Since Go 1.23 is no longer supported, we should not use it.
Go 1.23 is still supported and is probably the best bet for
the release-1.2 branch.
Signed-off-by: Kir Kolyshkin <kolyshkin@gmail.com>
This is to ensure that Go version in Dockerfile (which is used to build
release binaries) is:
- currently supported;
- used in CI tests.
Signed-off-by: Kir Kolyshkin <kolyshkin@gmail.com>
(cherry picked from commit df4acc8867)
Signed-off-by: Kir Kolyshkin <kolyshkin@gmail.com>
For some reason, some jobs in .github/workflows/validate.yml
have "fetch-depth: 0" argument to actions/checkout, meaning
"all history for all branches and tags". Obviously this is
not needed here.
Signed-off-by: Kir Kolyshkin <kolyshkin@gmail.com>
(cherry picked from commit e0b00171eb0f338cf024760019abdd4e7dec690f)
Signed-off-by: Kir Kolyshkin <kolyshkin@gmail.com>
(cherry picked from commit 0200ccb53d9265c43f203fb98a9862407835eb23)
Signed-off-by: Kir Kolyshkin <kolyshkin@gmail.com>
On some systems (e.g., AlmaLinux 8), systemd automatically removes cgroup paths
when they become empty (i.e., contain no processes). To prevent this, we spawn
a dummy process to pin the cgroup in place.
Fix: https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/issues/5003
Signed-off-by: lifubang <lifubang@acmcoder.com>
(cherry picked from commit bba7647d09)
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
This will result in slower runs but we are having issues with
golangci-lint (false positives) that are most probably related
to caching.
Signed-off-by: Kir Kolyshkin <kolyshkin@gmail.com>
(cherry picked from commit 96dfa9de54)
Signed-off-by: Kir Kolyshkin <kolyshkin@gmail.com>
This was always the intended behaviour but commit 72fbb34f50 ("rootfs:
switch to fd-based handling of mountpoint targets") regressed it when
adding a mechanism to create a file handle to the target if it didn't
already exist (causing the later stat to always succeed).
A lot of people depend on this functionality, so add some tests to make
sure we don't break it in the future.
Fixes: 72fbb34f50 ("rootfs: switch to fd-based handling of mountpoint targets")
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
(cherry picked from commit 9a9719eeb4)
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
This new version includes the fixes for CVE-2025-52881, so we can remove
the internal/third_party copy of the library we added in commit
ed6b1693b8 ("selinux: use safe procfs API for labels") as well as the
"replace" directive in go.mod (which is problematic for "go get"
installs).
Fixes: ed6b1693b8 ("selinux: use safe procfs API for labels")
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
(cherry picked from commit 96f1962f91)
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
On MIPS arches, Rdev is uint32 so we have to convert it.
Fixes issue 4962.
