6 +1087,27 @@ type EXPLICIT_ACCESS struct {
Trustee TRUSTEE
}
// https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/winnt/ns-winnt-ace_header
type ACE_HEADER struct {
AceType uint8
AceFlags uint8
AceSize uint16
}
// https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/winnt/ns-winnt-access_allowed_ace
type ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE struct {
Header ACE_HEADER
Mask ACCESS_MASK
SidStart uint32
}
const (
// Constants for AceType
// https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/winnt/ns-winnt-ace_header
ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE_TYPE = 0
ACCESS_DENIED_ACE_TYPE = 1
)
// This type is the union inside of TRUSTEE and must be created using one of the TrusteeValueFrom* functions.
type TrusteeValue uintptr
@@ -1157,6 +1179,7 @@ type OBJECTS_AND_NAME struct {
//sys makeSelfRelativeSD(absoluteSD *SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR, selfRelativeSD *SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR, selfRelativeSDSize *uint32) (err error) = advapi32.MakeSelfRelativeSD
//sys setEntriesInAcl(countExplicitEntries uint32, explicitEntries *EXPLICIT_ACCESS, oldACL *ACL, newACL **ACL) (ret error) = advapi32.SetEntriesInAclW
//sys GetAce(acl *ACL, aceIndex uint32, pAce **ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE) (ret error) = advapi32.GetAce
// Control returns the security descriptor control bits.
func (sd *SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR) Control() (control SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR_CONTROL, revision uint32, err error) {
vendor/golang.org/x/sys/windows/zsyscall_windows.go
Generated Vendored
+18
View File
@@ -91,6 +91,7 @@ var (
procEnumServicesStatusExW = modadvapi32.NewProc("EnumServicesStatusExW")
procEqualSid = modadvapi32.NewProc("EqualSid")
procFreeSid = modadvapi32.NewProc("FreeSid")
procGetAce = modadvapi32.NewProc("GetAce")
procGetLengthSid = modadvapi32.NewProc("GetLengthSid")
procGetNamedSecurityInfoW = modadvapi32.NewProc("GetNamedSecurityInfoW")
procGetSecurityDescriptorControl = modadvapi32.NewProc("GetSecurityDescriptorControl")
@@ -401,6 +402,7 @@ var (
procTransmitFile = modmswsock.NewProc("TransmitFile")
procNetApiBufferFree = modnetapi32.NewProc("NetApiBufferFree")
procNetGetJoinInformation = modnetapi32.NewProc("NetGetJoinInformation")
procNetUserEnum = modnetapi32.NewProc("NetUserEnum")
procNetUserGetInfo = modnetapi32.NewProc("NetUserGetInfo")
procNtCreateFile = modntdll.NewProc("NtCreateFile")
procNtCreateNamedPipeFile = modntdll.NewProc("NtCreateNamedPipeFile")
@@ -1223,6 +1225,14 @@ func setEntriesInAcl(countExplicitEntries uint32, explicitEntries *EXPLICIT_ACCE
return
}
func GetAce(acl *ACL, aceIndex uint32, pAce **ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE) (ret error) {
r0, _, _ := syscall.Syscall(procGetAce.Addr(), 3, uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(acl)), uintptr(aceIndex), uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(pAce)))
if r0 == 0 {
ret = GetLastError()
}
return
}
func SetKernelObjectSecurity(handle Handle, securityInformation SECURITY_INFORMATION, securityDescriptor *SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR) (err error) {
r1, _, e1 := syscall.Syscall(procSetKernelObjectSecurity.Addr(), 3, uintptr(handle), uintptr(securityInformation), uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(securityDescriptor)))
if r1 == 0 {
@@ -3486,6 +3496,14 @@ func NetGetJoinInformation(server *uint16, name **uint16, bufType *uint32) (nete
return
}
func NetUserEnum(serverName *uint16, level uint32, filter uint32, buf **byte, prefMaxLen uint32, entriesRead *uint32, totalEntries *uint32, resumeHandle *uint32) (neterr error) {
r0, _, _ := syscall.Syscall9(procNetUserEnum.Addr(), 8, uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(serverName)), uintptr(level), uintptr(filter), uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(buf)), uintptr(prefMaxLen), uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(entriesRead)), uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(totalEntries)), uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(resumeHandle)), 0)
if r0 != 0 {
neterr = syscall.Errno(r0)
}
return
}
func NetUserGetInfo(serverName *uint16, userName *uint16, level uint32, buf **byte) (neterr error) {
r0, _, _ := syscall.Syscall6(procNetUserGetInfo.Addr(), 4, uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(serverName)), uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(userName)), uintptr(level), uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(buf)), 0, 0)
if r0 != 0 {
vendor/modules.txt
Vendored
+3 -3
View File
@@ -24,8 +24,8 @@ github.com/coreos/go-systemd/v22/dbus
# github.com/cpuguy83/go-md2man/v2 v2.0.2
## explicit; go 1.11
github.com/cpuguy83/go-md2man/v2/md2man
# github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin v0.2.4
## explicit; go 1.13
# github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin v0.3.1
## explicit; go 1.20
github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin
# github.com/docker/go-units v0.5.0
## explicit
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ golang.org/x/exp/slices
# golang.org/x/net v0.24.0
## explicit; go 1.18
golang.org/x/net/bpf
# golang.org/x/sys v0.19.0
# golang.org/x/sys v0.22.0
## explicit; go 1.18
golang.org/x/sys/execabs
golang.org/x/sys/unix