Fixes: 8476df83 ("libct: add/use isDevNull, verifyDevNull")
Fixes: de87203e ("console: verify /dev/pts/ptmx before use")
Fixes: 398955bc ("console: add fallback for pre-TIOCGPTPEER kernels")
Reported-by: Tianon Gravi <admwiggin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kir Kolyshkin <kolyshkin@gmail.com>
(cherry picked from commit 1b954f1f06)
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Aleksa Sarai (24):
VERSION: back to development
VERSION: release v1.3.3
rootfs: re-allow dangling symlinks in mount targets
openat2: improve resilience on busy systems
selinux: use safe procfs API for labels
rootfs: switch to fd-based handling of mountpoint targets
libct/system: use securejoin for /proc/$pid/stat
init: use securejoin for /proc/self/setgroups
init: write sysctls using safe procfs API
utils: remove unneeded EnsureProcHandle
utils: use safe procfs for /proc/self/fd loop code
apparmor: use safe procfs API for labels
ci: add lint to forbid the usage of os.Create
rootfs: avoid using os.Create for new device inodes
internal: add wrappers for securejoin.Proc*
go.mod: update to github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin@v0.5.0
console: verify /dev/pts/ptmx before use
console: avoid trivial symlink attacks for /dev/console
console: add fallback for pre-TIOCGPTPEER kernels
console: use TIOCGPTPEER when allocating peer PTY
*: switch to safer securejoin.Reopen
internal: move utils.MkdirAllInRoot to internal/pathrs
internal/sys: add VerifyInode helper
internal: linux: add package doc-comment
Li Fubang (1):
libct: align param type for mountCgroupV1/V2 functions
Kir Kolyshkin (3):
libct: maskPaths: don't rely on ENOTDIR for mount
libct: maskPaths: only ignore ENOENT on mount dest
libct: add/use isDevNull, verifyDevNull
Fixes: CVE-2025-31133 GHSA-9493-h29p-rfm2
Fixes: CVE-2025-52565 GHSA-qw9x-cqr3-wc7r
Fixes: CVE-2025-52881 GHSA-cgrx-mc8f-2prm
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Aleksa Sarai (22):
rootfs: re-allow dangling symlinks in mount targets
openat2: improve resilience on busy systems
selinux: use safe procfs API for labels
rootfs: switch to fd-based handling of mountpoint targets
libct/system: use securejoin for /proc/$pid/stat
init: use securejoin for /proc/self/setgroups
init: write sysctls using safe procfs API
utils: remove unneeded EnsureProcHandle
utils: use safe procfs for /proc/self/fd loop code
apparmor: use safe procfs API for labels
ci: add lint to forbid the usage of os.Create
rootfs: avoid using os.Create for new device inodes
internal: add wrappers for securejoin.Proc*
go.mod: update to github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin@v0.5.0
console: verify /dev/pts/ptmx before use
console: avoid trivial symlink attacks for /dev/console
console: add fallback for pre-TIOCGPTPEER kernels
console: use TIOCGPTPEER when allocating peer PTY
*: switch to safer securejoin.Reopen
internal: move utils.MkdirAllInRoot to internal/pathrs
internal/sys: add VerifyInode helper
internal: linux: add package doc-comment
Li Fubang (1):
libct: align param type for mountCgroupV1/V2 functions
Kir Kolyshkin (3):
libct: maskPaths: don't rely on ENOTDIR for mount
libct: maskPaths: only ignore ENOENT on mount dest
libct: add/use isDevNull, verifyDevNull
Fixes: CVE-2025-31133 GHSA-9493-h29p-rfm2
Fixes: CVE-2025-52565 GHSA-qw9x-cqr3-wc7r
Fixes: CVE-2025-52881 GHSA-cgrx-mc8f-2prm
Reported-by: Lei Wang <ssst0n3@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Li Fubang <lifubang@acmcoder.com>
Reported-by: Tõnis Tiigi <tonistiigi@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
It seems there are a fair few images where dangling symlinks are used as
path components for mount targets, which pathrs-lite does not support
(and it would be difficult to fully support this in a race-free way).
This was actually meant to be blocked by commit 63c2908164 ("rootfs:
try to scope MkdirAll to stay inside the rootfs"), followed by commit
dd827f7b71 ("utils: switch to securejoin.MkdirAllHandle"). However, we
still used SecureJoin to construct mountpoint targets, which means that
dangling symlinks were "resolved" before reaching pathrs-lite.
This patch basically re-adds this hack in order to reduce the breakages
we've seen so far.
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Previously, we would see a ~3% failure rate when starting containers
with mounts that contain ".." (which can trigger -EAGAIN). To counteract
this, filepath-securejoin v0.5.1 includes a bump of the internal retry
limit from 32 to 128, which lowers the failure rate to 0.12%.
However, there is still a risk of spurious failure on regular systems.
In order to try to provide more resilience (while avoiding DoS attacks),
this patch also includes an additional retry loop that terminates based
on a deadline rather than retry count. The deadline is 2ms, as my
testing found that ~800us for a single pathrs operation was the longest
latency due to -EAGAIN retries, and that was an outlier compared to the
more common ~400us latencies -- so 2ms should be more than enough for
any real system.
The failure rates above were based on more 50k runs of runc with an
attack script (from libpathrs) running a rename attack on all cores of a
16-core system, which is arguably a worst-case but heavily utilised
servers could likely approach similar results.
Tested-by: Phil Estes <estesp@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
openSUSE has an unfortunate default udev setup which forcefully sets all
loop devices to use the "none" scheduler, even if you manually set it.
As this is a property of the host configuration (and udev is monitoring
from the host) we cannot really change this behaviour from inside our
test container.
So we should just skip the test in this (hopefully unusual) case.
Ideally tools running the test suite should disable this behaviour when
running our test suite.
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
(cherry picked from commit e6b4b5a128)
Signed-off-by: Kir Kolyshkin <kolyshkin@gmail.com>
If an error occurs during a test which sets up loopback devices, the
loopback device is not freed. Since most systems have very conservative
limits on the number of loopback devices, re-running a failing test
locally to debug it often ends up erroring out due to loopback device
exhaustion.
So let's just move the "losetup -d" to teardown, where it belongs.
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
(cherry picked from commit ceef984fb3)
Signed-off-by: Kir Kolyshkin <kolyshkin@gmail.com>
Apparently, having a minor of 0 does not always mean it's the
whole device (not a partition):
=== /proc/partitions (using major: 259) ===
major minor #blocks name
8 16 78643200 sdb
8 17 77593583 sdb1
8 30 4096 sdb14
8 31 108544 sdb15
259 0 934912 sdb16
8 0 78643200 sda
8 1 78641152 sda1
Rewrite the test to not assume minor is 0, and use
lsblk -d to find out whole devices.
This fixes a test case which was added in commit 7696402da.
Signed-off-by: Kir Kolyshkin <kolyshkin@gmail.com>
(cherry picked from commit 46dac589c1)
Signed-off-by: Kir Kolyshkin <kolyshkin@gmail.com>
In case there's a duplicate in the device list, the latter entry
overrides the former one.
So, we need to modify the last entry, not the first one. To do that,
use slices.Backward.
Amend the test case to test the fix.
Reported-by: lifubang <lifubang@acmcoder.com>
Signed-off-by: Kir Kolyshkin <kolyshkin@gmail.com>
(cherry picked from commit 0b01dccfbb)
Signed-off-by: Kir Kolyshkin <kolyshkin@gmail.com>
This support was missing from runc, and thus the example from the
podman-update wasn't working.
To fix, introduce a function to either update or insert new weights and iops.
Add integration tests.
Signed-off-by: Kir Kolyshkin <kolyshkin@gmail.com>
(cherry picked from commit 7696402dac)
Signed-off-by: Kir Kolyshkin <kolyshkin@gmail.com>
All the new code appears in main (not in the release branches),
and we only want extra linter rules to apply to new code.
Disable lint-extra job if the PR is not to the main branch.
Signed-off-by: Kir Kolyshkin <kolyshkin@gmail.com>
(cherry picked from commit 1c4dba693f)
Signed-off-by: lifubang <lifubang@acmcoder.com>
Since gofumpt v0.9.0 there's a new formatting rule to "clothe" any naked
returns.
Signed-off-by: Kir Kolyshkin <kolyshkin@gmail.com>
(cherry picked from commit b2f8a74de5)
Signed-off-by: lifubang <lifubang@acmcoder.com>
Due to the sensitive nature of these fixes, it was not possible to
submit these upstream and vendor the upstream library. Instead, this
patch uses a fork of github.com/opencontainers/selinux, branched at
commit opencontainers/selinux@879a755db5.
In order to permit downstreams to build with this patched version, a
snapshot of the forked version has been included in
internal/third_party/selinux. Note that since we use "go mod vendor",
the patched code is usable even without being "go get"-able. Once the
embargo for this issue is lifted we can submit the patches upstream and
switch back to a proper upstream go.mod entry.
Also, this requires us to temporarily disable the CI job we have that
disallows "replace" directives.
Fixes: GHSA-cgrx-mc8f-2prm CVE-2025-52881
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
An attacker could race with us during mount configuration in order to
trick us into mounting over an unexpected path. This would bypass
checkProcMount() and would allow for security profiles to be left
unapplied by mounting over /proc/self/attr/... (or even more serious
outcomes such as killing the entire system by tricking runc into writing
strings to /proc/sysrq-trigger).
This is a larger issue with our current mount infrastructure, and the
ideal solution would be to rewrite it all to be fd-based (which would
also allow us to support the "new" mount API, which also avoids a bunch
of other issues with mount(8)). However, such a rewrite is not really
workable as a security fix, so this patch is a bit of a compromise
approach to fix the issue while also moving us a bit towards that
eventual end-goal.
The core issue in CVE-2025-52881 is that we currently use the (insecure)
SecureJoin to re-resolve mountpoint target paths multiple times during
mounting. Rather than generating a string from createMountpoint(), we
instead open an *os.File handle to the target mountpoint directly and
then operate on that handle. This will make it easier to remove
utils.WithProcfd() and rework mountViaFds() in the future.
The only real issue we need to work around is that we need to re-open
the mount target after doing the mount in order to get a handle to the
mountpoint -- pathrs.Reopen() doesn't work in this case (it just
re-opens the inode under the mountpoint) so we need to do a naive
re-open using the full path. Note that if we used move_mount(2) this
wouldn't be a problem because we would have a handle to the mountpoint
itself.
Note that this is still somewhat of a temporary solution -- ideally
mountViaFds would use *os.File directly to let us avoid some other
issues with using bare /proc/... paths, as well as also letting us more
easily use the new mount API on modern kernels.
Fixes: GHSA-cgrx-mc8f-2prm CVE-2025-52881
Co-developed-by: lifubang <lifubang@acmcoder.com>
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
sysctls could in principle also be used as a write gadget for arbitrary
procfs files. As this requires getting a non-subset=pid /proc handle we
amortise this by only allocating a single procfs handle for all sysctl
writes.
Fixes: GHSA-cgrx-mc8f-2prm CVE-2025-52881
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
All of the callers of EnsureProcHandle now use filepath-securejoin's
ProcThreadSelf to get a file handle, which has much stricter
verification to avoid procfs attacks than EnsureProcHandle's very
simplistic filesystem type check.
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
From a safety perspective this might not be strictly required, but it
paves the way for us to remove utils.ProcThreadSelf.
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
EnsureProcHandle only protects us against a tmpfs mount, but the risk of
a procfs path being used (such as /proc/self/sched) has been known for a
while. Now that filepath-securejoin has a reasonably safe procfs API,
switch to it.
Fixes: GHSA-cgrx-mc8f-2prm CVE-2025-52881
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
os.Create is shorthand for open(O_CREAT|O_TRUNC) *without* O_EXCL, which
is incredibly unsafe for us to do when interacting with a container
rootfs (especially before pivot_root) as an attacker could swap the
target path with a symlink that points to the host filesystem, causing
us to delete the contents of or create host files.
We did have a similar bug in CVE-2024-45310, but in that case we
(luckily) didn't have O_TRUNC set which avoided the worst possible case.
However, os.Create does set O_TRUNC and we were using it in scenarios
that may have been exploitable.
Because of how easy it us for us to accidentally introduce this kind of
bug, we should simply not allow the usage of os.Create in our entire
codebase.
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
If an attacker were to make the target of a device inode creation be a
symlink to some host path, os.Create would happily truncate the target
which could lead to all sorts of issues. This exploit is probably not as
exploitable because device inodes are usually only bind-mounted for
rootless containers, which cannot overwrite important host files (though
user files would still be up for grabs).
The regular inode creation logic could also theoretically be tricked
into changing the access mode and ownership of host files if the
newly-created device inode was swapped with a symlink to a host path.
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
lifubang